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source: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxiv/zl.html 380. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State/1/ Lagos, April 13, 1967, 1723Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis (Noforn except British). Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, London, Accra, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, USIA, DOD, NSA, AND CIA. 8088. Ref: Lagos 7981/2/ and 8039./3/ /2/Dated April 11. (Ibid., POL 23-9 NIGERIA) See footnote 2, Document 379. /3/Telegram 8039 from Lagos, April 12, transmitted Mathews' estimate that Ojukwu would probably seek early independence, but that the East would probably submit quickly if foreign governments complied with FMG economic measures and otherwise continued to support Nigerian unity. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA) 1. I talked almost hour with Gowan and PermRep Extaff Ogbu this noon. 2. Re visit to Ojukwu, I reported he reiterated opposition to Decree No. 8, expressed doubt as to utility SMC meeting but did not say would not attend if Ghanaians able to arrange. Seemed to realize and discount that if East seceded prospects for early international recognition would not be good and took generally pessimistic and hard line re prospects for Nigerian unity. 3. I then asked Gowan how he saw future. He responded that in view increasing intransigence of and provocation by Ojukwu he did not believe SMC meeting would be productive. He was however willing make another attempt and would attend meeting arranged by Ghanaians. He thought this would take place in relatively near future and all members SMC would be present. He dismissed participation other African heads of state. I expressed hope that despite gloomy prospects meeting would be successful. 4. Gowan said bitterly that East continuing to import arms and in view population pressure probably planning to expand North and West. He cited China as parallel. I expressed doubt that East had military capability seriously to contemplate such course. He agreed this true now but if permitted Ojukwu would continue military buildup for future effort. 5. I asked Gowan whether he thought Ojukwu would soon issue formal declaration of secession or independence. Gowan talked around this question, but gist of his remarks was he thought it more likely Ojukwu would continue for time being to move toward de facto independence. Gowan reiterated that it was his responsibility to prevent Ojukwu from breaking up Nigeria and that FMG would have curb East. I commented that I assumed he had only economic measures in mind and urged him to avoid measures that would do lasting damage to Nigerian economy. Gowan nodded assent. 6. Gowan went on to say that except for Ojukwu and some other Ibos, all Nigerians wanted to remain together in one country. This definitely included minority tribes in East who "did not want to be left alone with Ibos." He had therefore been considering various ways of meeting wishes of most Nigerians. He had thought of possible course of action which he might adopt if upcoming SMC meeting proved abortive. He would then offer Ojukwu and Ibos option of seceding and establishing their own "little Switzerland" within Nigeria. From care with which Gowon led up to this and unusual precision of his language, and keen interest with which Ogbu listened and watched me, it was evident that they regarded this as major if not brilliant gambit. 7. I commented that this was new idea to me and asked whether his reference to Switzerland meant that he had in mind landlocked Iboland. He said yes. I wondered whether this move might not lead other Nigerian groups to seek similar independence along tribal lines and thus end in disintegration Nigeria which he wanted prevent. Gowon stoutly rejected this possibility. He said Ojukwu's intransigence and arrogance had dissipated sympathy which most Nigerians had had for Ibos after events of last year. Other Nigerians now swinging to view there no living with Ibos and if they want to go let them, but without Eastern minorities. 8. I said I strongly hoped it would not be necessary to take such radical step, and urged that every effort be made to find other solution at SMC meeting. 9. Foregoing interview has not caused me to change analysis in Lagos 8039. Only new element is Gowon's Iboland idea which Ojukwu would reject out of hand. As psychological warfare ploy, however, it could mobilize anti-Ibo sentiments of many Nigerians and increase Ojukwo's problems in Eastern minority areas. Mathews
