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Quick Kill in Slow Motion:

The Nigerian Civil War

 

By

 

Major Michael R. Stafford, USA

April 2, 1984

Marine Corps Command and Staff College,

Marine Corps Development and Education Command,

Quantico, Virginia 22134

 

source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/SMR.htm

 

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

 

 

I owe my sincere appreciation and gratitutde to the many

 

professionals who assisted and encouraged me during the

 

production of this paper.  First, Lieutenant Colonel William

 

Isom, Director of African Studies, National War College, and

 

Lieutenant Colonel William Hubard, USA, Major Mary Becka,

 

USA, and Dr. William Stoakley (all of the Defense

 

Intelligence Agency), gave their time, considerable

 

expertise, and recommendations to the direction of this work.

 

Second, Lieutenant Colonel Musa Bitiyong, Nigerian Army,

 

provided substance to my research through his correspondence.

 

        Finally, I need also acknowledge Lieutenant Colonel

 

Donald Bittner, USMC, Mrs. Mary Porter, the Reference

 

Librarian at Breckinridge Library, and Mrs. Marvella McDill,

 

Lieutenant Colonel Bittner's encouragement was substantial,

 

and he painstakingly edited the first draft of this

 

manuscript.  Mrs. Porter  amazed me with her dexterity in

 

obtaining relatively scarce documents which were used in the

 

research for this paper.  Mrs. McDill diligently and

 

cheerfully typed this document.

 

        To each of these kind people, I offer my thanks.

 

 

                               TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

                                                                                  Page   

Maps

 

   I           Africa                                                       iii

  II    Nigeria                                                        iv

 III           Nigerian Regions-January 1967                           v

  IV      Midwestern Invasion, August-September 1967     vi

   V    Status, October 1968                                     vii

  VI           Airlift, November 1968                                 viii

 VII           Biafra, May 30, 1969                                     ix

VIII           Final Collapse, December 1969-January 1970           x

 

INTRODUCTION                                                                       1

 

CHAPTER

 

   I           ROOTS OF CONFLICT                                                  5

               Pre-War History                                              5

               The Nigerian Military                                    10

               The Ibo Experience                                             16

 

  II           THE COMBATANT FORCES                                20

               The Federal Side                                               20

               The Rebel Forces                                    26

 

 III           THE WAR BEGINS                                                30

               Initial Phase (June-July 1967)                   30

               The Midwestern Invasion (August-September  

          1967)                                                        35

 

  IV    THE WAR DEVELOPS                                    43

               The Influence of Gowon                         43

               1 Division Operations                            45

               2 Division Operations                            50

               3 Marine Commando Division Operations            54

 

   V    OJUKWU'S BIAFRA                                     62

 

  IV      TO THE END OF THE WAR (SEPTEMBER 1968-

            JANUARY 1970)                                  71

 

 VII           THE AIR WAR                                                    80

               The Rebel Air Force                              80

          The Federal Air Force                            86

 

VIII           CONCLUSIONS                                                    90

 

 

END NOTES                                                                              97

 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                     107

 

 

APPENDICES

 

  A.           CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS                       113

  B.           LIST OF PROMINENT PERSONS                  115

 

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                                      INTRODUCTION

 

        The Nigerian Civil War marked a significant milestone in

 

the military history of independent Black Africa.  For the

 

first time, 20th Century technology reached a battlefield

 

where Black African met Black African in conventional combat.

 

The expansion of capabilities, from the chaotic

 

spears-and-knives of the Congo to the set piece, automatic-

 

rifles-and-jet-airplanes of Nigeria, introduced new

 

dimensions in devastation to Africa south of the Sahara.

 

        The premise of this paper is that  a study of the

 

Nigerian Civil War offers the opportunity to understand how

 

the introduction of sophisticated weapons affects the combat

 

capabilities and actions of the military in the developing

 

countries of the world.  The quantities of modern weapons in

 

the Nigerian-Biafran conflict were not substantial, but their

 

impact was great.  There were no tanks or heavy artillery

 

(122mm Russian Guns were the largest), so the individual

 

battle lethality can not compare to the Arab-Israeli

 

conflicts or other technology-intensive campaigns.  However,

 

the Nigerian Civil War caused the deaths of hundreds of

 

thousands of people, primarily through the starvation

 

associated with seige warfare.  In the end this war proved as

 

unjust and deadly as war can become.  Those who suffered the

 

most were once again the very young and the very old.

 

        Much has been written about the Nigerian Civil War.

 

There are many fine histories detailing the development of

 

the country and the factors which led to the Civil War of

 

1967 to 1970.  For this reason, this paper only capsulizes

 

this information.  Likewise, there is only limited space

 

expended here to review the Nigerian military's evolution,

 

growth and eventual initiation of two 1966 coups d'etat which

 

proved to be immediate causes of the Nigerian Civil War.

 

Robin Luckham thoroughly analyzes this subject in his book,

 

The Nigerian Military (Cambridge:  University Press, 1971).

 

        Other areas which have received considerable analysis

 

include international politics and foreign intervention, the

 

relief efforts and the implications of the policy of

 

starvation, the economics of civil war, and the propaganda

 

war waged within the civil war itself.  Because of the wide

 

range of information available on these topics, I selected an

 

area of research more directly related to my profession--the

 

analysis of the military campaign.

 

        This paper is not a detailed history of the war in

 

Nigeria.  Rather, selected battles and campaigns are

 

discussed and analyzed based on their significance to the

 

outcome of the war, their edification of certain lessons of

 

the conflict, or their benefit in illustrating points

 

regarding the development of the forces involved or the war

 

itself.  In all cases, effort has been exerted to use written

 

accounts from actual participants and observers, especially

 

military personnel, in formulating analysis of the subject

 

events.  This proved necessary for two reasons.  The first

 

was the propaganda war mentioned above.  Press releases from

 

the two sides were so distorted that the New York Times, for

 

example, ran adjacent Biafran and Nigerian sourced stories.

 

The other reason is the bias exhibited by foreign

 

correspondents covering the war.  On the Nigerian side,

 

access to the war zone was extremely limited since the

 

military controlled the movements of journalists, thus

 

effectively censuring much information.  The Biafrans allowed

 

freer movement by the media, seeking every advantage in

 

courting world opinion.  This often resulted in the co-opting

 

of journalists.  As Frederick Forsyth noted about his

 

perspective, if "I may be accused of presenting the Biafra

 

case, this would not be without justification.  It [his book]

 

is the Biafra story, and it is told from the Biafran

 

standpoint."(1)

 

        Realizing that participants may have reputations at

 

stake, multiple accounts of individual incidents were a must.

 

This has been possible in most cases, since Biafran and

 

Nigerian versions of most episodes were available.

 

        After assembling the military analyses of the selected

 

battles and campaigns, a summary of historical factors

 

leading up to the Civil War was compiled to aid the reader in

 

understanding the content of the conflict.  This is found in

 

Chapter One.  Finally, a brief summary of conclusions is

 

provided as the final chapter to highlight the most

 

significant aspects of the Nigerian Civil War.

 

        For those interested in further reading or study on the

 

details of the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, the bibliography has

 

been annotated with this writer's comments on the content and

 

value of each listing to this research.  It is important to

 

note that readings should be balanced between authors of

 

Biafran and Nigerian perspectives.

 

 

                                      CHAPTER 1

                      

                                ROOTS OF CONFLICT

 

 

        Understanding the nature of the Nigerian Civil War

 

begins with a knowledge of the unique and complex factors

 

which led to the secession of Biafra and subsequent open

 

hostilities.  By their nature, these causes drew worldwide

 

attention to the potential redivisions of Black African

 

boundaries along traditional cultural, tribal and

 

geographical lines.  (The Organization of African Unity

 

attempted to avoid the possible disintegration of its states

 

into conflict and civil war by establishing in its 1963

 

charter the policy of keeping the national boundaries drawn

 

by the former colonial powers.)  Later in this chapter, I

 

shall examine how the military in Nigeria was shaped and

 

driven by these influences and as an institution contributed

 

to the chaos that ended as civil war.

 

        Pre-War History.  Nigeria is the most populous country

 

in Africa.  At the start of the civil war in 1967, she

 

possessed about 56 million inhabitants.  Most of these people

 

belonged to one of three tribes--the Northern Hausa--Fulani,

 

the Western Yoruba, or the Eastern Ibo.  The West and East

 

are collectively called "The South."

 

        Before the imposition of European influence in the 19th

 

Century, these tribes shared little common experience.  They

 

were separated geographically.  The Northern Hausa-Fulani

 

tribes were situated in dry savannahs south of the Sahara and

 

accessible to the influences of the Mediterranean region,

 

especially Islam.  City states there developed under the rule

 

of powerful emirs and the Islamic religion took root.

 

        The Yoruba in the West maintained more contact with the

 

North than did the Eastern tribes, due to their highly

 

developed trading activities and moderately open territory.

 

Urban dwellers, the Yoruba were divded into states, each

 

centered on a city.  The tribe was industrious; crafts were

 

numerous; and the religion complex due to interaction with

 

many outside cultures.  The relative sophistication of

 

Yoruban society helped it withstand the trauma of European

 

rule.(1)

 

        The Ibo of the Eastern region were initially quite

 

different from the hard-working, intelligent people that

 

developed after the arrival of the British.  Isolated in the

 

dense, wet woodlands of the Niger Delta, the Ibo lacked the

 

sophistication of the Yoruba or the coastal minority tribes.

 

In contrast, the originally backward Ibo emerged from the

 

British colonial period as the most westernized tribe,

 

espousing Christianity (as did some Yoruba) and proving

 

adaptable to the imported work ethic due to their initiative

 

and vigor.(2)

 

        Having earlier exploited the Niger area slave trade,

 

Britain decided to stop it in the early 19th Century.  First

 

the Royal Navy patrolled the coastal waters with vessels

 

controlled from a consulate set up on Fernando Po, a Spanish

 

island possession 150 miles southeast of the Niger River

 

Delta.  In 1861 Britain claimed control of Lagos with the

 

goal of ending the slave trading which originated at that

 

port.  Having established a mainland foothold, British

 

influence gradually reached further inland.(3)  The Oil

 

Rivers Protectorate was established in (what is now) Southern

 

Nigeria to administer traders doing business in that region,

 

and the Niger Company was chartered to trade in the Niger

 

River Basin.

 

        By 1885, when Bismarch called the Berlin Conference.

 

Britain was firmly established in Nigeria.  As was the

 

purpose of the conference, Africa was divided among the

 

European nations into spheres of influence.  This division

 

was made wholly on the competitive political situations in

 

Europe and did not take into account those factors on which

 

western nation-states had historically been built.

 

Geographical and cultural influences such as natural

 

boundaries, tribal locations and tribal differences were

 

totally ignored.  With the acceleration of British

 

involvement, this set the stage for the artificial fusion of

 

three distinctly different populations.

 

        In 1886 the National African Company (also known as the

 

Royal Niger Company) was granted a royal charter to oversee

 

the territories north of Oil Rivers Protectorate; by 1893

 

this had become the Niger Coast Protectorate.  The National

 

African Company was empowered to establish a police force and

 

provide government services in the north.

 

        In 1897 the kingdom of Benin was brought under British

 

control.  After the annexation of other southwest areas, the

 

Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was established in 1900.  In

 

the same year, the charter of the National African Company

 

was revoked and the North redesigned the Protectorate of

 

Northern Nigeria.  The two southern protectorates were united

 

in 1906, and by 1914 the British consolidated control over

 

all of Nigeria.  What had in fact happened was the joining of

 

three different foreign administrative organizations rather

 

than the unification of three different indigenous

 

peoples.(4)

 

        The first governor of the unified Nigeria was Frederick

 

Dealtry Lugard, 1st Baron Lugard.  He introduced in Nigeria

 

the system of indirect rule, in which local government was

 

essentially delegated in toto to tribal chiefs or indigenous

 

ruling bodies.  These local authorities acted under the

 

supervision, or more accurately in many cases, the advice of

 

British administrators.  In Nigeria, this allowed the

 

continuation of strong regional political differences.

 

        Little progress occurred in Nigeria until the end of

 

World War II, when nationalistic movements surfaced in Africa

 

as well as much of the rest of the colonial world.  This was

 

actually part of the unrest in the European empires as

 

peoples in various areas sought to remove outside rule from

 

their homes.  Powerful political parties developed n each

 

sector of the country.  Chief Awolowo founded the Action

 

Group in the West.  However, the old city-states remained,

 

dividing the West between local and regional interests.  The

 

East saw the formation of a single democratic party, the

 

National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC).  The

 

theme of this party, which was led by Dr. Azikiwe, was

 

national unity--the formation of a single, powerful

 

independent state.  The Northern emirs responded to the

 

growing political awareness in the South by submerging their

 

region in the "designedly local and monolithic" Northern

 

Peoples Congress.(5)

 

        With British assistance, these three regions negotiated

 

a constitutional government which resulted in the loosely

 

constituted federation established when independence was

 

achieved in October of 1960.  In this federation, two of the

 

three parties had to form a coalition to gain control of the

 

government.  Incredibly, the Ibo of the East who advocated a

 

strong federal union and the more conservative Northerners

 

who favored a weak confederation united.(6)  Dr. Azikiwe

 

became President and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the North was

 

named Prime Minister.

