Nigeria Has A
Balance of Power Problem
By
Taiwo Akinola
culled from GUARDIAN, February 9,
2006
Balance of power is a widely used
concept in international relations, one whose importance in the understanding of
the political dynamics in multi-ethnic states has been undervalued due to the
limitations in the interpretations of its meanings.
The basic theme of the balance of power theory is that the international system
is anarchical in the absence of a common government and goals. The management of
this anarchy is based on the power relations among states. However, within the
state system - which is presumed to be non-anarchical, the integrated society is
managed by a strong consensus, hence, there is no need to balance power.
The underlining principle of the
balance of power concept is that, the pursuit of power is the common denominator
to which all foreign policy can be reduced, and the notion that any preponderant
power will always be a menace to the interest and security of other states.
The concept of Balance of power
could be applied to Nigeria's internal politics, because Nigeria is a state of
nationalities but not a nation of individuals. In which case, balancing for
survival within the state's internal system is as important as the balancing
between states in the international system. The Nigerian state system is in
crisis because the northern group of nationalities - under the leadership of the
Hausa-Fulani nation - enjoys an over-balance of political power, which it has
used to threaten the security of other nations and nationalities within the
system. The result is the wide gap between fact and value, based on the
assumption that what is good for the North is good for Nigeria.
Balance of power implies an
objective arrangement in which there is relatively widespread satisfaction with
the distribution of power, so that no one actor or a group of actors can hold
others to ransom "with impunity". As a policy guide, it prescribes that
structures should be put into place that can reverse or deter any actor from
seeking to enjoy over-balanced power.
The need to balance power could
lead to war, but this is not to say that balance of power is the cause of wars.
The cause of wars can be found in the fundamental issues, which the balance of
power seeks to remove. This includes: The need to prevent the establishment of a
universal hegemony; to preserve the constituent elements of the system and the
system itself; the need to ensure stability and mutual security in the
international system; and to strengthen peace by deterring a policy of expansion
by any aggressor.
The traditional methods and
techniques of maintaining or restoring the balance were: the policy of divide
and rule (working to diminish the weight of the heavier side); territorial
compensations after a war; creation of buffer states; the formation of
alliances; spheres of influence; intervention; diplomatic bargaining; legal and
peaceful settlement of disputes; reduction of armaments; armament's competition;
and war itself. Pre-colonial existence of balance of power in West Africa
Balance of power is not necessarily a new phenomenon in the relationship between
the many nationalities that were members of the West African political
constellation, some of which later constituted the modern Nigerian State. This
balance of power struggle exists independently of internal class problems.
Before the arrival of the British colonial government, the geographical area was
made up of many nationalities, among which between 250-350 were later brought
together to constitute the current Nigerian state.
The area was naturally going
through the process of enlarged communities and people moved across ethnic
boundaries to maximise threats. The Fulanis were involved in balance of power
struggles with the Hausas; the Hausa-Fulani were involved in balance of power
struggles with the Yorubas, the Kanuri, and numerous nationalities in the Middle
Belt area. The Yorubas were involved in similar struggles with the Dahomeys (now
Republic of Benin), Benin and Nupe nationalities. The Igbos too were engaged in
a balance of power tussle against Benin, Igala and some other nationalities.
None of the actors was able to enjoy over- balanced power, and there was no
consciousness to bring about a Nigerian nation-state. Fulani expansion was
arrested militarily in the north-east by the Kanuri of Bornu, and in the
south-west by the Yoruba; while in the south-east, impenetrable terrain barred
the Fulani-mounted cavalry.
The balance of power changed in
character, intensity and scope when the British metropolitan powers disturbed
the local balancing system and imposed an Hausa-Fulani hegemony on the remaining
nationalities.
The pre-colonial balancing system
was seen to be fair because there was no outside interference - what each actor
was able to gain or lose was influenced by its power and its diplomatic skills
at making alliances. Robert S. Smith who carried out a study of interaction
among these pre-colonial social units in West Africa observed that:
"In large parts of West Africa,
before partition of the region among European powers, international relations in
peace and war were carried on in a more or less recognisable fashion, and, to go
a little further, in a coherent and rational manner which showed itself capable
under favourable conditions leading to political, economic and technical
improvements in sociality."