381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria/1/ Washington, April 14, 1967, 2:34 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Melbourne on April 13 and approved by Trimble. Repeated to London, Accra, Enugu, Ibadan, Kaduna and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 175217. Ref: Lagos 8039./2/ Nigerian Crisis. /2/See footnote 3, Document 380. 1. Assessment has received careful study and Department accepts substance of evaluation concerning likelihood East's and Ojukwu's intentions as given in first 4 paras. However, some reservations arise here in weighing effect of Eastern secession on rest of country and possible success of economic sanctions against East. Divisive elements in other Nigerian regions could erupt within measurable time after secession by East. Department uncertain that continuing foreign recognition of FMG would alone suffice to deter serious internal trouble while FMG seeks to bring East to heel by economic means. Also less certain that East would collapse within six months or longer. 2. It has been consensus of Department and Embassy that Nigerian association could only be maintained by mutual agreement of regions. It highly questionable whether one region could be coerced by others to remain in association. Department considers severe economic sanctions would only feed Eastern flames at time when FMG does not present convincing picture of its ability effectively and unitedly to press toward envisaged goal. In view stage crisis has reached, believe it would be most useful if Embassy and UK HICOM could discuss and evaluate situation and for Embassy to report extent of common conclusions. 3. Because of developments, prospects for SMC meeting to include Ojukwu would appear bleak, wherever held and under whatever auspices. Department considers only prospect now is Ghanaians who may still have sufficient joint credit with disputants to get them together. Commonwealth Secretariat mediation, presumably extending over time, seems unlikely. Thus any proposals which you and UK HICOM might have would indeed be welcome. Katzenbach
382. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana/1/ Washington, April 19, 1967, 10:08 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Melbourne and Country Director for Ethiopia Matthew J. Looram, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Lagos, and London. 177827. 1. Coup attempt in Ghana may upset plans for meeting there of Nigerian SMC in second Aburi conference under Ankrah auspices. On other hand Ankrah may be spurred to keep meeting on early schedule to use it as clear evidence of stability of NLC. In order to keep momentum of Nigerian mediation efforts, however, request views of Embassies Lagos and London on utility of seeking more active intervention by Emperor of Ethiopia in Nigerian picture. 2. For Addis Ababa. Appreciate in light of Addis 6397 Notal/2/ that this may not be most appropriate time seek Emperor's intervention. Realize moreover that only few days remain (April 22) before his trip Bermuda, US, Canada and West Germany. Nevertheless, in light Ghana developments, Emperor may be only African figure who can still make significant contribution toward prevention disintegration Nigeria. However we would not wish undercut Ghana efforts if there still possibility of success. /2/Reference is presumably to telegram 3697 from Addis Ababa, April 18. (Ibid., POL 15-1 ETHIOPIA) 3. Embassy Lagos requested discuss possible role of Emperor with UK HICOM and Embassy London with CO re validity of suggested actions by Emperor: a. Emperor would address communication to Ankrah encouraging him to proceed with projected second Aburi meeting. b. In above message to Ankrah he would ask if there were any way he could be helpful during Aburi Two and affirm his willingness to assist mediation in any way possible at beginning of or following his return from trip. c. Send separate message to Nigerian SMC. In this he could state that recent instances of instability in Africa have been damaging to its reputation and future prospects for development and progress. It would be tragedy for entire continent if Nigeria, a key country with bright potential for itself and rest of Africa, should be shattered or if Ghana should fail in this major reconciliation effort. Accordingly he would urge Nigeria's leaders make major urgent effort resolve their differences in spirit of reason and accommodation at Accra or elsewhere. 4. Embassy Accra's comments requested on prospects for early meeting there and possible reaction to suggested HIM initiatives. However our possible intervention with Emperor should not be mentioned to GOG. 5. If reactions favorable, Ambassador Korry would seek immediate appointment with HIM or FonMin in order solicit views as to what they or we might do to preserve Nigeria. In such interview talking points would include context suggested message from Emperor to Ankrah, supplemented by our fears of delay in second Aburi meeting. They would be told we recognize Gowon's sensitivities if he and Ojukwu were singled out as sole disputants. If Ojukwu given equal status with Gowon, latter might well be cool to any initiatives. Among various moves which we think might occur to Ethiopians, three points of Para. 3 above would be raised. Substantive action would be urged as having salutary effect on relationships between Nigerian regions. Hence US making this approach to HIM as a recognized leader of Africa and peacemaker. Rusk
383. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State/1/ Lagos, April 21, 1967, 1500Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Accra, Addis Ababa, and London. Passed to the White House, DOD, NSA, CIA, and USIA. 8348. Ref: State 179138./2/ Emb shares Dept's concern over deteriorating Nigerian situation. We have consulted with UK HICOM on proposals for joint intervention set forth in reftel and we agree that any such initiative at this time would not only be resented but probably rebuffed especially by Gowon's closest supporters and advisers. Feeling among FMG members is said to be that each admonishment by US and UK is in effect a request that FMG accept each new provocation of Ojukwu without reacting; and thus serves to prove to FMG that US and UK pro-East. Several sources close to FMG have indicated that SMC members have become very impatient with external intervention in present situation. Yesterday Edward Enahoro, number three officer in Extaff (who very pro-West and has English wife) informed UK diplomat that FMG fed up with outside gratuitous advice and mentioned US and UK in particular. Embassy, therefore, reluctantly concludes that only outside intervention which likely to receive consideration now is that of the Emperor (Addis 3749)./3/ We further conclude as result of information contained in Datt 1130 and ANL 1552/4/ that FMG no longer interested in Aburi Two and that today's meeting of SMC likely to be decisive on courses of action to be pursued by FMG against Eastern acts of insurrection. Information available UK HICOM basically confirms reports transmitted in above messages. /2/Telegram 179138 to Lagos, April 20, reported the Department's concern over the possibility that the FMG might try to isolate the Ibos by breaking up the East into mini-states, with the Ibos in the center, before a possible Aburi or comparable meeting could alleviate the FMG-East dispute. (Ibid.) /3/Telegrams 3749 and 3752 from Addis Ababa, April 21, reported Emperor Haile Selassie's intention to send telegrams to Ankrah and the Nigerian FMG. (Ibid.) /4/Not further identified. Mathews
384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria/1/ Washington, May 5, 1967, 4:01 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL NIGERIA-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Melbourne and cleared by Trimble. 188570. Following is FYI noforn based on uncleared memcon subject to revision on review: 1. Ambassador Martins accompanied by his Counselor met with Secretary for 40-minute talk immediately prior to his departure for Lagos on consultation. AFW Director Melbourne also present. Ambassador presented under instructions aide-memoire outlining events since January 1966 from FMG perspective. Martins in lengthy exposition covered ground of aide-memoire whose main theme dwelt on relations between FMG and East, and outlined program adopted April 22 by Supreme Military Council. Document concluded, "in order to successfully implement this program, FMG would appreciate moral support, sympathy and understanding of all friendly governments particularly Government of USA." Text being pouched. 2. Ambassador explained he returning Nigeria under instructions to talk with Gowon and key SMC officials and that he intends travel in all regions on personal mission to speak in behalf single Nigeria. He knew Ojukwu well and felt he should make every effort with him. Before his return he thus wished get Secretary's views on Nigeria. 3. Secretary responded that because of great trials in US history it could understand tensions arising from maintenance of unity in diversity. US had no prescription for Nigerians, who would have to settle problem themselves. However, he wanted to emphasize great importance of finding their way to unity. Perhaps their representatives should stay in conference until they found agreement in manner analogous to Catholic Cardinals' selection of Pope. He cited great loss to Nigerian people if their experiment should fail including their national safety, decline in world confidence, and loss of their leadership in Africa. Nigeria had real responsibility, for what happens in Africa if Nigeria fails? This great responsibility ramifies externally into deep realities. Therefore, it desperately important Nigerian problems be solved. 4. Martins, gratified at Secretary's remarks, said he could go to Nigeria with every assurance of US interest. To this Secretary replied we were following situation with interest mixed with affection since we felt very close to Nigeria. Historical importance of crossroads for country could not be over-estimated. Nigerians should understand that it takes much time and effort to make constitution work. 5. On new tack, Martins stated that Department had behaved impeccably and responsibly during course of Nigerian troubles. He did wish to raise on personal basis suggestion for US public statement. In view great US world responsibilities, he suggested US say it believes united Nigeria would be best for Nigerian people and for all of Africa. To Secretary's query as to effect of such statement in Nigeria, Ambassador asserted he had met no Nigerian from any region who thought a break-up would be beneficial. Secretary simply replied that suggestion would be studied with aide-memoire and he hoped comments would be available to US Embassy Lagos while Martins in Nigeria. 6. In final observation, Secretary emphasized that no Nigerian solution by violence is conceivable. Consequences of such action could be tragic. He only hoped those in Nigeria with responsibility would rise above their short-term differences and in behalf their country's future let their dreams take over. Rusk
385. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, May 25, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64-8/67. Secret. WWR: SUBJECT I suspect that events are about to take a nasty turn in Nigeria. I won't bore you with a blow-by-blow, but, on the whole, I think we have played our own hand well. (We simply don't hold many high cards.) Nevertheless, the fact is that the dissolution of Nigeria is imminent--barring miracles. The primary operational questions we now face are: --Can we salvage the most useful tokens of unity--a common currency, a single representative at the UN, etc? (A common army is clearly out of the question.) --Can we avoid civil war? --Can we provide reasonable assurance of the safety of the 7,000 Americans in Nigeria, and/or evacuate them efficiently if necessary? Let me preface my answers with a brief analysis of the present situation. Where we are There are four major political actors on the Nigerian scene: (1) Colonel Gowon, chief of the central government; (2) Colonel Ojukwu, military governor of the East; (3) Chief Awolowo, leader of the Yoruba tribe which controls the West; and (4) General Katsina, military governor of the North. As you know, the main lines of conflict are between the North and the East. The North is large, populous, and backward; the East is smaller, relatively rich (oil, etc.), relatively well-educated, and dominated by the Ibo tribe which has a long-standing feud with the northern Hausas. The North wants a strong northern-controlled central government; the East favors the loosest possible confederation of autonomous regions. After a long, dreary slide, the parties are now at the following positions: 1. Ojukwu has laid all the groundwork for secession, right down to the name of the new country ("Biafra"). He probably could not stop the train now if he wanted to. Our intelligence indicates that he may be planning either to declare independence within the next few days or to propose tomorrow that the regions form a "confederation" which would leave each with "an international personality." The federal government would be reduced to a secretariat to nurture economic relations between almost totally separate states. Ojukwu has fomented so much independence fever that he probably couldn't accept a tighter federal arrangement at this point without threatening his political future. 2. Awolowo has paved the way for secession of the West if the East secedes. He would probably still prefer a federation--the West will have a difficult economic time of it alone. But he thinks the West would be better off on its own than in an unequal partnership with the North. He has persuaded the western Military Governor to demand that Gowon remove all northern troops now stationed in the West. Gowon has agreed to do so by the end of May. It remains to be seen whether he has enough control to carry it off. If he doesn't, there may soon be fighting in the West. 3. The North is run by a loose collection of Moslem emirs, under the rather precarious control of Katsina. (It is never quite clear who controls whom.) We have solid intelligence that the northern segments of the army are preparing to fight the East if Ojukwu secedes. Katsina's role in this is uncertain. He may not be able to keep the army quiet in the face of secession even if he wants to, and there will certainly be strong forces at work to dissuade him from wanting to. Aside from tribal hatred, the most powerful northern fear is that dissolution of the federation would cost them their route to the sea. (They are already at work on arrangements for trade routes through Dahomey.) 4. Gowon remains the most reconstructed leader of northern origin, but he is rapidly fading as a major influence. The history of his problems is not entirely to his discredit. But, as things now stand, Ojukwu refuses to have anything to do with him; the northerners are extremely unhappy with his "softness" toward the East; he is distrusted in the West; and he has largely shot his bolt in bargaining terms. He may have sealed his own fate last week with an abortive proposal that British troops guarantee the security of a meeting of the regional Military Governors; Ojukwu dismissed the suggestion out of hand and made it clear that the British are finished as mediators as far as the East is concerned. Gowon made a last-ditch effort to save the day over the weekend by rescinding the economic sanctions against the East, but it now seems that Ojukwu will not reciprocate, and that the only effect of Gowon's announcement was to multiply his problems in the North. In summary, the probabilities now argue for: (1) an Ojukwu ultimatum calling for a very loose confederation on pain of immediate secession; (2) a wishy-washy answer from Gowon which will not satisfy anybody; (3) a public statement by Awolowo favoring Ojukwu's proposal, but promising that the West will secede if Gowon drags his feet; (4) serious pressure in the North, probably reflected in