 

        The  Westerners, as oddman out, vented their frustration

 

in a division of their party between Awolowo and his

 

followers, and local party segments led by Western Regional

 

Premier Akintola.  Akintola's faction aligned with the North,

 

and formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), while the

 

other factions united with the Eastern Ibo to establish the

 

United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).

 

        Open hostility in the West resulted in Federal

 

intervention, under strange circumstances, and the discovery

 

of "immense defalestions of regional revenues into party

 

funds and private hands"(7).  Awolowo was tried, convicted

 

and imprisoned for treason, and his rival, Akintola, gained

 

power based on his alignment with the Northern Party.

 

        Civil unrest was increased by other incidents during

 

this time.  The 1962 census results were released in 1963 and

 

showed a total Nigerian population of 55.6 million people, of

 

which 29.8 million were identified as living in the Northern

 

Region.  This outright majority caused other regions to

 

vehemently discount the accuracy of the census.

 

        As the 1964 parlimentary elections neared, corruption

 

was rife.  Local political activity was marked by

 

intimidation, and cheating was rampant, especially in the

 

North.  The UPGA boycotted the elections, but later accepted

 

a second election in 1965 and garnered about a fourth of the

 

seats.  In that year the events surrounding the Western

 

Regional legislative election bordered on civil war.  Clashes

 

between Akintola's NNA and the UPGA brought about many deaths

 

and recorded another episode in the headlong tumble from

 

independence to civil war (8).

 

 

        The Nigerian Military.  Into this cauldron of seething

 

historical, political and cultural antagonism stepped the

 

military in the first coup attempt of January 1966.  The

 

discord between regions was based on tribal differences

 

accentuated by religious and social disparities.  The

 

military, as an institution, was intertwined with these

 

contradictions and could not act independently from the rest

 

of Nigerian society.  Hence, instead of stabilizing the

 

country, the armed forces led it to civil war with a coup in

 

Jaunary 1966 and a counter-coup in July of the same year.

 

Former military ruler Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo

 

maintained that these coups were the immediate causes of the

 

Nigerian Civil War.  He has noted that the political equation

 

was altered, and the fragile trust existing among the three

 

major tribes was shattered.(9)

 

        But the military lacked the size to control Nigeria.  At

 

the time of the first coup, Nigerian forces totaled only

 

10,500.  The Army was the largest with 9,000 soldiers.  The

 

Navy numbered 900, including 80 officers, and the newly

 

formed Air Force boasted about 700 men.  In a country more

 

than twice the size of California, the military was spread

 

too thinly and was without the training, equipment and

 

sophistication to suitably dominant Nigeria's vast area and

 

population.  Additionally, this small organization

 

reverberated with the ethnic turmoil confronting the rest of

 

the country which further reduced its ability to handle the

 

civil strife.

 

        The Nigerian Army traced its roots back to the West

 

African Frontier Force created in the late 19th Century by

 

the chartered companies to administer their respective

 

regions.(10)  By 1914 this force included a Gold Coast

 

Regiment, the Sierra Leone Battalion and a Gambia Company.

 

In that year, Nigerian and Gold Coast (Ghana) units fought in

 

Togoland against the Germans there, and a detachment of

 

British Colonial forces and a French Senegalese unit

 

campaigned in the German Cameroons.(11)  In Accra, the

 

British established the West Africa Command to exercise

 

command and control of its regional colonial units.  It

 

remained until 1956, when it was disbanded because Ghana

 

gained independence and desired its own army, thus forcing

 

the break up of the Regional Force.(12)

 

        About 30,000 Nigerians served with the British Forces in

 

World War II.  The 81 and 82 (West Africa) Divisions included

 

Nigerian soldiers who saw action in Burma.  Nigerian troops

 

also served with the Royal West African Frontier Force in

 

Ethiopia against the Italians, and later Nigerian units

 

served with British units in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Palestine

 

and Sicily.  Allied commanders were reportedly generous in

 

their praise of Nigeria's soldiers and units.(13)

 

        Until independence the Nigerian Army consisted of

 

recruits essentially from the lower levels of Nigerian

 

society, with a high concentration of minority tribe members.

 

The officer corps was predominately British with a gradual,

 

slow transition to "Nigerianization" from 1949 to 1964.

 

Ethnic politics delayed the announcement of a Nigerian

 

Commander of the Army until 1965 when Major General Johnson

 

A. Ironsi, an Ibo, was given that position.

 

        After independence, military service gained prestige,

 

and the more educated Southerners, particularly Ibo, began to

 

enlist in increasing numbers.  With decreasing British

 

funding, the Nigerians were forced to escalate military

 

spending.  The armed forces which before received little

 

interest (14) became a matter of national pride and pressures

 

to expand the military size became a popular issue.(15)  In

 

1958 the Nigerian military numbered 7,600 officers and men.

 

By 1964 it had increased by 2,900.  Growth in the Navy and a

 

relatively ambitious Air Force program accounted for much of

 

this expansion.

 

        Quota systems were implemented in 1958 for the enlisted

 

ranks and in 1961 for the officer grades to balance service

 

compositions with national regional demographics.  These two

 

efforts served to highlight tribal differences within and

 

politicize the small military.  Along with the Nigerianiza-

 

tion of the Officer Corps (see Table I), the quota system

 

thoroughly confused the dynamics of officer development.  The

 

rapid influx of officers created an age imbalance and a

 

professional gap.  Promotion rates accelerated, especially

 

for officers commissioned before 1960.  An officer accessed

 

at age 20, could be a lieutenant colonal at 31.  When the

 

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officer ranks began to stabilize in 1965 after all the

 

British officers had departed, younger officers became

 

frustrated because of slower promotion rates.(16)  This

 

frustration may have found outlets in political action, first

 

by the "Majors' Coup" in January 1966 followed by the

 

counter-"Captains' Coup" the following July.  The most direct

 

impact of these two coups on the Nigerian military was the

 

destruction of the command structure and the polarization of

 

the forces along two lines, basically Ibo and non-Ibo (the

 

first coup was planned and executed by a predominately Ibo

 

group of officers, while the second coup was led by non-Ibo

 

officers; this served to create a mutual suspicion).  The

 

loss of relatively experienced officers (see Table II) would

 

prove particularily damaging to the Federal side in the Civil

 

War because of the migration of middle grade Ibo officers to

 

Biafra.

 

        The impact of the coups was even more devastating to the

 

country as a whole.  The early coup destroyed the delicate

 

first republic.  Though the coup was organized to end

 

corruption throughout the Nigerian political system, the net

 

effect only placed the military in power, while the

 

corruption found a way to continue.  It in fact was a

 

standard justification for subsequent coups, cited in

 

military takeovers in 1975 and as recently as January 1984.

 

In a British TV interview, the leader of the January 1966

 

coup, Major Chukwumah Nzeogwu stated,

 

        We wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt

        ministers, political parties, trades unions and the

        whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system.  We

        wanted to gun down all the bigwigs on our way.

        This was the only way.  We could not afford to let

        them live if this was to work.  We got some but not

        all.  General Ironsi was to have been shot, but we

        were not ruthless enough.  As a result he and the

        other compromisers were able to supplant us.(19)

 

Instead of ending the corruption, the coups triggered

 

hostilities which blanketed the country in civil war and

 

forced the rapid expansion of the military.  But the Nigerian

 

military could not provide the stability to serve as a

 

unifying institution for an oil-rich emerging power in Black

 

Africa.

 

 

        The Ibo Experience.  A final point needs to be made

 

regarding the animosity toward the Ibo.  In their acceptance

 

of European values and the Christian religion, the Ibo

 

further differentiated themselves from the other tribes of

 

Nigeria, particularly those of the North.  The Ibo proved

 

themselves intelligent, ambitious and conscientious.  These

 

traits enabled the Ibo to capitalize on educational

 

opportunities and saw them dominate administrative

 

organizations, like the civil service and similar positions

 

in industry.  They did especially well on the General

 

Qualification Examination for Officer Placement in the

 

military, due to their higher education level.(20)  This

 

eventually became a factor in the establishment of a regional

 

quota system for officer recruitment, so as to achieve an

 

ethnic balance in the armed forces.

 

        Resentment built up among the other tribes of the near

 

Ibo monopoly of the skilled professions and white collar

 

jobs.  Old tribal prejudices were aggravated by the belief

 

that the Ibo were trying to dominate Nigeria.  The coup of

 

January 1966, instigated by Ibo majors, led to the death of

 

the key non-Ibo leaders in the country and, though apparently

 

unplanned, placed Ibo General Ironsi in power.  After an

 

initial period of relief at the believed end of corruption,

 

doubts formed among the non-Ibo population and a fear

 

developed that the coup was another step in an Ibo plan to

 

control the country.

 

        Hundreds of Ibo were massacred in May 1966 in a backlash

 

to the coup.  General Ironsi had failed to take positive

 

steps to stabilize the political situation by harshly

 

punishing the plotters, most of whom were jailed

 

indefinitely.  The appearance of complicity and the growing

 

nationwide unrest created the climate for the counter-coup in

 

July 1966; this coup was initiated by non-Ibo company grade

 

officers.  Ironsi was brutally slain and his Chief of Staff,

 

Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu "Jack" Gowon, was a compromise

 

choice as his replacement.  Gowon was the senior Northern

 

officer serving in the Army at the time; however, his choice

 

created some interesting aspects since he was Christian, from

 

a middle belt minority tribe, and had been hitherto

 

relatively obscure.

 

        The second coup saw the directed movement of troops and

 

troop units to the regions of their respective ethnic

 

heritage.  The exodus of Ibo to the Eastern Region grew and,

 

increasingly, that region in a de facto sense partitioned

 

itself from the rest of Nigeria.  Led by Lieutentant Colonel

 

Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu, like Gowow a British-trained combat

 

officer, the Eastern Region slowly emerged as the safe haven

 

homeland of the Ibo peoples.  In October of 1966, despite

 

Gowon's declaration that the Ibo would be protected, pograms

 

and rioting resulted in the mutilation and death of thousands

 

of Ibo and a mass flight to the Eastern Region by a million

 

and a half Ibo.  This October 14, 1966 Time eyewitness

 

account indicates the terror of that period:

 

 

                       ...A Lagos-bound jet had just arrived from

               London, and as the Kano passengers were escorted

               into the customs shed, a wild-eyed soldier stormed

               in, brandishing a rifle and demanding, 'Ina

               Nyammari?'--Hausa for 'Where are the damned Ibos?'

               There were Ibo among the customs officials, and

               they dropped their chalk and fled, only to be shot

               down in the main terminal by other soldiers.

               Screaming their bloody curses of a Moslem holy war,

               the Hausa troops turned the airport into a

               shambles, bayoneting Ibo worders in the bar,

               gunning them down in the corridors, and hauling Ibo

               passengers off the plane to be lined up and shot.

 

                       From the airport the troops fanned out through

               downtown Kano, hunting down Ibos in bars, hotels

               and on the streets.  One contingent drove their

               Land Rover to the rail road station where more than

               100 Ibos were waiting for a train, and cut them

               down with automatic fire.

              

 

                       The soldiers did not have to do all the

               killing.  They were soon joined by thousands of

               Hausa civilians, who rampaged through the city

               armed with stones, cutlasses, machetes, and

               homemade weapons of metal and broken glass.  Crying

               'Heathen!' and 'Allah!!' the mobs and troops

               invaded the sabon gari (strangers' quarter),

               ransacking, looting and burning Ibo homes and

               stores and murdering their owners.

              

                       ...All night long and into the morning the

               massacre went on.  Then tired but fulfilled, the

               Hausas drifted back to their homes and barracks to

               get some breakfast and sleep.  Municipal garbage

               trucks were sent out to collect the dead and dump

               them into mass graves outside the city...:(21)

 

        The fear of extermination built out of such incidents was the

 

foundation of the will to resist a vastly superior force

 

throughout the Civil War.  The Ibo nurtured fear in their enclave

 

of Eastern Nigeria with the resulting belief that only secession

 

and the formation of a separate country would ensure their

 

security and safety.  On May 30, 1967.  Ojukwu cast aside Gowon's

 

continuing efforts to maintain a federal government and proclaimed

 

the formation of the independent Republic of Biafra.

              

        The resulting Civil War lasted over two and half years.

 

The cost in human life has been estimated as high as two million

 

people, and Nigeria's expanding oil-based economy simmered when

 

its unimpeded growth could have raised the country to a position

 

of international responsibility unparalled in Black Africa.