The British unification process
took the form of consolidating all the nationalities into one state system,
which it divided into three regions suspended over two societies. The northern
region is predominantly Arabic with little African culture but almost no
European influence. The two southern regions are predominantly African societies
with strong European influence.
William Graf, who also carried
out a study of interaction among the nations and nationalities in the Nigerian
State, observed that: "Harmony, co-operation and unity have manifestly not
characterised social and political life in post-independent Nigeria. Whenever
the Nigerian political system has most dramatically experienced breakdowns -
constitutional crisis, political immobilism, coups d'etat, civil war, etc. -
this has always occurred within a context of inter-ethnic controversy..."
The accuracy of this observation
is supported by the fact that almost all the major crisis that has fundamentally
affected the security of the Nigerian State can be traced to her balance of
power problems. These include the delay in Nigerian independence in order to
persuade the north from seceding from the federation; the treasonable felony
charges against Chief Awolowo and his colleagues, their detentions without
charge and later, their imprisonment. The Akintola crisis in the old Western
Region, the January and July 1966 military coups, the creation of the first 12
states, and the civil war are not unconnected with Nigeria's balance of power
problems. The declaration of the 'Delta Peoples Republic'; the violent
disturbances in the Middle Belt areas in 1920, 1939, 1945, 1948, 1960 and 1964;
the Major Gideon Orkar attempted coup; the Ogoni crisis featuring the execution
of Ken Saro Wiwa; and the June 12 crisis (of which the alleged Diya coup attempt
is an extension) all revolve around the country's balance of power problems.
However, in order to conform to
the assumptions of the balance of power concept - that "there could be no
balance of power struggle within a state system" - the crises within the
Nigerian state are either normally associated with problems of class, religion,
lack of democracy, military rule, corruption, ethnicity, tribalism, inadequate
education and poor infrastructure. But, it could not be a balance of power
problem - because the balance of power theory does not prescribe it as possible.
The balance of power concept as it is interpreted does not recognise the
existence of a balance of power struggle within the original Indian State. But
it later recognised its existence between the three independent Indian states
after it had been broken up because of the same balance of power crisis which
has now taken a nuclear dimension between the original India and Pakistan
states. The concept also did not recognise the existence of balance of power in
the former Soviet Union until it was broken up into fifteen independent
states.
Yet, it is a fact of history that
a striking forerunner of the later European multi-state system was to be found
in the political and diplomatic system of Renaissance Italy. (Bozeman p459-89
quoted in Northedge F.S., 1976). Between the Renaissance cities of Venice,
Milan, Florence and Naples, together with papacy mirrored in small scale the
later European world of Great Powers'. The Peloponnesian war between the two
great coalitions led by Athens and Sparta respectively (431 to 404 BC) was in
one sense a war for the unification of Greek people, in much the same way as the
war between Austrian and Prussia in 1866 was a war for the unification of the
German people. The same thing could be said of the 17th century power struggle
between the three nations, England, Scotland and the Wales, in the United
Kingdom. The political balancing acts in multiethnic states such as India,
Nigeria, today are close to that of Renaissance Italy.
How realistic and how objective
is this approach? The litmus test seems to be that balance of power between
social and political units could only be recognised, no matter how it was
achieved, if they exist as independent juridical states and not if they are
separated organically - this is the ideal nation state. The European idea of a
nation-state is a product of its history. Yet, judging by the standard of the
European experience - either in United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, Italy,
Switzerland or Russia - on which this concept is based, this is simply a
fallacy. Kosovo, Northern Ireland and Scotland are each trying to answer the
same question: how to balance power and how to reconcile different loyalties and
identities within a single state. This co-exists with the class problems in
those societies. The case of the Kurds, the Yorubas or the Hausas, whose nations
extend beyond one state border, has proved that the most important bond of a
social and political unit is the organic rather than the legalistic bonds.
In constructing the new Nigerian
State, the British did not seek to remove the cause of the pre-colonial balance
of power crisis - the struggle to prevent over balance of power. That was never
their mission. Instead, they conquered the smaller nationalities on behalf of
the larger ones, and later imposed the authority of one of the larger nations on
other members of the union. This action on its own created a problem of
legitimacy, which further increased the scope and the intensity of the internal
balance of power struggle- crisis became a permanent feature of the new system.
