Inter-service Relations: Imperatives for Jointness (Part 5)
Nowa
A. Omoigui
nowa_o@yahoo.com
Being
a lecture delivered at the National War College, Nigeria
THE NOTION OF INTER-DEPENDABILITY OF SECURITY
AGENCIES
Let me introduce the concept of
Inter-dependability of Security services and roles.
Recent experience has taught us that transnational
problems can manifest domestically while apparently domestic issues can spill
over borders. It is also important to factor in the extension of the security
arena into ill-geographically defined areas such as computer networks and the
emergence of asymmetric threats (low intensity warfare) as the dominant paradigm
for current and future Military operations other than war.
Functionally, it makes sense that some of the
domestic security responsibilities should be primary, based on core competence
and capability to function as the first responder and lead agency. Other
responsibilities should be secondary, based on the need to provide depth to
other agencies that are better oriented, equipped and maintained to be first
responders to such matters in support of National Security. (See Table below)
TABLE OF POTENTIAL DOMESTIC MILITARY AND POLICE
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
(Adapted from a presentation by Dr. Nowa Omoigui
on “Civilian views of civil-Military relations in democratizing states” at the
“Next Generation of African Military Leaders Program”, on January 24, 2006 -
National Defense University, Washington DC.)
Responsibility |
Military role |
Police role |
Role of other government departments
|
|
Primary |
Secondary |
Secondary |
Prevention and investigation of civil crimes |
None (unless requested for support on a
case-by-case basis) |
Primary |
Secondary |
Small scale emergency services |
None (unless requested for support on a
case-by-case basis) |
Primary |
Co-primary (Fire service, hospitals) |
Assurance of State control of the machinery of
government |
Secondary (could be primary in major insurrections,
strikes, etc.) |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary |
Environmental security |
Secondary |
Secondary |
Primary |
Information security |
Secondary |
Secondary |
Primary |
Financial security (Counter-money laundering) |
None |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Domestic Intelligence |
Secondary |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Counter-intelligence |
Secondary |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Immigration and Customs control |
None (However, Naval units have sometimes been
tasked to assist) |
Secondary (may be primary in some countries) |
Primary (Customs) |
Counter-Smuggling |
Secondary (e.g. maritime interception) |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Primary |
Counter-Inland waterway Piracy |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary |
Counter-Proliferation of small arms |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary |
Counter-Proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Anti-Terrorism |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary |
Counter-Terrorism |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary |
Drug enforcement (Counter-Drug operations) |
Secondary |
Secondary |
Primary (Drug Enforcement Agencies) |
Critical Infrastructure Security/Key Asset
protection |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Secondary (could be primary) |
Public Health security |
Secondary (extreme cases) |
Secondary (extreme cases) |
Primary |
Complex Disaster Search and Rescue; Evacuation and
resettlement; Famine relief |
Primary (could be secondary) |
Secondary |
Secondary (could be primary if dedicated) |
Civic works (roads, bridges, dams, irrigation
projects etc.) |
Secondary |
None |
Primary |
Space exploration |
Secondary (could be primary) |
None |
Primary (could be secondary) |
What this table shows is that the Military and the
Police are only two among many inter-dependable partners for National Security.
APPLYING INSIGHTS GAINED TO CONTEMPORARY
NIGERIAN PROBLEMS
As we have seen, joint operations are not a new
idea in Military history. Nevertheless, the two primary reasons for
contemporary “Military jointness” are as follows:
|
It enhances optimal matching of commitments,
resources and capabilities, as the Armed Forces develops the ability to
function seamlessly and in a timely manner within an integrated battle space
that includes not only sub-surface, surface, near-surface, air and space
environments, but also cyberspace. To attain this, joint vision, joint
tactics, joint doctrine, joint staff procedures, joint budgeting and joint
training must be developed and implemented. |
|
Based on the foregoing, jointness helps to win
wars and ensure success of selected “military operations other than war” by
allowing the Joint Commander to exercise any permutation and/or combination
of choices in his tool box dictated by circumstances. |
Similarly, the two primary reasons to minimize
rivalry and enhance cooperation between the Military and Police are:
|
It saves resources, by allowing optimal
matching of domestic commitments, resources and capabilities. |
|
It enhances individual, public and state
security by ensuring security inter-dependability. |
Thus, from the standpoint of Military jointness,
Nigeria should:
|
Facilitate Joint Vision, Joint Values and
Joint Ethics across the Military services for Defence |
|
Reinvigorate individual service
professionalism to enhance the quality of force generation. |
|
Consider separate career tracks for future
service chiefs; one which leads to appointment of individual service chiefs
on the basis of certain “individual service” criteria and the other for
future Chiefs of Defence Staff, based on aptitude for and experience in
“joint” appointments. The system of rotation among the three services
should be continued. The structure of the British Ministry of Defence and
Joint HQ deserves further study to determine applicability to Nigeria.