 

 

                                       CHAPTER 2

 

                               THE COMBATANT FORCES

 

        The Federal Side.  When war broke out, the Nigerian

 

military was beset with numerous problems.  The Army was not

 

totally inexperienced, having sent two battalions with the

 

United Nations Peacekeeping Force to the Congo between 1960

 

and 1964  and a smaller force to Tanzania later for a similar

 

peacekeeping mission.  But the small 10,000-man Army that

 

existed in 1966 was wrecked by the divisiveness of the tribal

 

strife.  Many senior leaders were killed during the two

 

coups, and the migration of Ibo to the East resulted in the

 

loss of more experienced officers and NCOs.  According to one

 

source, the Federals were able to claim about 184 officers

 

while the Biafrans had 93 at the start of the war.(1)  The

 

difficulties of selection, training and development of

 

officers, including the distorted promotion schedules and age

 

structures (note that the military head of the country,

 

Lieutenant Colonel Gowon, was 32 years of age at the outbreak

 

of the war), were outgrowths of the rapid expansion of the

 

Army to 80,000 at the end of 1967 (2) and more than 200,000

 

by the end of the war.  Battalions were formed with 5 or 6

 

(vice 30+) officers in late 1967.  The resulted in tentative

 

command and control and rudimentary staff work.(3)

 

        The seeds of indiscipline were watered by the nature of

 

the force constructed.  The Nigerian Army never had to resort

 

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What existed on the Nigerian Air Force was located at Kaduna

in the Northern Region.  Naval Forces were headquartered at

the port near Lagos.

 

to conscription to fill its ranks.  Instead, it raised the

 

pay of privates to $46 a month (in a nation with per capita

 

income at the time of about $120/year) and quickly filled its

 

ranks with thousands of recruits, notably the uneducated from

 

the middle belt minority tribes; but immigrants came from

 

Chad seeking a better life.  These untrained, unsophisticated

 

soldiers highlighted the shortage of skilled personnel in

 

specialized areas like maintenance and administration.(5)

 

        Table III documents the concentration of Nigerian Army

 

Forces in the North before the war.  This disparity was

 

probably due to political manipulation.  In any event, the

 

structure left the Midwest State completely unprotected and

 

only ceremonial and administrative units in Lagos.  To

 

counter this situation and prosecute the early Nigerian

 

strategy, the Army was reorganized along these lines:

 

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Army Headquarters was in Lagos and even with early growth of

 

the Army, it still tried to maintain the centralized

 

administrative control that existed before the war.  No

 

central field control was established, and this problem was

 

exascerbated when the Chief of Staff, Colonel Joe Akapan,

 

died in a helicopter crash in the first month of fighting.

 

Until the last months of the war, the Nigerians failed to

 

exert unity of command in their operations.  By the time

 

three divisions were formed, each operated independently.  No

 

Corps Headquarters was established.  Instead, each Division

 

Commander acted as a "feudal baron", competing with the other

 

Divisions for resources amd attention, often returning to

 

Lagos to conduct business at the headquarters while fighting

 

continued in sector.  For most of the war, the Nigerian Army

 

was configured into three divisions:

 

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        a.      1 Division had been organized around what remained

 

of the Nigerian Army.  Representing the best trained and

 

disciplined of Nigerian forces, the division had about 40,000

 

soldiers in six infantry brigades.  Although its leaders were

 

slow and meticulous, 1 Division never failed in accomplishing

 

its missions (6).

 

        b.      2 Division included three infantry brigades and

 

around 20,000 troops (7).  Hastily formed during the Midwest

 

Crises of August 1967, its lack of capable leadership and

 

limited experience resulted in numerous failures on the

 

battlefield.

 

        c.      3 Marine Commmando Division distinguished itself

 

throughout most of the war.  With a total strength of about

 

35,000 (8), this division was divided into eight commmando

 

brigades which executed numerous amphibious and riverine

 

operations throughout the war.

 

        The Nigerian Navy was instrumental in blockading Biafra.

 

Though there were few ships available, the Nigerians fully

 

demonstrated their conceptual understanding of the need to

 

control the coastline and adjacent waters.  A frigate, the

 

N.A.S. Nigeria, and a submarine chaser had been obtained from

 

the Netherlands in 1966.  The British had provided two

 

minesweepers, a landing craft and a patrol craft.(9)  The

 

Russians also sold the Federals three torpedo boats (10) and

 

several radar-equipped seaward-defense vessels (11) after the

 

war started.  These last vessels were effective in canalizing

 

relief flights for Biafra into uncovered air avenues.

 

        The Nigerian Air Force had not existed until 1962 and

 

was building as the war commensed.  The British had started

 

the Air Force training, but terminated it when the Nigerians

 

unilaterally voided a military landing rights agreement.  The

 

West Germans than assumed the program in 1963.  Training was

 

conducted both in West Germany and Nigeria, but ended in July

 

1967 with the first air raid on Kaduna Airfield when a West

 

German trainer reportedly was killed.  The other trainers

 

left immediately.(12)  Over 100 Nigerian pilots were

 

qualified on trainer aircraft.  Many of these pilots were Ibo

 

who were lost to the Air Force with the advent of war.

 

Regardless, the Nigerians had no combat aircraft.  In early

 

1967, her fleet consisted of five Dakota (C-47) transports,

 

20 Dornier DO-27 light liaision planes, and 12 P149D

 

Piaggios.(13)  The Dorniers and Piaggios had come from the

 

Luftwaffe Training Mission.

 

        But help soon arrived; a July 1967 trip to Moscow bore

 

fruit in mid-August 1967 when the Soviets sent MIG 15's and

 

17's, as well as Czech Delfin L-29 light attack trainers

 

(adapted for strafing and bombing).  In all the Nigerians

 

received about 15 MIG's and 12 Delfins during the war (14) and

 

hosted hundreds of Soviet and Czech technical advisors.

 

Egyptian, European and South African mercenaries piloted the

 

jet aircraft through the first part of the war.  In early

 

1968, three IL-28 Ilyushin bombers were received at Makurdi.

 

Additionally, the Federals boasted two BAC Jet Provosts

 

(gifts from Sudan), eight Westland Whirlwind Helicopters

 

(purchased from Australia) and five DC-3's (borrowed from

 

Nigerian Airways).(15)

 

        In total, the Nigerian Air Force represented a flexible

 

and intimidating factor which had significant theoretical

 

strategic impact on the war effort.  Yet even with its

 

tremendous superiority over the Biafran opposition, the

 

Nigerians never fully exerted their advantage.  In fact, the

 

Air Force figured prominently in two of the more negative

 

aspects of the conflict, the bombing and strafing of the

 

civilian population and the failure of the Federals to stop

 

the airlift into Biafra after it was cut off from every other

 

means of support.

 

        The Rebel Forces.  The Biafran Army grew to a strength

 

of nearly 90,000.  Formed around the nucleaus of 2000 former

 

Nigerian soldiers, the Rebel Army also felt growth pains; it

 

was eternally wanting for experience, ammunition and food.

 

Overwhelmingly outmanned and outgunned, poorly led and

 

lacking an adequate support base, the Biafran Army still

 

managed to survive for two and a half years against what

 

easily became the strongest military force in Black Africa.

 

        The Biafrans maintained five undersized divisions and

 

several special units like the Biafran Organization of

 

Freedom Fighters (BOFF) and the 4th Commando Brigade.  Though

 

guerrilla tactics did enhance Biafran operations, they were

 

never embraced as the disparity between the two forces might

 

have indicated.  Ojukwu, in fact, was marked as a "prisoner

 

of classic British tactics."(16)  His methods were based on

 

the belief that a secure homeland was essential for the Ibo.

 

As such, his priority was the maintenance of an impenetrable

 

defensive parameter.

 

        There was little artillery or mortars in the Biafran

 

Army, and advanced armaments consisted of homemade rockets

 

and land mines, fabricated tanks and pre-World War II French

 

armored cars.  Desperate for war materials, the Biafrans were

 

often dependent on captured Federal equipment.  This created

 

problems.  Rebel soldiers would stop to pick up clothing and

 

supplies instead of pursuing retreating Federal troops.  When

 

the Nigerians discovered this trait, they baited preplanned

 

artillery and mortar targets with military supplies.(17)

 

        The shortage of equipment also meant that the Biafrans

 

were unable to capitalize on the large numbers of volunteers

 

which initially streamed in.  Time magazine reported that one

 

of the elite Biafran Brigades had enough arms for only 3,000

 

of its 6,000 men.(18)  This situation persisted until the

 

summer of 1968 when the French announce support of the

 

Biafran cause.

 

        The Biafran Navy was essentially a non-entity after the

 

raid on Bonny.  It consisted almost entirely of machine gun

 

mounted Chris-Crafts taken from the Port Harcourt Sailing

 

Club (19), and armed harbor and river craft.  Though the

 

Rebels tried to obtain naval vessels, they were unsuccessful

 

and never seriously influenced the naval war.

 

        The Biafran Air Force, however, evolved into a viable

 

institution.  Twice it countributed to Biafran initiatives.

 

Early in the war, the Air Force consisted of:

 

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Keeping this ancient fleet in the air rapidly overwhelmed the

 

Biafrans.  The initial value of these aircraft was the

 

psychological effect they created in the disorganized early

 

stage of the war.  The bombers made harassing attacks on

 

Lagos and the Northern air fields, creating large scale panic

 

with their erratic bombing with homemade munitions.  The

 

helicopters likewise dampened Federal fervor on the

 

battlefield.  Used primarily for reconnaissance, Federal

 

soldiers soon discovered they were not safe when the

 

Alouettes were in the air due either to aerially supported

 

artillery or mortar attacks, or homemade bombs dropped from

 

the aircraft.  They quickly learned to seek cover when the

 

helicopters were flying.(22)

 

        Besides the continuing airlift, the next important

 

contribution made to the air war came at the end.  A Swedish

 

citizen was moved by the suffering created in Biafra by

 

Federal air raids.  This man, Count Carl von Rosen, decided

 

to get the Biafrans a countering air capability and

 

introduced 19 Swedish single engine MFI-90 airplanes.  Each

 

of these trainers had 12 rockets in a pod mounted under the

 

wing and was capable of flying undetected at tree top level

 

to its targets.  These tactics had an immediate impact on the

 

Nigerians, but it was a case of too little, too late as the

 

war ended before the potential of this small air force could

 

be realized.  They were particularly effective in attacks

 

against fixed targets, like oil wells and equipment.(23)

 

        The Biafrans simply were never able to match the

 

relative Federal might.  The oil revenue with which they

 

expected to finance their war effort was soon cut off as the

 

Federal blockade was enforced.  By the time massive French

 

aid was received, the war was lost and the aid merely

 

prolonged the suffering.

 

 

                                      CHAPTER 3

       

                                  THE WAR BEGINS

 

 

               I need not tell you what horror, what

        devastation and what extreme human suffering will

        attend the use of force.  When it is over and the

        smoke and dust have lifted, and the dead are

        buried, we shall find, as other people have found,

        that it has all been futile, entirely futile, in

        solving the problem we set out to solve. (1)

 

        Initial Phase.  (June-July 1967).  No one heard the

 

prophetic words of Colonel R.A. Adebayo, Governor of the West

 

Region of Nigeria.  Both sides were totally unprepared for

 

what was to come.  This was the foremost lesson at the start

 

of the war.  On the Federal side, there was no comprehension

 

of the paranoia which encompassed the Ibo being.  Instead,

 

Gowon expected a "police acton" whereby the rebellious

 

Biafrans would be surrounded and isolated from the world;

 

then Biafran resistance would quickly fade and Federal

 

victory would be rapid--"a quick kill."

 

        Even before the Biafran Independence Announcement, the

 

Federal government cut off telephone, telegraph and postal

 

service to the rebellious state.  Afterwards, airlines,

 

railroads and highways were closed, and the small Nigerian

 

Navy prepared to blockade all shipping except oil tankers.

 

Even these were restricted from transit as hostilities

 

intensified.

 

        Mobilization was half-hearted at best.  In the North,

 

the Chairman of Internal Administrative Services warned

 

provincial administrators of the impending conflict.  Limited

 

training in civil defense began and evacuation planning was

 

conducted in the event of raids on the larger cities.

 

Ex-servicemen, some 7,000, were recalled to active duty and

 

formed four new infantry battalions.  The Army started

 

recruiting members from the local and national police

 

forces.(2)

 

        After a five week lull, the first offensive actions

 

began.  Barely qualifying as skirmishes, they marked a

 

Federal campaign to advance from the North on four axes with

 

the objective of crushing Biafran resistance and seizing

 

their capital of Enugu.  After some initial successes, the

 

Nigerians began to meet increasing Rebel resistance.  It

 

became apparent that they had underestimated the measure of

 

resolve of the poorly equipped Biafran Army. Also

 

highlighted were the lack of training and discipline of the

 

Nigerian Army and the difficulties they would experience due

 

to their long lines of communication.  The offensive ground

 

to a halt, and the rebellion that they expected would take

 

only days to crush exhibited more long term potential.