the army, for military action against the East--perhaps resulting in violence. Options My own considered judgment is that no foreign power can assert anything like decisive influence on the Nigerian situation without commitment of major resources--troops and money. On balance, I don't think it is worth such a commitment on our part. Three outside influences are relevant to the Nigerian problem: other African states, particularly Ghana; the British; and the U.S. (All Nigerian factions are opposed to taking this matter up in the U.N. Unless and until there is widespread violence, most Afro-Asians will probably agree.) The Ghanaians have been heavily involved in mediation. General Ankrah has been to see all of the Nigerian leaders several times, and Ghana was the site of the last meeting of Military Governors. Ankrah is not persona non grata with them now; he simply has run out of things to sell--and Ojukwu has built up secession pressure to the point where there is no more time to develop new solutions. Unfortunately, mediation by other African leaders has become a cause celebre, with Ojukwu pushing for a conciliation panel of Nasser, Haile Selassie, etc., and Gowon opposing any non-Nigerian influence. Both sides have made clear that they want nothing to do with the OAU, although Diallo Telli has visited Nigeria several times of late. The British, always viewed with some suspicion, seem now to have ruined themselves entirely by their tacit support of Gowon's proposed meeting guaranteed by British arms. Both sides have also rejected the idea of a Commonwealth peace mission. Our own situation is by far the best of the three. We have been very strong for unity, but have generally managed to keep from being tarred by either side with favoritism for the other--although we are suspected by both. We also have $15 million per year in technical assistance to use as leverage. The truth is, however, that unless we are prepared to risk another Katanga, we don't have the bilateral tools to affect the outcome. We can marginally influence the method of change--particularly, I hope, limit violence--but the unity question is beyond us. Our real choice is whether to go all out now with some sort of grandstand diplomatic play, or to keep our powder dry so as to have the best possible start with the successor states. Our best diplomatic play would probably be a Presidential emissary to all the regional capitals--with or without fanfare--carrying a personal Presidential request for a new try at preserving unity. For my own part, I would vote against this, and I am confident Secretary Rusk and Joe Palmer would agree. My principal objection is that it wouldn't work. We are simply beyond the stage at which anybody with a solely diplomatic mandate could get any of the sides to about-face. We might gain a month; there might even be a new meeting of the Military Governors. But the cost would be much greater U.S. involvement; correspondingly greater subsequent pressure for U.S. intervention when the talks broke down and/or degenerated into violence; and, almost certainly, some feeling in the East that the United States had chosen sides against her. Thus, painful as it is, my advice is that we sweat it out and prepare to deal with whatever configuration of autonomous states emerges. In the meantime, of course, we should continue to press for whatever tokens of unity are possible. I think there is considerable hope that we can preserve a common currency and common public utilities. But we should take no action which would indelibly identify us with any of the factions. Violence and Evacuation We have an elaborate joint evacuation plan with the British. I think it is adequate. We have also worked out detailed contingency plans for all the specific problems which would arise from any of the likely degenerative processes. Of course, any action to evacuate will increase instability and probably enlarge the chances of violence. Thus, the critical question will be when to begin. This should be a Presidential decision. You should know that the evacuation plan does call for the use of one rifle company to guard the C-130s while they land, load, and take off. The British will make a similar commitment. This is the minimum military involvement (about 200 U.S. soldiers) we will be able to get away with if evacuation is necessary. I know this is a bleak picture. I paint it in this detail to demonstrate that the fact that we are not pushing for some Presidential action now reflects neither disinterest nor optimism. It flows from the fundamental fact that we are marginal to the deepest problems in Nigeria, and that it would take an enormous--and unwarranted--investment to become an important influence. You may want to give the President a precis of this situation if opportunity should arise. (You might also remind him that African politics have a way of charging headlong to the very edge of the cliff and then unaccountably drawing back. With luck, we may be treated to another such experience.) EH
386. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, May 30, 1967, 6:05 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Charles Runyon and Palmer, and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to all posts in Africa and Europe, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and USUN. 204937. Ref: State 204502./2/ Nigerian Crisis. /2/Dated May 30. (Ibid.) 1. In early hours May 30, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria formally proclaimed Eastern Nigeria sovereign independent Republic of Biafra. Federal Military Government (FMG) has declared state of national emergency and is reacting vigorously to Eastern action. 2. FYI: Since FMG use of military force against East is distinct possibility, our most immediate concern is protection Amcits throughout Nigeria. End FYI. As reported reftel, we advising against unnecessary travel to any part of Nigeria or within that country. To date, Embassy Lagos has not believed that Amcits are in imminent danger or that they should consider leaving country. Further deterioration in situation would of course raise questions of additional steps. 3. It remains our basic position that problem of Nigeria is a matter of primary concern to the Nigerians, to Africa and to the Commonwealth. We continue to support a peaceful resolution of this problem. While continuing maintain our relations with FMG, we intend to maintain consular presence and functioning in East, which is of course not to be construed as USG recognition of Biafra. 4. If queried on Nigerian developments and USG recognition of Biafra posts may draw on above for guidance, avoiding comments on substance of Nigerian crisis and any speculation on recognition question. FBIS report quoting Eastern Nigeria radio to effect USG (as well as other nations) has already recognized Biafra is false and has been denied by US Embassy in Lagos. 5. FYI: We consider attitude of other AF states, Commonwealth countries and perhaps OAU an important factor in determining US position on status and recognition of Biafra and wish await clearer demonstration their intentions, as well as developments in Nigeria. In any event, we wish maintain friendly relations with all parts of Nigeria, including East and any other entities which might emerge. End FYI. Rusk
387. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, May 31, 1967, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Aides File, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 29. Secret. The memorandum was passed to President Johnson with a May 31 covering note from Rostow at 7:50 p.m. WWR: SUBJECT 1. After eleven months of slow deterioration--in which we played every card in our limited hand to maintain unity--the Eastern region declared itself the independent Republic of Biafra yesterday morning. 2. Gowon responded with a public statement that the East had committed an "act of rebellion" which "must be crushed." (He later softened "crushed" to "contained.") He reimposed the economic blockade of the East, and ordered full mobilization of the Federal army. (In practice, mobilization will add little to the 9,000 troops now under Gowon's command; there are no reserves to call up. The Eastern army totals about 7,000 men--better trained and positioned than Gowon's troops.) 3. Gowon called in the U.S. and British Ambassadors yesterday afternoon. He said that he planned to take action against the East, and asked for military help, apparently implying troops. Both Ambassadors immediately replied that this was out of the question. Gowon retreated to a request for tactical aircraft and a naval presence. Again the Ambassadors refused. As a final shot, Gowon asked what the U.S./British would do if "others" intervened on the side of the East. The Ambassadors replied that this was a hypothetical question which they could not answer./2/ /2/Telegram 9607 from Lagos, May 30, reported these exchanges and other details of the two Ambassadors' discussion with Gowon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA) 4. Gowon did indicate in the above conversation that he would cooperate in any evacuation of British and American citizens. 5. Late yesterday afternoon we instructed our Embassies in London and Lagos to approach the British urgently to set in motion our joint evacuation plan for dependents and non-essential personnel. This first stage involves a commercially-operated airlift (PanAm and the British airlines). The instruction reflects our unanimous judgment (Katzenbach included) that we can no longer give reasonable assurance of the safety of more than 7,000 American citizens in Nigeria, and that an evacuation order will not bring on substantially greater instability. 6. HMG (Saville Garner) replied this morning that they can give us no final answer until tomorrow, but that they lean toward the view that the threat is not yet serious enough to justify evacuation. In any event, Garner said, HMG will be heavily influenced by the views of the British Ambassador to Nigeria. 