The British embarked on policies, which enhanced the disparities among the
different nationalities. This includes the engineering of an unbalanced
structure, and different administrative and educational systems. The effect of
the latter, says Professor Awa, "helped to create a cleavage between the North
and the South in intellectual and psychological orientation." By creating the
three regions, the British weakened the power of the centre and the bonds of
tribalism - which was, at the time, the fundamental units of social bonding and
political activities among most of the political units- and allocated the power
to the Hausa-Fulani, the Yorubas and Ibos. The Yoruba gained greater awareness
as a nation through this process that also marked the beginning of Ibo
nationalism. The Hausa-Fulani took advantage of the situation and created a
northern awareness, by merging the ruling class of the Hausa-Fulani, Kanuri,
Nupe and the Tivs into one Northern power elite. This had the disadvantage of
decreasing the number of actors, but increasing the intensity, the stake and the
resources for perpetrating the balance of power crisis.
Sir Hugh Clifford, a former
Governor who was aware of the extent of the damage that had been done to
Nigeria's unity - at a time when the possibility of dividing Nigeria into two
separate countries was contemplated - had expressed his concern at the
correctness of creating the Nigerian state when he said: "Assuming that the
impossible were feasible - that this collection of self-contained and mutually
independent Native States (separated from one another, as many of them are, by
great distances, by differences of history and traditions, and by ethnological,
racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers) were indeed capable of
being welded into a single homogeneous nation - a deadly blow would thereby be
struck at the very root of national self-government in Nigeria, which secures to
each separate people the right to maintain its identity, its individuality and
its nationality, its own chosen form of government; and the peculiar political
and social institutions which have been evolved for it by the wisdom and by the
accumulated experience of generations of its forebears."
There is considerable evidence
from the behavioural irregularities which characterise the social, economic and
political direction of events in the Nigerian state, that its unbalanced
structure is the most critical factor to the country's inability to compound and
synthesise its enormous resources into effective economic, military and
governmental mechanism to further its national interest. Nigeria has a balance
of power problem, fronted by the three nations - the Hausa-Fulani, the Yorubas
and the Ibos - whose particular configurations form the basic structural
framework within which all other interest groups in the federation are forced to
operate. However, power is over-balanced to the advantage of the Hausa-Fulani
who led the northern group of nationalities. My thesis is not that the
Nigerian state, like any other developing country, is immune from problems such
as corruption, poor education, lack of infrastructure, ethnicity, tribalism,
military rule, class divide and manipulation by the elites. Far from that. My
argument is that in terms of intensity and scope, its balance of power problem
is the one single factor that contributes most to the economic and political
instability in the state. It is the super-structure engendered by this factor
that compounds the normal problems facing Nigeria. It is this problem that
renders everything we touch putrid and poisonous, and is the only reason why the
state is not making progress. If we do not address this problem, but pretend to
be marching forward, we would be negating all our positive inputs by sheer
stupidity. In order to fully appreciate the influence of the balance of power
problem over the other ills facing the Nigerian, it may be necessary to point
out that the super-structure created by the overbalanced power thrives on
corruption and nepotism. Because the system lacks ownership, corruption at the
centre is seen as a way to empower each nation and nationality involved in the
struggle for power. And for the nationalities in power, it is also a means to
reduce the influence of real and potential enemies. Outside the context of
balance of power conflict, what they are doing may amount to corruption or
nepotism, however, in the context in which their actions are carried out, the
attitude which they display, is comparable with the way states tend to justify
the resources spent on wars as reasonable because 'national interest' is
involved.
However, at the local levels -
nations, nationalities and tribes - where a different type of corruption occurs
(the sort associated with the process of development), there are heavy
penalties. The difference in attitude is caused by a lack of ownership of the
centre, which is not the case at the local level. The resources at the centre
have no legitimate owner, but the sub-systems do. There is competition at the
local level with no intention to destroy existing resources; but there is
conflict at the centre, giving rise to a destructive attitude and a lack of
prudent management. How does one account for the tendency of northern
nationalities - who control the power at the centre - to hire Indian and
Pakistani teachers to the detriment of fellow Nigerian teachers from the south,
who may be more qualified than most of the foreign teachers?
The military and the security
establishment - now in the service of the 'north' - is required to maintain the
status quo. It cannot be reformed nor reoriented until it is no longer required
to perform this duty.
Mr. Akinola is the current Secretary of the Movement for National Reformation
(MNR) (Europe Branch).