 

        The Biafrans set their strategy as the establishment of

 

a secure homeland for the Ibo and the development of a might

 

which, as Ojukwu stated, no force in Black Africa could

 

overcome.(3)  Like the Federals, the Rebels stressed civil

 

defense procedures.  With limited military resources, yet

 

driven by terrible fear, the people of the region prepared

 

defensive positions on likely avenues of approach, formed

 

local militias and secured Nigerian-owned war materials that

 

remained in the region.  In fact, Rebel preparations began

 

well in advance of the actual secession date.  They started

 

in earnest with the massive influx of refugee Ibo during and

 

after the September/October 1966 pogroms.  Non-Easterners had

 

been ordered out of the region at that time, and there are

 

clear indications that secession was planned from that

 

point.(4)

 

        The Biafrans met the initial Federal advances from the

 

Northern Region with full resistance.  They used to their

 

advantage the fact that they were fighting in their home

 

territory, capitalizing on the availability of manpower to

 

hinder Federal advances.  Traps, ditches and obstacles were

 

placed in the paths of attacking Nigerians.  These only

 

slowed the Federals, who used their superior firepower to

 

saturate prepared positions and their mobility advantage to

 

outflank Biafran strong points.  At Obollo Eke, for example,

 

artillery and mortar shelling began at 6 a.m. August 3, 1967,

 

and continued until 8 a.m.  After a brief attack, artillery

 

preparations resumed, followed by another probe.  This

 

alternating pattern of two hours of shelling and a probing

 

attack continued during daylight hours for four days before

 

the Rebles were pushed out of Obollo Eke.(5)

 

        The extensive road network in northern Biafra created

 

flank defensive problems.  After the first loses of Biafran

 

territory at Obudu, the Rebels planned to fall back to Ogoja.

 

In retreat they ran into a Federal ambush and learned just

 

how vulnerable their flanks were.(6)  Quickly they adjusted

 

their tactics, moving to the flanks when armored vehicles

 

assaulted their lines and reclosing the ranks after they

 

passed.  The Rebels soon resorted to hit-and-run tactics in

 

the form of ambushes to harrass Nigerian operations.  But

 

they never abandoned their static defenses, and from the very

 

beginning the Biafrans were victims of their lack of military

 

experience.

 

        One bright spot for the Biafrans appeared on July 21,

 

1967  when a World War II American-made B-26 bomber piloted by

 

a Polish expatriot, called "Kamikaze" Brown, bombed and

 

strafed Federal positions at Obukpa.  This greatly lifted

 

Biafran morale (7), but offered ominous clouds for future

 

events. Both Great Britain and the Untied States had

 

rejected Nigerian requests for aircraft.  By July 31 Nigerian

 

representatives were reported in Moscow (8) and expansion of

 

the war's lethality was imminent.  (Note:  Arms supply was a

 

major part of a critical issue, outside intervention, which

 

dominated international discussion of the Nigerian Civil

 

War.)

 

        Another event which portended the calamities to follow

 

was the amphibious assault on and capture of the Island of

 

Bonny at the mouth of the Port Harcourt Harbor.  This Federal

 

operation was important for two reasons.  First, it

 

demonstrated a boldness, fluidity and imagination seldom seen

 

in Federal operations.  The Bonny assault was not remarkable

 

in its execution; however, the operation was in marked

 

contrast to the "skirmishes, slow, cautious probes, and long

 

distance bombardments of doutful object with doubtful

 

accuracy [and an] incredible amount of aimless and wasteful

 

shooting"  (9) which dominated the northern battlefields. On

 

Bonny a 1000 man invasion force loaded on two ships

 

overwhelmed a company--sized garrison after a limited naval

 

bombardment.  Destroyed was Biafra's only real naval vessel,

 

a Nigerian patrol boat seized at secession; more important,

 

Port Harcourt, the major port and oil terminal in Biafra, was

 

effectively sealed off.

       

        This leads to the second importance of the Bonny

 

capture.  It pinpoints the failure of Biafran leaders to

 

appreciate the incredible consequence of losing their sea

 

lines of communications.  They did not see the need to secure

 

adequate sea power before the war began and were unable to

 

correct their shortcoming when it became apparent how serious

 

the Federals were about enforcing their blockade of the

 

Biafran coastline.  The New York Times noted at this stage of

 

the war that Biafra had a "better-than-even chance of

 

survival" ...but that it was... "clear, that the East cannot

 

survive for many months unless the naval blockade is

 

broken."(10)  Instead of confronting this problem, however

 

the Biafrans turned inward.

 

        The Midwestern Invasion (August-September 1967).  The two

 

forces fought tentatively through July of 1967 and into

 

August, with the Federals steadily gaining ground.  Then the

 

Biafrans, who had seemed interested only in a defensive war,

 

launched an attack into the Midwestern State.  This marked

 

the turning point in the war, as the Rebels gambled on a

 

disastrous offensive campaign.

 

        "We have no territorial ambitions.  We do not want to

 

capture anybody or punish anybody.  We just want to be left

 

alone,"(11) Ojukwu wrote.  The drive into the Midwest,

 

however, stood in stark contrast to this claim, Biafra had

 

moved boldly beyond simply protecting the Ibo enclave and

 

seized the initiative, taking the war to the Federals. The

 

objectives of the strike were lightning attacks on, and the

 

capture of, the Federal capital of Lagos and the Western

 

State capital of Ibadan.  The occupation of these two

 

capitals was expected to cause an immediate collapse of the

 

Federal government and an end to the war.  But the way the

 

Rebel forces spread throughout the region, it is clear that

 

Ojukwa had other objectives in their advance.  Among these

 

were establishment of internal control of the Midwestern

 

State and limited prosecution of the war into the Northern

 

State.

 

        The execution of the plan higlighted the incompetence

 

of the strategic planners in Biafra.  Just as they failed to

 

fully grasp the implications of a naval blockade, they lacked

 

the professional skills and imagination (and patience, and

 

resources) to coordinate an effective attack.  The plan took

 

advantage of the sparse Federal forces which were thinly

 

spread throughout the region in small garrisons, more an

 

internal security force than an army.  But the plan did not

 

correctly account for many of the non-military factors

 

bearing on the situation, nor did it have sufficient

 

flexibility to confront in any realistic sense changing

 

conditions.

 

        The Midwestern State was in a precarious position, a

 

small, wealthy area caught between the secessionist Ibo and

 

the Federal captial of Lagos.  In its boundaries were some

 

800,000 Ibo who could be expected to have sympathies for the

 

East.  Primarily agrarian, the region was rich in palm oil,

 

rubber and timber, while oil was a growing resource.

 

One-third of Nigeria's 1967 production and one-half of her

 

reserves were located here.  This made the Midwest a

 

desirable property for both sides.(12)

 

        At 3 a.m. on August 9, a 100 vehicle column (about 1000

 

men) crossed the Onitsha Bridge over the Niger River.  Within

 

hours Rebel troops occupied the Midwest captial of Benin,

 

while others had fanned out towards Okene (see Map IV) in the

 

north, Owo, also north, and Sapele and Warri to the south.

 

The takeover was facilitated by an insurrection of Ibo-led

 

troops in the region and few shots were actually fired.

 

Evidence is strong that Federal military leaders of Ibo

 

origin secretly collaborated with the Biafrans, providing

 

intelligence on Federal troop dispositions and coordinating a

 

revolt from Nigeria in conjunction with the offensive.(13)

 

As a result, operational security and surprise were achieved.

 

The inital success of the raids, coupled with an August 11

 

air attack on Lagos, had a devastating psychological effect

 

on the Federal side.

 

        In compensation for the tremendous security surrounding

 

the operation, the Biafrans delayed the formation of their

 

brigade-sized task force, conducted no rehersal and even

 

withheld appointment of the task force commander until the

 

day before the attack.(14)  This demonstrated a lack of

 

appreciation for the necessity of building teamwork and

 

cohesion in military units and entered several unknowns into

 

the Midwest operational equation.

 

        a.      Lieutenant Colonel Victor Banjo, a Yoruba, was

 

selected to be the operational commander for politcal

 

reasons rather than his military skills.  There was a belief

 

that a non-Ibo leader would help gain Midwest and Western

 

support for the Biafran attack and in the end, help unite all

 

of the South against the North.  This not withsanding, Banjo

 

ignored his principal objective, Lagos, and twice held up his

 

advance.  At Benin he halted to "reorganize" his forces,

 

though they had not fired a shot.  Time was lost in an

 

argument between Benin and Enugu over who was to be the new

 

governor of the region.(15)  After three days the Rebels

 

advanced on to the west before stopping at Ore.  Forgeting

 

that their success depended on speed, the Biafrans were

 

hesitant to face the uncertainty of continued advance.(16)

 

Lack of agrresive leadership and unity of purpose resulted

 

in a two week delay after which the Rebels lost the

 

initiative.

 

        b.      The shock of the invasion and the lack of discipline

 

displayed by Biafran soldiers produced adverse results.  The

 

support expected for the Midwest Ibo did not materialize as

 

expected, and the negative reaction by non-Ibo in the Midwest

 

and West was far worse than anticipated.  It evidenced a

 

political blindness in the Biafran leadership akin to their

 

military shortcomings.  John de St. Horre notes that this

 

political blindness was "too often repeated to be a chance

 

phenomenon."(17)

 

        c.      The political "wheeling and dealing" that took place

 

in Benin over control of the region, at the expense of

 

military objectives, lent a suspicious cast to the Biafran

 

leadership.  The motives and actions of all officers became

 

suspect because of the rumor of "saboteurs" within the

 

leadersip.(18)  This prejudgement severely hampered command

 

and control in Biafra thereafter and is discussed in Chapter

 

5.

 

        d.      The Biafrans probably lacked the capability to

 

conduct such an offensive operation.  In his book, Reluctant

 

Rebel, Fola Oyewole details the lack of preparation for the

 

Midwest offensive by his company.  Here is a summary of one

 

episode.  Upon his return from a battalion field exercise, he

 

was ordered to form a new company at Onitsha.  He delivered

 

his car and possessions to family members in that city and

 

reported immediately to his battalion.  Within hours he moved

 

to the Midwest.  His unit's mission was the capture of the

 

army barracks at Ugbelli.  With an officer cadet as his

 

executive officer and no experienced noncommissioned

 

officers, the company was bused to the objective area.  Ten

 

miles from Ugbelli, he stopped the column and provided a

 

short briefing, though he was without intelligence or

 

reconnasissance.  Fortunately there was no opposition at the

 

objective.  Even so, the untrained and undisciplined troops

 

engaged in sporatic firing which resulted in one wound.(19)

 

Such episodes illustrate just how unprepared the Rebels were

 

for the war.  The vehicles used for the attack included

 

homemade armored cars, farm trucks and passenger cars.  The

 

Biafran soldiers were poorly equipped, and many were without

 

uniforms.  They were lucky to meet only token resistance from

 

the few Federal Forces.

 

        From the Federal side, the Midwest Invasion achieved one

 

significant result.  It broke the complacency surrounding the

 

Federal war effort, and unified the ojectives of Lagos, the

 

West and the North.  The entire country was intimidation by

 

the aggressiveness of the Eastern Ibo and the response was

 

 immediate.  In a demand for Federal action, anti-Ibo riots

 

broke out in Lagos and Ibadan.  A dawn-to-dusk curfew was

 

imposed at Ibadan, and troops and armored cars presented a

 

show of force in Lagos to buoy public confidence.

 

        Militarily, the reaction was more substantive.  A war

 

cabinet was formed in Lagos.  Remaining Federal forces

 

operating in the Midwest fell back to blocking positions,

 

most notably to the south of Ore about 120 miles from Lagos

 

on the overland axis of advance from Benin.  There they were

 

reinforced by a company of Federal Guards from Lagos.  A new

 

unit, 2 Division, commanded by then Lieutenant Colonel

 

Murtala Mohammed, sent its 7 Brigade to Ore, while the 6 and

 

8 Brigades were placed on the northern border of the Midwest

 

to occupy the Biafran's right flank.

 

        Lagos must have been reminiscent of Paris and her taxis

 

during the first battle of the Marne.  Ground wagons and red-

 

and-silver buses delivered soldiers from Lagos to the front.

 

Six hundred soldiers were recalled from Bonny, and 500 more

 

were moved by rail from Kaduna in the north.  The war in the

 

north of Biafra slowed as attention and resources were drawn

 

to overcome the threat in the Midwest.  Nigeria's leading

 

playwright, Wole Soyinka, observed that "the short, surgical

 

police action is being conducted with blunt and unsterile

 

scapels."(20)

 

        By mid-August, blown bridges and their own hesitation

 

had stopped the Biafrans.  The very factor which had hampered

 

the Federal offensive earlier, long lines of communcations,

 

now was a problem for the Rebels.  A small force from the

 

beginning, it was stretched too far to withstand the growing

 

Federal pressure.