|
|
Streamline membership of the National Defence
and Security Councils to enhance jointness. This may require constitutional
amendment. |
|
Establish Joint doctrines |
|
Negotiate a Joint concept of operations
|
|
Adopt strategic capability planning as the
basis for Force development |
|
Revisit the concept of unified commands and
formalize the chain of command for operations to tighten any loopholes.
|
|
Minimize the number of types of officer
commissions to enhance officer cohesion |
|
Consolidate Joint Staff, Joint Intelligence,
Joint Logistics, Joint Training, Joint Operations, Joint Procurement and
Joint Personnel planning |
|
Develop Joint Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) Tactics |
|
Upgrade Force generation measures and
development of ethos at Service levels |
|
Apply conditions of service in a consistent
manner across the services. |
|
Consolidate and minimize the number of entry
depots for non-commissioned officers and other ranks |
From the standpoint of Military-Police
cooperation, Nigeria should:
|
Facilitate a Joint Vision, Joint Values and
Joint Ethics across the Security services (including the Military and
Police) for a variety of Security roles (See Table of domestic roles).
This will enable the introduction of super ordinate goals of high appeal
value for both soldiers and Policemen whose attainment is beyond the
resources and efforts of either group alone. |
|
Ensure that the Military and Police leadership
understands that there is no such thing as a bad soldier or bad Policeman;
only bad Military and Police officers. It is the responsibility of the
leadership to show good example to servicemen at lower rungs in the system
and enforce professional values and ethics. The notion that all is well
between senior Military and Police officers, while their men shoot each
other to death, is an unfortunate admission of command failure.
|
|
Consider establishing a Joint National
Security Academy, where various courses that cut across the entire field of
Human Security can be offered to service personnel at low, intermediate and
senior levels drawn from Military, Police and other security agencies, as
well as the public. In the alternative, offer such training at Military and
Police institutions to which service personnel from any service can
subscribe or be sent. This will support other efforts to nurture corporate
esprit de corps at the supra-service level of "National Defence and
Security." |
|
Exploit the opportunity presented by the
threat of contemporary asymmetric, space, and cyber-space warfare to create
new non-traditional joint Force Structures. This could include establishing
a Constabulary (or National Guard) to which soldiers and Policemen may be
deployed (after re-training) on rotation for duties that fall in between
traditional Military and Police roles. During these rotations the
Constabulary will enable soldiers and Policemen to co-exist, guided by joint
etiquette, customs, ceremonies, and traditions. |
|
Consolidate and minimize the number of entry
depots for non-commissioned officers and other ranks. |
|
Increase the number of opportunities for the
Military to attend educational programs at Police institutions particularly
for operations other than war. |
|
Upgrade physical, moral and academic
requirements for entry into the Police. Although Police training should be
specialized and adapted to Police tasks, Military personnel should not be
allowed to acquire the perception that the Police accept recruits of lower
physical, moral and academic stature. |
|
Formalize internal processes in the military
for ensuring that its personnel maintain up-to-date driving (and riding)
licenses and insurance documents. |
|
Vigorously expand Joint Training (including
Joint NCO training) for Internal Security duties. |
|
Reinvigorate Police professionalism and assist
the Police in its need for rebirth to enhance its public image. It cannot
seriously expect to be better respected by the Military if society as a
whole has a poor image of it. |
|
Create mechanisms to allow Military and Police
service personnel discuss Police-Military relations at open fora.
|
|
Develop standard guidelines for investigating
and responding to inter-service clashes, including creating opportunities
not just for disciplining erring servicemen and women but also for
psychological counseling of the units involved. |
|
Monitor joint Military and Police social
events to ensure that opportunities for socialization are actually being
exploited. Inter-personal suspicions dating back to the days of Military
rule have kept many officers and other ranks away from mess life. Those
social events that enhance inter-dependability should be encouraged.
|
|
Revive the office of Military-Police Liaison
officers at the Police and Defence Headquarters. Liaison officers,
preferably drawn from the Military Police, also need to be established at
state and local levels. These liaison officers should establish joint
mechanisms for resolving misunderstandings before they get out of hand.
|
|
Avoid accepting applicants into the Police who
have been rejected by the Military for any reason. |
|
Deliberately teach Inter-service rivalry and
cooperation at Military, Police and other Security Academies. |
|
Consider co-location of Military and Police
Barracks in future Force planning estimates. This will allow sharing of
certain amenities like schools for children of service persons. |
|
Vigorously address welfare issues and
corruption in the Security sector as a whole. There isn’t likely to be much
progress if money budgeted for security ends up in personal bank accounts
while under-trained and under-equipped poverty stricken servicemen and women
are abandoned on the streets to fend for themselves. |
Concluded
|