7. The approach to the British in Lagos was even less fruitful. We have the full text of what the UK Ambassador recommended to London. Essentially, he advised against any evacuation of the whole of Nigeria--now or in the future--and against immediate evacuation of the East. His arguments are (1) it isn't clear whether we face a prolonged conflict or a "foray;" (2) evacuation would seriously disrupt the Nigerian economy, particularly in the East, and would bring the British into disfavor with Biafra; (3) many Brits would refuse to leave; and (4) British citizens might well be safe in a successful attack on the East if they followed instructions and "kept their heads down." He summarized that he would not recommend evacuation until "British subjects become a target." 8. At this point, which is about 2:30 this afternoon, the story trails off. We know there are several messages which have been sent from Lagos, but not received. We have received word that our Ambassador has instructed our Consul in the East to advise U.S. dependents to leave that region. We do not know whether he has done the same in the other regions. (This is of great political importance in terms of U.S. even-handedness, which will largely determine the nature of our post-independence relations with Biafra.) Joe Palmer has sent a flash inquiry to find out what is going on. We assume our man is moving forward with a Nigeria-wide evacuation. 9. Whatever the present facts, as I reported to you yesterday we propose to proceed--with or without the British--with commercial evacuation of dependents and non-essential personnel from all regions. We shall probably have to let this be known publicly tomorrow if Lagos has not already announced it. I will furnish George Christian with guidance and stand by to help with the briefing if necessary. EH
388. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 6, 1967, 4:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Nigeria-Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. Mr. President: At Tab A,/2/ for your approval, is a brief reply to a message from General Gowon of Nigeria. Gowon wired you and many other heads of government urging against recognition of the newly-proclaimed Republic of Biafra--formerly the eastern region of Nigeria. The incoming message is at Tab B./3/ /2/The attached tabs are not printed. /3/Tab B is a copy of Gowon's May 30 message. None of your advisers would recommend recognition of Biafra until the Nigerian situation is clarified. However, we did hope to avoid answering this message so as to not appear to favor either the Central Government or the Biafrans. (How we handle the recognition question will greatly affect the tone of our relations with these states in whatever configuration emerges.) However, Harold Wilson has now responded to Gowon's message to him with a non-committal hope that Nigeria can find her way out of her present difficulties. (A copy of the Wilson response is at Tab C.) If we don't say at least this much, we will probably wear out some of our welcome with the central government. Thus, the proposed reply takes very much the same non-committal line. Walt Approve/4/ /4/This option is checked.
389. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, June 28, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64-8/67. Confidential. Prepared by Rostow. SUBJECT Enahoro had requested a meeting with the President to present a "personal message" from General Gowon. He was persuaded that the message would reach the President if he gave it to me and to Nick Katzenbach, whom he saw later in the day./2/ /2/Telegram 219423 to Lagos, June 29, described Katzenbach's meeting with Enahoro. (Department of State, Central Files, POL NIGERIA-US) There was no written text to Enahoro's message. The points he made were as follows: 1. General Gowon feels "let down" by the USG. As the defender of Nigerian unity, he believes he deserves a more sympathetic and understanding attitude from us. 2. The USG should take steps to keep the United States from being used as a base for Biafran activity--either propaganda or money-raising. Several Nigerians and Americans are now carrying on such operations here; the State Department knows who they are. As demonstrated in the case of Katanga, the USG does have the legal means to suppress this sort of thing if it has the will. 3. Payments of royalties and taxes by foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria must continue to be made to the FMG, notwithstanding the recent Biafran decree that companies operating in the East must pay the Biafran government. 4. Some Americans seem to have accepted the notion that the FMG is a bloodthirsty leviathan bent on annihilating the gallant and peace-loving Easterners. The truth is that the FMG bears no malice towards the citizens of Eastern Nigeria, and it intends to use no more force than is necessary to maintain Nigerian unity. If the situation evolves to the point where civilians deal with civilians, there is no doubt in Gowon's mind that the secession would end and peaceful unity be restored. I did not attempt to argue the specifics of Enahoro's case. I questioned him at several points to clarify his argument, but left detailed response to Under Secretary Katzenbach. I did remark that we are most hopeful that a peaceful solution to Nigeria's difficulties could be found, and that it is very difficult for us to be helpful in a family quarrel. R [Next documents] |
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