 

        Abruptly, the Rebel offensive ended as the Federals took

 

the initiative.  After a single, fierce, battalion-level,

 

infantry battle at Foriku, just south of Ore, Biafran

 

resistance faded into an "accelerating retreat" characterized

 

by minor delaying actions, blown bridges and cratered

 

roads.(21)  The two northern brigades were in a race to

 

outflank the Biafrans and cut off their retreat to the Niger

 

River Bridge at Onitsha.  In their haste, the Biafrans left

 

behind many soldiers who did not receive word to withdraw and

 

were consequently captured.  Benin was evacuated days before

 

the Federals arrived.  The remnants of the invading force

 

crossed the Niger Bridge at Onitsha, blowing two spans in

 

their passing.  The destruction of the bridge, a giant

 

edifice commemorative of Nigerian progress, was symbolic of a

 

final isolation for Biafra and a new and deadlier phase of

 

the war.

 

        From the Midwest Invasion the Biafrans had hoped to show

 

the world that they were a legitimate power deserving of

 

international recognition; instead the foray ended with

 

disaster.  The Rebels gained some food, materiel, and the

 

assets of the Bank of Benin which were expropriated in the

 

occupation.  But the losses far overshadowed those minor

 

gains:

 

        a.      The Federals declared all out war, launching the

 

first air strikes of the war at Enugu, Onitsha, Port Harcourt

 

and Calabar among others.(22)

 

        b.      The Biafrans removed the buffer of the midwest

 

state.  All sympathy in the South was lost as non-Ibo became

 

pro-Federals.  Additionally, the blockade became more

 

effective as trade that had flourished in the Niger died.(23)

 

        c.      The loss of resources, men and materiel, in the

 

Midwest hastened the fall of Enugu.  The withdrawal of these

 

assets had weakened the defense of the northern region. When

 

these forces did not return and the Federals resumed their

 

advance with a rekindled fervor, the early fall of the

 

Biafran capital was assured.(24)

 

        d.      Finally, the initiative was surrendered to the

 

Federals.  With the offensive they initiated in mid-August,

 

the Federals began to display their superiority.  The

 

conflict slowed to the plodding war of attrition that would

 

continue for over two years.  The norther border was closed

 

by the Nigerian 1 Division, the Midwestern Region had been

 

clearly by 2 Division, and the Navy had blockaded most of the

 

sea approaches.  The Cameroons had closed their rugged border

 

in June 1967, and the noose was slowly tightened by the

 

Federals.

 

 

                                          CHAPTER 4

                              

                                    THE WAR DEVELOPS

 

                               (October 1967-August 1968)

 

 

        The Biafrans had gambled on taking the initiative away

 

from the Federal forces.  Pushed back across the Niger River

 

after the abortive Midwest invasion, they had lost any chance

 

of victory and had spurred the Nigerians into action.  The

 

Federal response was a three-pronged offensive from the

 

north, the west and the south, while they methodically

 

tightened their blockade.  The result was the isolation of

 

Biafra and the gradual collapse of the Rebel state into a

 

smaller and smaller enclave.

 

        The Influence of Gowon.  The deliberateness of the

 

Nigerian effort was indicative of the character of the

 

Federal leader, now Major General Yakubu "Jack" Gowon.  This

 

occurred despite the fact that personally Gowon was atypical

 

of the people he led.  Born into  a Methodist minister's

 

family in 1934, Gowon was a Christian from a minority tribe

 

in the predominantely Moslem north.  He was educated in

 

Nigeria and received military training in the British-

 

operated Officer Training School at Teshire, Ghana and at

 

Eton Hall and the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst in

 

England.  He and his counterpart on the Rebel side, Ojukwu,

 

had similar military backgrounds.

 

        Both were commissioned in the Army in 1957 and served

 

with the United Nations Force in the Congo.  After staff

 

college in Camberley, England, Gowon was promoted to

 

Lieutenant Colonel in 1963.  In 1965 he attended the Joint

 

Services Staff College in England, returning to Nigeria two

 

days before the first coup of January 15, 1966; his absence

 

from Nigeria may actually have saved his life.  In any event,

 

Major General ironsi took power and appointed him Chief of

 

Staff of the Nigerian Army.  In the aftermath of the July

 

1966 counter-coup, Gowon was a compromise selection to head

 

Nigeria though he apparently was not involved in the coup.

 

        Where Ojukuw was outgoing, openly ambitious and

 

charismatic, Gowon was more sedate.  A man of slight stature,

 

Gowon was trim, dapper and polished.  He radiated little of

 

the fire and exhibited none of the clever intelligence of his

 

adversary; but Gowon was stable, serious and determined.  He

 

had the talents to hold together and orchestrate the wartime

 

administration of the emerging power engaged in a bitter

 

civil war.  This General Gowon did under the intensive

 

scrutiny and criticism of the international media, yet he

 

displayed insight that tinged his leadership with

 

Lincolnesque qualities.(1)  His moderation is regarded as

 

possibly the greatest single asset that he brought to the

 

war.(2)  There was no panic in his headquarters, and Gowon

 

let his field commanders run their operations with little

 

intervention.  In fact, his visits to the fronts were

 

virtually nonexistant; he depended on radio and telephone

 

contact for information.(3)

 

        Gowon was sensitive to the fear of genocide in the Ibo

 

and to the necessity of rebuilding the country when the war

 

ended.  He issued a code of conduct for the military.  He

 

refused to authorize any awards for the conduct of the Civil

 

War.  Finally, General Gowon invited a team of international

 

observers to the front to appraise the conduct of Federal

 

soldiers.(4)

 

        Gowon balanced his understanding of the long term

 

aspects of his policies with a resolve which demonstrated his

 

comprehension of the short range needs of Nigeria to conduct

 

war.  He gradually built up his forces and arms rather than

 

immediately acquiring armaments and munitions in bulk, thus

 

avoiding morgaging his country's furture.(5)  Additionally,

 

once he decided that siege warfare was the best method to

 

secure victory, he applied the blockade and did not waiver

 

under the intense international pressure to allow mass relief

 

operations into Biafra.  Regardless of whether his position

 

was morally right or wrong (considering the people who died

 

of starvation), Gowon maintained the commitment necessary to

 

direct his country througout the war and the insight to

 

reunite it when peace arrived.

 

        1 Division Operations.  The unit that most reflected

 

Gowon's cautious resolve was 1 Division which fought in the

 

north of the Eastern Region.  Containing the bulk of the

 

remaining  Nigerian regular prewar army, the division applied

 

renewed pressure around Enugu after the Midwest offensive.

 

Enugu's importance went beyond the fact that it was the

 

Biafran capital: it was a coal mining and steel town which

 

lay on the only railroad into the Eastern Region.  As a

 

captial, the city had symbolic value; but as an industrial

 

center, it represented a major asset to the Biafran war

 

machine.

 

        Characteristic of 1 Division, detailed planning and

 

preparation went into the operational concept for the Enugu

 

assault.  1 Brigade was tasked with capturing Enuku; it had

 

seven battalions (1000 men each) with another 1000 men

 

available as individual replacements.  The first brigade was

 

tasked with capturing Enuku.  The plan called for a two axes

 

advance from Nsukka to Nine Mile Corner and Eka, followed by

 

a single axis movement to Enugu.(6)

 

        On September 10, 1967 the Rebels launched a pre-emptive

 

counter-attack in which they introduced their own armored

 

personnel carriers, pre-World War II French vehicles called

 

"Red Devils."  Slow and bulky, the "Red Devils" were

 

particularly vulnerable to antitank weapons, and the attack

 

quickly stalled.(7)  Two days later the Federal attack

 

renewed.  It was a deliberate process as the Federals met the

 

typical Rebel rear guard delaying action.  Obstacles were

 

created using craters, trenches and debris, and progress was

 

futher hampered by well planned covering fires on the

 

obstacles.

 

        The shelling of Enugu commenced on September 26th and

 

continued sporatically, but in volume, until the city was

 

taken on October 4th.(8)  The serious fighting occurred on

 

October 1st when Nine Mile Corner was captured by the

 

Nigerians.  The dominant high ground, Millikin Hill, was

 

controlled after weak resistance as the Biafran support base

 

fled from Enugu and the soldiers, isolated, soon followed.(9)

 

        The Federals had clearly demonstrated their superior

 

firepower with the capture of Enugu.  The relatively

 

extensive artillery preparation was the key to capturing the

 

city.  However, the psychological damage done by, and

 

resources diverted to, the loss in the Midwest (which was

 

cleared at the end of September by the Nigerians) can not be

 

overlooked as factors in the defeat at Enugu.  Additionally,

 

Lieutenant Colonel Banjo and three others held responsible

 

for the Midwest debacle were executed by the Biafrans on

 

September 24th, feeding the suspicion of the Biafran populace

 

regarding "saboteurs."

 

        The fall of Enugu highlights several problems which were

 

to haunt the Biafrans throughout the war:

 

        a.  The tremendous shortages of food and materiel were

 

exacerbated by the support base which the Biafrans developed.

 

Administrative directorates, completely civilianized, were

 

responsible for providing services to military units.  For

 

instance, the food directorate set up kitchens behind the

 

lines.  These cookhouses prepared food which was moved to the

 

troops for consumption.  Throughout the war, as at Enugu,

 

when the Army was forced to withdraw, the kitchens were

 

disassembled and reestablished several days later in a safer

 

location.  Meanwhile, the troops were without food for days

 

as they continued to fight.(10)  By the end of 1967 the Army

 

formed the Biafran Army Service Corps (BASC) to help with

 

food distribution and other support requirements, but the

 

BASC often engaged in petty arguments with the directorates

 

over control of resources.  Many of these disputes required

 

personal intervention by Ojukuwu and clearly showed a lack of

 

logistics awareness and unity of purpose in the Biafra war

 

effort.

 

        b.      Disorganization is also apparent in the way that

 

reserves were thrown pell mell into battle when the situation

 

was desperate.  Time and again, the Federals would attack and

 

overwhelm their objective; thus, the Biafrans would

 

frantically mobilize every available resource and try to

 

reverse an already lost cause.  At Enugu, it was the

 

formation and deployment of the "S" Brigade, raised to

 

recapture the city from the Federals.  This brigade continued

 

resistance at Enugu for weeks until it was outflanked and

 

forced to withdraw.  The lesson here is that the Biafran

 

leadership did not fully consider its operational problems.

 

Fighting a defensive war, the superficial, obvious

 

preparations for battle were made.  Defensive fortifications

 

with concrete bunkers, alternate  positions and preplanned

 

ambushes were planned and emplaced.  Yet the leadership did

 

not plan for the worst case.  Consequently, hectic scrambling

 

occurred to regain lost positions when some degree of

 

realistic foresight and planning might have saved precious

 

resources and ensured more successes.

 

        c.      Perhaps the reason that the Biafrans did not

 

consider the worst was because discussion of such cases would

 

have cast suspicion on the planner as being a "saboteur."

 

Paranoia was rampant throughout Biafra.  Even in official

 

channels, the truth, if disastrous, was avoided.  After the

 

fall of Enugu, Biafran documents, books and press releases

 

were identified as originating from "Enugu."  Umuahia, where

 

the govenment moved from Enugu, was called the "Administra-

 

tive Center," a euphemism for capital, and Port Harcourt

 

later was said to be "disturbed" instead of captured.(11)

 

Ultimately, the air of suspicion and the lack of reality in

 

the precautions of the government hindered the military

 

capacity and caused thousands of civilian deaths.

 

        The Federals also demonstrated patterns which were to

 

follow them through the rest of the war.

 

        a.      Their long lines of communications, dependence on

 

artillery bombardment (which required massive resupply

 

efforts) and reliance of armored personnel carriers to lead

 

combat formations, initially tied them to over-the-road

 

movements.  This was especially true since they started the

 

war in the rainy season.  Soon their supply lines were

 

overextended.  This may have been a major factor for the

 

deliberateness of 1 Division operations.  After their

 

cautious movement during combat, they took six months to

 

resupply and reorganize before their next operations.

 

        b.      The Federals did not capitalize on the use of

 

infantry tactics.  Systemic is the word one author used to

 

define every Federal operation.  The saturation shelling which

 

preceeded Federal assaults left the soldiers with little to

 

do other than walk-in and mop-up the various objectives.(12)

 

This meant that the inexperienced troops gained minimally

 

from each successive operation.  It also allowed for greater

 

civilian casualties, especially as the war continued, and the

 

Biafrans were squeezed into smaller and smaller areas.

 

        c.      Lastly, Enugu once more pointed out shortcomings in

 

the Federal intelligence capabilities.  At the outbreak of

 

the war, the Federals had inaccurately predicted the Biafran

 

capacity to wage war and had planned a short "police action."

 

The Midwest Invasion had caught them by surprise, and when

 

retaking Benin, Federal forces barraged the city even though

 

the Biafrans had vacated the premises days before.(13)  At

 

Enugu, 1 Division did not realize in their caution that

 

pursuit of the disorganized, retreating Biafrans, and the

 

destruction of the Rebel force which was then possible, might

 

have brought a rapid conclusion to the civil war.(14)

 

        2 Division Operations.  Things were not all one-sided on

 

the northern front.  At Onitsha, the Federal 2 Division was

 

bogged down.  Its continuous setbacks there were one of the

 

major failures of the Nigerian Army in the war.  The green,

 

untrained and poorly led 2 Division offered a marked contrast

 

to 1 Division.

 

        Thrown together in the heat of the Midwest Invasion, 2

 

Division got a false sense of its own and Biafran

 

capabilities as the Rebel forces melted away in the

 

Midwestern Region under slight pressure.  Securing the Region

 

by the end of September, the Division Commander, then Colonel

 

Murtala Mohammed, prepared for his next operation--the

 

capture of Onitsha on the Biafra side of the Niger River.

 

Onitsha was important  because it was a commercial center with

 

the largest market in West Africa.  Denial of access to these

 

resources would seriously reduce Biafran logistical

 

capabilities.  Additionally, securing a bridgehead on the

 

east bank of the Niger at Onitsha would shorten Nigerian

 

lines of communications  with Lagos.  Even with the Niger

 

River Bridge down, waterborne movement from the main road on

 

the western side would greatly reduce transit time for

 

replacements and supplies into the Eastern Region.  Finally,

 

Onitsha marked the route into the Ibo heartland and therefore

 

would take the war to traditional tribal home.  The

 

possible psychological gain was great. 

       

        All available ferry boats in the country were collected

 

at Asaba on the western side of the river, and limited

 

special training was conducted on river crossing operations.

 

The Army and Supreme Headquarters advised against the opposed

 

river crossing, recommending instead that 2 Division should

 

transit the Niger unopposed, north at Idah and then attack

 

overland to Onitsha.  Both staffs realized how complicated

 

this operation was for inexperienced troops with inadequate

 

equipment.  The General Officer Commanding (GOC), Colonel

 

Mohammed, had his way.  Onitsha was attacked with mortars and

 

artillery in preparation for the assault.  On the night of

 

October 12, the Federals crossed in strength, established a

 

bridgehead and fanned out into the city with two armored

 

personnel carriers in the lead.  Here, the conduct of the

 

operation faltered.

 

        The undisciplined soldiers became obsessed with

 

ransacking Onitsha for spoils, forgetting the need for

 

securing the bridgehead.  The Biafrans, under Colonel Joe

 

Achuzie, counter-attacked; the Federals were surprised, out

 

of position and routed.  Driven back to the river's edge, the

 

soldiers discovered that expected reinforcements and supplies

 

had not arrived because of the mechanical failure of the

 

follow-on support vessel.  The 1000-man assault battalion was

 

decimated in their disorganization under the Rebel fire.  In

 

this and other crossing attempts, drownings accounted for an

 

excessive number of losses, pinpointing the lack of detailed

 

training/rehearsals for the crossings.(15)

 

        The second crossing was tried on September 28.  It

 

failed when the Biafrans machinegunned the boats in the

 

water.  By the time the third attempt came, demoralized 2

 

Division troops were on the verge of mutiny and chaos.(16)

 

The Division Commander then abandoned further river assaults

 

and executed the plan originally recommended by his higher

 

headquarters.  He crossed the Niger unopposed at Idah which

 

was under Federal control and moved slowly to Onitsha in 1

 

Division territory.  Planning and operational security were

 

poor, but the Rebels were overextended and could not redeploy

 

in sufficient numbers to counter the 2 Division attack.(17)

 

        At the end of March 1968, six months after the first

 

abortive river crossing, Onitsha fell to a two-pronged

 

attack, one brigade closing from the north and another

 

conducting a river crossing over the Niger (near the original

 

sites).  The battle only lasted five hours (18), belying the

 

difficulty the Federals experienced at Onitsha.  The victory

 

was pyrrhic.  2 Division was demoralized and largely

 

ineffective as a combat orgainzation. It had difficulty

 

moving beyond Onitsha and clearing its sector.  The road

 

between Onitsha and Enugu where 1 Division maintained its

 

headquarters was closed by Rebel activity until the last days

 

of the war.  The Division later had to return elements to the

 

Midwest to counter recurring Rebel guerrilla activities in

 

that region.  One strong Rebel raiding expedition in April

 

1968 took Asaba and briefly closed direct supply across the

 

Niger.(19)  Such harassment with its drain on manpower

 

constantly degraded 2 Division capabilities on the eastern

 

side of the Niger.

 

        Two final events starkly characterized 2 Division during

 

this period.  First, soldiers of the Division massacred,

 

without apparent provocation, 300 Ibo men, women and children

 

who had gathered in Onitsha Cathedral to pray during the

 

city's seige.  This brutal act typified the lack of

 

leadership, discipline and professionalism in 2 Division.

 

Such incidents solidified sentiments that the Federals wanted

 

to exterminate the Ibo, thus hardening the Ibo resolve to

 

fight on.(20)

 

        The second incident occurred during resupply operations 

 

for the battle at Onitsha.  A division convoy of over 100

 

trucks, led by two armored cars, was ambushed by Colonel

 

Achuzie's forces at Abagana, a few miles northeast of

 

Onitsha.  The armored vehicles sped away from the convoy when

 

it was ambushed, while the packed column provided a

 

spectacular target when a petroleum tanker went up in flames.

 

The fire swiftly spread through the convoy which was lost in

 

its entirety, including almost all the drivers and

 

escorts.(21)  Once more poor planning, training and

 

discipline haunted 2 Division, as the whole supply column was

 

destroyed in one lucky ambush.

 

        3 Marine Commando Division Operations.  The war in the

 

south took on a different nature.  Colonel Benjamin Adekunle

 

had obtained permission to redesignate his 3 Infantry

 

Division as 3 Marine Commando Division.  This was based on

 

the unique role the unit had played up to that point in the

 

war, first with the amphibious assault at Bonny and then with

 

riverine operations to help clear the Midwestern Region.  The

 

new division took on the special qualities of its GOC.

 

Colonel Adekunle, Age 29, was diminuative and aggressive,

 

known to be more daring than the other division commanders.

 

A staunch disciplinarian, Adekunle carried a golf club shaft

 

or bat which he used to prod soldiers under fire.  Colonel

 

Adekunle apparently was able to get away with this because of

 

the universally accepted belief that he was fearless.  He was

 

noted for personally leading his brigades into battle.(22)

 

        Adekunle was dynamic and innovative in his plans and

 

operations.  In early October 1967, he put these traits to

 

use as 3 Marine Commando Division finalized preparations for

 

an amphibious assault of Calabar.  Calabar was the eastern

 

most port on the Biafra coastline.  Through it, small

 

quantities of materiel were still shipped into the region.

 

Calabar also lay on the remaining passible road to the

 

Cameroons.  By capturing Calabar, the Federals would

 

interdict all land routes into Biafra and control the entire

 

coast, thus cutting off the secessionists from the rest of

 

the world except by air and telex.

 

        A garrison of 1000 men was left at Bonny to defend the

 

island, whiel the rest of the division, six battalions of 500

 

men each, loaded out naval shipping for the assault of

 

Calabar.  It is important to note that this operation took

 

all of the Federal naval force, leaving Bonny weakly

 

supported.  The Rebels later attacked and overwhelmed the

 

Federal garrison which was pushed to a perimeter on the

 

waterline before adequate relief arrived in early 1968.

 

Adekunle and the headquarters at Lagos had been willing to

 

take this risk, because of the additional front opening at

 

Calabar.  The total of five fronts (Bonny, Onitsha, Enugu,

 

the Northeast, and Calabar) significantly overextended the

 

already strained resources of the weaker Biafrans.  By this

 

reasoning and their comprehension of the import of the naval

 

blockade, the Federal leadership demonstrated its superior

 

grasp of strategic issues.

 

        One battalion of Biafran infantry was defending both

 

Calabar, to the east of the Cross River inlet, and Oron to

 

the west of the inlet.(23)  Adekunle ignored the company-

 

sized Oron contingent and attacked near Calabar to seize that

 

city.  After a naval bombardment interspersed with aerial

 

bombing and strafing, the Federal's lone tank landing ship,

 

the NNS Lokoja, debarked one battalion in late morning.

 

Resistance in the form of small arms fire was soon overcome.

 

The Lokoja embarked another battalion which it delivered to

 

an adjacent beach head that afternoon.  The two battalions

 

proceeded on separate axes into Calabar.  Fighting was

 

spirited and confused by pro-Federal snipers.  Several

 

sources stated that Federal troops were infiltrated into

 

Calabar disquished as fishermen and later created havoc.(24)

 

Hand-to-hand fighting occurred in the streets and heavy

 

civilian casualties resulted.  The defending battalion (-)

 

was reduced to 350 men by the end of the first day and 200

 

men on the second day (25) when the Federals landed a third

 

battalion.  The old slave port fell to the Nigerians on

 

October 19, as the Biafrans were simply overwhelmed by a

 

superior force.

 

        The capture of Calabar was followed by a one month

 

consolidation period as 3 Marine Commando Division found how

 

difficult reorganization and resupply of an amphibious beach-

 

head were to accomplish.  At night Rebel snipers engaged

 

Federal targets, and the lone Biafran B-25  attacked Federal

 

activity during the day.(26)

 

        Meanwhile, white mercenaries were introduced to the

 

ground battle on the Biafran side.  Led by a Frenchman, Roger

 

Faulques, a contingent of about 50 foreigners saw action at

 

the Dunlop Rubber Plantation just north of Calabar.  They

 

soon discovered the situation in Nigeria was unlike their

 

Congolese experiences.  They lost several comrades and their

 

taste for fighting quickly.  Faulques recommended retreat to

 

the western side of the Cross River, and the remnants of the

 

Biafran battalion soon set up riverline defensive positions

 

on the other side.  The surviving mercenaries soon left

 

Biafra for safer environs.(27)

 

        With resistance gone, the Federals linked up with

 

Federal elements from Ikom to seal off the Cameroon border

 

and complete the encirclement of Biafra.

 

        The Calabar operation showed the diverse capabilities of

 

the Federal forces.  Even moreso, it put the spotlight on the

 

imaginative and dynamic Colonel Adekunle.  He proved skillful

 

and courageous in the assault of the town, landing on the

 

first day to lead the forward units.  His operational concept

 

was pertinent and gave a quick foothold to the Federals.

 

        Unfortunately, the offensive bogged down as the Federals

 

consolidated.  They allowed the surviving Biafrans to

 

establish themselves on the western banks of the Cross River

 

and grow from battalion size into a brigade and later a task

 

force division.(28)  Since the heavily forested southeastern

 

region severely limited mobility and dictated river crossing

 

points, this was a serious mistake.  The predictability of

 

options reduced the potential for surprise or success and

 

resulted in heavy Federal losses as early attempts at

 

crossing failed.(29)  Making the same mistakes in the east as

 

at Onitsha, the Federals found that the riverline defense

 

greatly favored the Biafrans in opposed encounters,

 

especially when proper equipment and well trained troops were

 

unavailable.  Later the Federals gained a foothold using a

 

canoe-borne assault and a fording operation further

 

down-river.  After consolidating, they rapidly pushed the

 

Rebels back.(30)

 

        On the Biafran side, they learned how flexible the

 

Federals could be, as they were once again surprised by an

 

amphibious landing.  They also were subjected to the

 

possibility that the minority tribes in their territory were

 

not firmly on their side.  They had earlier suspected this,

 

but the sniping and open-armed acceptance of the Federals by

 

the residents of Calabar further confirmed this suspicion.

 

Lastly, the Biafrans received an object lesson in the fact

 

that mercenaries would not be their salvation.  They did

 

employ many for their airlift, but only a few, most notably

 

Rolf Steiner, who was responsible for forming 4 Commando

 

Brigade, were used for ground operations.

 

        Both sides turned their attention to the tightening

 

pressure. The Biafrans were fighting a desperate defensive

 

war, while the Federals looked to the offensive.  Their next

 

major target was Port Harcourt.  The Rebel losses of Enugu,

 

Calabar, and later Onitsha, left Port Harcourt, with its

 

airport, oil processing facilities and businesses (including

 

department stores), as the only remaining Biafran major urban

 

center, and the sole link to the outside world for the

 

Rebels.

 

        Adekunle had started planning for the attack on Port

 

Harcourt while his division was still clearing hte

 

southeastern state.  His plan called for a three-pronged

 

attack from the Cross River to Port Harcourt.  Materiels and

 

men were built up at Opobo on the coast to support the

 

operation.  Before the division was ready, an abortive

 

amphibious assault was attempted by 15 Brigade, the unit

 

formed around the garrison that Adelunke had left at Bonny.

 

The Brigade proved too weak to challenger the Port Harcourt

 

defense and was crushed.  the Biafrans cut off future

 

amphibious attempts by pumping crude oil into the Bonny

 

Channel and setting it on fire.

 

        The Rebels frantically watched the unchecked advance of

 

Federal columns from the west.  Colonel Joe Achuzie, who

 

enjoyed some success at Onitsha, moved to Port Harcourt to

 

organize the defense.  He was unable to rally the dispirited

 

Rebels as the Federals moved through the surrounding mangrove

 

swamps and brush to isolate the city.  On May 16, 1968, the

 

artillery and mortar bombardment began.

 

        The shelling of Port Harcourt saw a first in the civil

 

war.  Colonel Adekunle allowed a corridor through which

 

civilians could escape the seige.  Whether his intent was

 

humanitarian or not is unknown, but within a few hours of the

 

bombardment's start, traffic was backed up 15 miles.(31).  The

 

defense of Port Harcourt was just as disorganized and

 

haphazard as the evacuation.

 

        The occupation of Port Harcourt was anti-climatic.  By

 

May 18 it had fallen, and the Federals continued on.  First

 

they secured the local sector with riverline operations and

 

then drove north to Owerri and Aba.  By September 16 both had

 

been captured, and Biafra was reduced to one fourth of its

 

original size.

 

        The war was now confined to the Ibo heartland.  Air-

 

lifted supplies were temporarily halted with the loss of the

 

Port Harcourt Airport until alternate fields became opera-

 

tional.  Peace talks, an on again, off again phenomenon

 

throughout the war, slowed down as a surrender announcement

 

war expected.(32)  The Biafran Navy and Air Force ceased to

 

exist for the moment.  The militia was disbanded.

 

        The Federals sensed the war was almost over.  The desire

 

to reduce friendly casualties was shown in the pattern of

 

heavy artillery preparations that characterized the advance

 

from Port Harcourt to Aba.  The relative superior firepower

 

was used the "soften up" the Biafrans who were forced to move

 

from their defenses under intense bombardments.  The Federals

 

then moved slowly into the vacated positions, occasionally

 

"...leaving ojectives(s) empty as a sort of no-man's land for

 

several days."(33)

 

        But the war would not end in 1968.  The Federals never

 

truly understood the fear that embraced the Ibo; equally

 

important, they did not realize that Charles deGaulle would

 

chose Biafra as a surrogate to challenge the level of

 

Britain's influence in Western Africa.  Thus the war

 

continued.

 

 

                                      CHAPTER 5

 

                                  OJUKWU'S BIAFRA

 

        Understanding the nature of the Nigerian Civil War

 

requires review of the special qualities that allowed the

 

Biafrans to wage war for two and a half years even though

 

they were outnumbered, outgunned and isolated from the world

 

except by a tenuous airlift.  On reflection, the character is

 

not all positive, but it still bears examination.

 

        Much of the national character of the Biafrans is

 

revealed through the actions of their leader Major General

 

Chukuwuemeka ("Emeka") Odumegwu Ojukwu.  Intelligent,

 

ambitious and resolute, Ojukwu displayed the traits commonly

 

attributed to the Ibo as a tribe.  An Ibo born in 1933,

 

Ojukwu was the son of one of Nigeria's most wealthy

 

entrepreneurs, a man who converted a few used trucks into a

 

giant transport business.  His family's position made it

 

possible for Ojukwu to be educated in England, first at Epson

 

College for secondary school and then Lincoln College,

 

Oxford, for a bachelors degree in modern history.  But when

 

he returned to Nigeria, Ojukwu forsook the family business

 

and went into the civil service.  In 1957 Ojukwu entered the

 

military and was caught in the rapid Nigerianization.  He was

 

promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1964 and was serving as the

 

5 Battalion Commander at Kano in January 1966 when the first

 

coup occurred.

 

        Although no military officer in Nigeria was completely

 

untouched by the politization that occupied the Army after

 

independence, Ojukwu managed to avoid open involvement in the

 

coups.  He remained loyal to General Ironsi after the first

 

coup attempt and shortly thereafter was rewarded with an

 

appointment as Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria.  In this

 

position, Ojukwu emerged as the leader of the Ibo.  Said a

 

former Secretary in the Biafra Govenment, Raph Uwechue, "It

 

is sad but instructive irony that Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu

 

Ojukwa, one of Africa's one-time most brilliant political

 

promises, was the man that led his own people with such a

 

lack of ingenuity into what was clearly a foreseeable

 

disaster."(1)

 

        The tragedy was built on Ojukwu's inflexibility and the

 

resultant inability to effect compromise on the political

 

side.  He fueled the disaster with his ambition, desire and

 

ability to control the situation in Biafra.  Ojukwu was

 

fighting a war within the Civil War, as he struggled to keep

 

and consolidate his position of leadership.  And the tragedy

 

was prolonged and insured by the divisive actions Ojukwu used

 

to maintain his position of power.  These methods had

 

particular impact on the capabilities of the Biafran Army.

 

        Based on his military training and experience, Ojukwu

 

should have understood the complexity and difficulty of

 

establishing a cohesive fighting force in the Eastern Region.

 

Instead he alienated the military and rendered the leadership

 

ineffective through a series of intimidating acts and

 

witchhunts to find "the guilty" after tactical failures.  The

 

former is best seen in how Ojukwu handled his first Army

 

Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hilary Njoku who returned to

 

Eastern Nigeria with other native Easterners after the July

 

1966 Coup.  Soon Njoku and the other Army leadership were

 

distressed at the lack of policy direction in the region.

 

Either efforts were needed to negotiate the peace, or

 

preparations for war had to begin.  These officers met with

 

Ojukwu, but their fears were not allayed by Ojukwu's

 

arguments.  He demonstrated his ruthlessness and his modus

 

operandi in the way he preempted the potential threat to his

 

power by these military officers.

 

               In a few hours during the evening, he had the

        parents and relatives of Lt. Col. Njoku brought to

        Enugu.  He also sent for leading personalities, men

        and women carefully selected, as well as bishops

        and chiefs.  Before them he blandly accused Njoku

        of plotting to overthrow him by force.  Not that he

        cared about himself, he said with emotion, but only

        for the disaster and tragedy that such a move would

        bring to the people of Eastern Nigeria, particu-

        larly the Ibos, for whom he was fighting!  Women

        began to weep and invoke everything against any

        person concealing such an evil idea.  The bishops

        began to pray solemnly.  Njoku was bereft of words.

        Activity continued during the whole night and the

        following day, mainly by bishops and some selected

        leaders.  Njoku had to give promises and under-

        takings, both orally and in writing, never to do

        anything to disrupt the government.  But the

        Governor could not take chances.  With Njoku in the

        country and about, he could not feel comfortable or

        safe. He therefore decided that Njoku must leave.

        An excuse for this was not difficult to find.

        Njoku had been with the former Supreme Commander in

        Ibadan when the latter was abducted by the army.

        He was wounded but managed to escape.  His bones

        needed treatment and this was a good enough reason

        for sending him to Britain.  Immediately Njoku had

        gone, the Governor reorganised the army by

        splitting Njoku's former responsibilities and

        making himself the over-all commander.  In order to

        create rivalry among the senior officers he

        promoted Imo, Njoku and Effiong to the rank of

        Brigadier with the same seniority.  By accident or

        design, Njoku returned to Eastern Nigeria about the

        very day on which the civil war started.  He was

        given charge of the fighting but under the over-all

        control of the Military Governor.  Even thus, he

        was not to last very long.(2)

 

        Njoku did not last long because of the paranoia that

       

permeated the Ibo mentality.  At once this mindset was the

 

key to the strength of the Biafran defense and simultaneously

 

a factor in destroying the secession from within.  The Ibo

 

were so driven to protect themselves that they developed the

 

attitude that they could not lose.  They perceived the threat

 

of extermination of the tribe as so real that any weakness or

 

flaws in the defense of the Eastern Region was unthinkable.

 

When military setbacks occurred, scapegoats had to be and

 

were found.  Instead of realizing obvious facts--that men

 

armed only with rifles could be overwhelmed by armored

 

columns; that the Federals had superiority in terms of

 

manpower and firepower--the Biafran's believed that

 

"saboteurs" caused military reverses.  This phenomenon, begun

 

when Ojukwu as Governor warned the Easterners in late 1966 to

 

be on the vigil for traitors, infiltrators and even the

 

indifferent, (3) caused the downfall of Njoku and other

 

military officers.

 

        The loyalty of every officer, save Ojukwu, was question-

 

able, a situation that seemed to stem also from a distrust

 

generated of those officers who initiated the first coup.

 

Once the first blood flowed, all Nigerians became suspicious,

 

and they lost confidence in the Officer Corps.  The list of

 

examples of the result is endless.  Here are a few:

 

        a.  With the early loss of Opi Junction in the

 

North, Colonel Okon, the local commander was demoted and

 

removed from the Army (he was reinstated later).(4)

 

        b.  When the town of Oron fell, the defending brigade

 

commander, Colonel I.N. Aniebo, was identified as the

 

scapegoat and disgraced.(5)

 

        c.  As the Federals shelled the capital of Enugu,

 

remaining civilians were adamant in their belief that Biafran

 

Army "saboteurs" were firing the rounds.  Soldiers had to be

 

sent from the lines to check the stories so Nioku's

 

replacement, Colonel A.A. Madiebo, would not be thought a

 

collaborator.(6)  Madiebo also tells of having the brief every

 

civilian who came to his headquarters with questions to avoid

 

the start of rumors that he was concealing information.(7)

 

        d.  At the loss of the critical airport and oil

 

facilities at Port Harcourt, Colonel O. Kalu was accused of

 

collaboration with the enemy.(8)

 

        e.  Captain Nweka, 53 Battalion Commander, returned from

 

a reconnaisance at Amadim and was executed for sabotage after

 

being accused of collaborating with the enemy.(9)

 

        The last example is the extreme case.  Usually, officers

 

were beaten, imprisoned and had their heads shaved when

 

accused of sabotage.  This was not a practice limited to the

 

military, but it had grave effects on the Army's ability to

 

function.  The constant turnover of officers resulted in a

 

continual drain of experience and a failure to develop

 

cohesion and unit integrity.

 

        Ojukwu found other ways to make the Army impotent as a

 

rival to his power.  These further diluted the unified

 

direction of his armed forces. Ojukwu played the civilians

 

off against the military.  He formed special units which

 

reported directly to him, usurping the role of his military

 

commanders.  Moveover, Ojukwu established directorates to

 

control the logistical aspects of the war efforts, thus

 

creating a rivalry not only with the military but also with

 

the existing civil service.

 

        There is also evidence that most Biafrans considered

 

their men as "fighters" instead of "soldiers" because they

 

viewed warfare naively as inter-village free-for-alls.(10)

 

Because of this, Ojukwu was able to pit the civilians against

 

the military.  As he stated:

 

        It has all along been my conviction that it is the

        civilians who will fight and win this war and not

        the soldiers.  From all that has happened already,

        it would be foolish to expect the soldiers to

        satisfy the aspirations of this new republic.(11)

 

These words to his strategic committee prefaced later actions

 

which contradicted his military training, especially con-

 

sidering the British influence on his development.  Ojukwu

 

had called on volunteers to come and defend Enugu.  As the

 

Biafran leader commented:

 

        Nothing can frighten professional soldiers more

        than the sight of civilian masses confront them.

        They will kill them no doubt, but will soon be

        tired.  That is the tactics adopted in the Asian

        countries.  China for instance.  I have got brought

        down to Enugu thousands of civilians from all over

        the Republic.  The aim is to throw them in in

        masses against the enemy who would thereby be

        confused and frightened by the prospect of mowing

        down thousands of civilians and incurring world

        condemnation.(12)

 

        Armed primarily with machetes (and a few shotguns)

 

Ojukwu's "fighters" were trucked to the front and reformed.

 

They marched off into the night chanting war songs and

 

screaming.  After a brief advance, the Federals unleashed a

 

great volley of shells.  All activity stopped, and the

 

formation melted into the night.(13)  Ojukwu never repeated

 

such a move.

 

        He did, however, form special purpose military units.

 

The first was the "S" (for special) Brigade.  This brigade

 

was organized from volunteer militia to retake Enugu.

 

Lacking experienced leadership and poorly organized, the "S"

 

Brigade was not able to reverse the loss of the capital by

 

bolstering the regular forces.  It was retained afterward as

 

the Governor's special unit and was given his personal

 

attention as well as a higher priority of support.  As with

 

many "elite" forces, its existence and priority created

 

jealousy in the regular forces.  Eventually, Ojukwu had to

 

merge the "S" Brigade into the regular army to eliminate the

 

command and control problems that its special status created.

 

        The same problem existed later with 4 Commando Brigade.

 

Commanded by Rolf Steiner, an ex-Hitler youth, ex-French

 

Foreign Legion mercenary, the Commando Brigade was originally

 

organized to conduct guerrilla warfare operations behind

 

Federal lines.  As with the "S" Brigade, Ojukwu gave the

 

Commando's special attention and priority supply support.

 

When the Commando Brigade proved successful in guerrilla

 

operations, it was expanded.  Despite protests, Ojukwu later

 

pressed it into service in a conventional role.  Its losses

 

were excessively heavy, and it lost its previous effective-

 

ness.  Jealousies which had developed in the Regular Force

 

found the opportunity to be vented, and Steiner was forced

 

out of command.  He was escorted to Uli Airfield and flown

 

out of the country.

 

        Despite the existence of a civil service, at the start

 

of the war Ojukwu created administrative directorates as

 

caretakers of the civilian population and the military

 

efforts.  These directorates controlled civil defense, the

 

militias, propaganda, military intelligence, food distri-

 

bution, food production, fuel, medical supplies, transport,

 

requisition and supply, and clothing.(14)  Their directors

 

supplanted the ministers and departments of government,

 

further dividing the war effort.  The civil service was

 

subordinated and embarrassed.  Likewise, when the supply and

 

transport organization was added to the mlitary inventory, it

 

openly battled the directorates for control of important

 

resources.  Often these "turf battles" had to be resolved by

 

Ojukwu, and the predictability of his decisions made the

 

directors powerful men in the Biafran ruling structure.

       

        The cumulative effect of these special units and

 

extra-organizational control groups divided the direction of

 

the war effort. They took authority away from those most

 

responsible for fighting the war--the military--and

 

institutionalized Ojukwu's actions to mitigate any potential

 

political opposition by producing a fragmented power

 

structure that answered only to him.  This resulted in an

 

inefficient support system that barely capitalized on

 

Biafra's interior lines of communication when the Federal

 

effort lacked coordination.  Once the Nigerian Federals

 

finally coordinated their three pronged attack, the Biafran

 

disorganization was incapable of response, and the

 

secessionists were crushed.  But the Federals took another

 

year to realize this potential, and the war slowly followed

 

its course.

 

 

                                      CHAPTER 6

 

                               TO THE END OF THE WAR

                      

                (September 1968-January 1970)

 

 

        September 1968 was a dark time for Biafra.  Federal

 

pressure continued on every front.  The Rebels were cut off

 

from their major food producing areas, and the loss of Port

 

Harcourt forced them to rely on resupply through makeshift

 

air fields.  At this stage of the war, Ojukwu announced a new

 

phase of the Biafran effort--guerrilla warfare.  But the

 

change was half-hearted because promised French assistance

 

soon began in earnest with an average of over 20 tons of war

 

materiels arriving each night from French sources via

 

airlift.(1)  This infusion of military aid buoyed Rebel hopes

 

and resulted in a renewed belief that they could still win

 

the civil war (or more accurately, legitimately establish the

 

Biafra Nation) through conventional means.

 

        The Federals had captured the airstrip at Obilagwu and

 

on October 1, 1968 occupied Okigwi in the north with 1

 

Division units.  3 Marine Commando Division was spread across

 

a front of more than 100 miles in the south.  The line

 

stretched from the Niger River on the west over the Cross

 

River on the east.  Besides capturing Owerrri and Aba, the

 

Division continued pressure toward Umuahia, "The

 

Administrative Center," and Oguta which was only 10 miles or

 

so from the strategic Uli air strip.  Federal operations, as

 

always, were preceded by relatively intensive artilley

 

preparations.  Several days were taken to position every

 

available weapon, so that all could be fired together in a

 

display that the flamboyant Adekunle called, "...my own

 

special thunder."(2)

 

        The French support altered the balance of power.  The

 

additional small arms, plus artillery, anti-armor weapons and

 

needed ammunition greatly bolstered the Biafrans.  They

 

stopped the drive to Umuahia from the south and put the

 

Federals on the defensive at Onitsha.

 

        An aggressive, brigade-sized riverine attack on Oguta

 

tested the Rebels on September 10.  The Federal 15 Brigade

 

landed within 12 miles of Uli air strip and created a panic

 

among the Rebels.  Emphasizing the criticality of the

 

situation, Ojukwu personally led the counter-attack to secure

 

the town and relieve pressure on Uli.(3)  The Federal

 

attackers, faced with encirclement, withdrew  back down the

 

river.

 

        The Rebels reverted to a frantic counter-offensive.  By

 

the end of September, they had recaptured Ikot Ekpene and

 

were moving on Aba and Owerri at Christmas of 1968.  The

 

Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighters (BOFF) was operating

 

throughout the region and in the Midwest, conducting

 

querrilla-type operations behind Federal lines; but their

 

successes were minimal.  Fola Oyewole, a Biafran staff

 

officer, noted that by this time most Biafrans were

 

disillusioned with the struggle.  The result was that many

 

who joined the BOFF were not committed to the cause and that

 

often Biafrans (Ibo) who remained in Federally occupied areas

 

did not cooperate with the BOFF.(4)  The BOFF nonetheless had

 

the Federal's attention and the highly motivated regular

 

Rebel units (5) produced important changes in Federal

 

attitudes over the year and a half of war.  They no longer

 

took midday siesta hours, and the war of ambush resulted in

 

disaster when vigilence faltered.(6)

 

        French assistance did not completely alter the Rebel

 

situation.  In December 1968 the International Committee of

 

the Red Cross estimated that 14,000 people were dying each

 

day in  Biafra.(7)  The December offensive against Owerri

 

continued and developed into a seige of the Federal 16

 

Brigade within the city.  For at least six weeks the brigade

 

had to be resupplied by air, but large quantities of materiel

 

landed in enemy hands.  The seige tightened until April 25,

 

1969 when the beleaguered Federal remnant successfully

 

executed a night withdrawal under pressure by slipping

 

through the Biafran lines.

 

        The recapture of Owerri proved a major setback for the

 

Federals, second only to the repeated failures in crossing

 

the Niger River to take Onitsha.  The loss damaged the

 

reputation of 3 Marine Commando Division and its aggressive

 

leader, Colonel Adekunle.  The Federals also were dispirited

 

by the indiscriminate bombing tactics of their Air Force

 

which attacked non-military targets throughout Biafra.

 

        In January and February 1969, the Nigerians stepped-up

 

their air strikes, especially on Umuahia; this signaled a

 

renewed offensive.  Foreign correspondents personally

 

verified attacks on civilian targets and presented their

 

findings in the world-wide media.  Such incidents rekindled

 

the fear of extermination among the Ibo people and damaged

 

Federal prestige abroad.

 

        The April 25 loss of Owerri overshadowed the 1 Division

 

triumph in capturing the Rebel capital of Umuahia on April

 

22, 1969.  The Federal advance, as normal along the roads,

 

had been difficult since the Rebels effectively deployed

 

French Panhard armored vehicles to menace the column.(8)  But

 

the methodical traits of 1 Division again proved successful

 

as Umuahia fell, marking the final phase of the war.  The

 

Biafrans were further disorganized as administrative elements

 

had to be spread around the country.  No suitable single

 

place remained in which to establish a functional capital,

 

though Owerri became the new Administrative Center.  Despite

 

the degradation of the Biafran infrastructure, the Federals

 

were unable to exploit the situation.  They had problems of

 

their own.

 

        Federal morale was low as political infighting among the

 

division commanders and staffs expanded.  The lack of unity

 

of command had created problems of insufficient coordination

 

and inadequate logistical support.  Colonel (later Major

 

General)  Olusegun Obasanjo described the situation in his

 

memoir of the war:

 

               The Federal victory in capturing Umuahia, the

        next rebel administrative headquarters after Enugu,

        was almost immediately effectively nullified by the

        loss of Owerri to the rebels.  The rebels,

        strengthened and emboldened by their recapture of

        Owerri, swiftly advanced southwards to threaten

        Igritta, a distance of fifteen miles north of Port

        Harcourt on the Owerri road.  The federal

        finger-tip hold on Aba was considerable weakened.

        The morale of the soldiers at least of 3 Marine

        Commando Division was at its lowest ebb.  Desertion

        and absence from duty without leave was rife in the

        Division.  The despondence and general lack of will

        to fight in the soldiers was glaringly manifest in

        the large number of cases of self-inflicted

        injuries throughout the formation.  Some officers

        tacitly encouraged these malpractices and

        unsoldierly conduct by condoning such acts or

        withdrawing their own kith or kin or fellow

        tribesmen to do guard durties in the rear and in the

        officers' own houses.  Distrust and lack of

        confidence plagues the ranks of the officer corps.

        Operations were unhealthily competitive in an

        unmilitary fashion and officers openly rejoiced at

        each other's misfortunes.  With the restrictions

        imposed by the Federal Military Government on many

        items of imported goods and the country in the grip

        of inflation, the civilian population began to show

        signs of impatience with a war which appeared to

        them unending.  In fact, some highly placed

        Nigerians started to suggest that the Federal

        Government should sue for peace at all cost to

        prevent the disaster that would befall it and its

        supporters if rebel victory seemed imminent.(9)

 

        Gowon heeded complaints and countercharges that staff

 

officers in Lagos were unresponsive to the field commanders

 

and that the field commanders had lost their initiative and

 

drive.  He thus transferred all three division commanders to

 

staff positions, replaced them and redefined the missions of

 

the three divisions.  On May 12, 1969 the changes were

 

announced.  2 Division withdrew from Onitsha and moved back

 

into the Midwestern Region to provide internal defense there

 

against BOFF guerrilla activity and defend on the west bank

 

of the Niger River.  1 Division took over the defense of

 

Onitsha and now had responsibility for the entire northern

 

sector, while 3 Marine Commando Division remained responsible

 

for the southern campaign in Eastern Nigeria.

 

        By May 30, 1969, the tide again turned.  Ojukwu had

 

taken personal command of all Biafra units, but the Rebels

 

were pushed back into an area of roughly 2000 square miles.

 

The Federal forces began coordinating their actions; however,

 

the rainy season and the first air attacks by Count Von

 

Rosen's Minicons (see the next chapter) slowed the Federal

 

advance.  Even so, the war was virtually over.  The arrival

 

of Soviet 122mm howitzers greatly improved Nigerian artillery

 

range and accuracy.  Biafran desertions increased as the will

 

to resist diminished in the face of more disciplined Federal

 

Air Force bombing and strafing.  The crumbling of the Biafran

 

infrastructure continued.  After two years of war and

 

shortages of spare parts, vehicles were wearing out with a

 

resultant loss of transit capability.  Even when resupply

 

occurred, distributing materiels to the front proved

 

difficult.

 

        Corruption by self-serving administrative officials

 

sapped the furor from the Biafran war effort, but one agency

 

stood apart even in this final part of the war.  The research

 

and production (RAP) directorate was an innovative and

 

resourceful agency without which the Biafrans could not have

 

prosecuted the war.  Composed of scientists and engineers

 

educated in Britain and the U.S., the RAP devised and built

 

portable oil refineries which produced gasoline with the heat

 

of wood fires, mortars from oil drilling equipment, and soap,

 

matches, and gin from available resources.(10)  They

 

developed ground-to-ground and ground-to-air rockets which

 

proved useful at Calabar and Onitsha.  The rockets were

 

electronically fired, area munitions launched from

 

especially-built stands; however, they sometimes wobbled in

 

flight and boomeranged, coming back to the fires.(11)

 

        The most important weapon built was the Ogbunigwe (Ibo

 

for "destroyers of all").  These devices were also known as

 

"Ojukwu's kettles" and were the keystone of the Rebel

 

defense.  They were made from available cooking pots filled

 

with locally-produced explosives and miscellaneous metal

 

products--nails, scrap iron or whatever else was on hand.

 

The Ogbunigwe were planted in the ground (or in road beds) or

 

abutted against trees and camouflaged.  When suitable targets

 

arrived, the mines were command detonated.  They produced a

 

tremendous explosion and proved immensely effective.  Their

 

use alone often created enough damage to rout Federal

 

attacks.

 

        The ingenuity of the RAP was not enough to overcome the

 

superior might of the Federals.  They reorganized their

 

divisions internally and applied pressure from both north and

 

south.  The Federals gained steadily until November 1969 when

 

the Nigerian Army Chief of Staff ordered his forces "to

 

liberate what was left of the Rebel held areas."(12)  Around

 

Christmas of 1969, powerful probes cut into Rebel held

 

territory.  Instead of stopping to consolidate gains, the

 

Federals drove on, surprising and overwhelming the Biafrans.

 

Ojukwu flew out of Uli Air Strip in the early morning of

 

Jaunuary 11, 1970 after he and his staff decided not to revert

 

to guerrilla warfare.  The war had ended by January 15, 1970

 

when Colonel Philip Effiong, who was left in charge,

 

announced the surrender.  The end was so rapid and the

 

Biafrans so demoralized that further resistance did not

 

materialize.

 

        The end was anti-climatic.  The Biafrans were exhausted

 

by hunger and had few medical facilities.  They lacked the

 

clothing and individual equipment to combat the superior

 

weapons of their opponent.  Most importantly, the Federals

 

benefited from personnel changes which produced better

 

generalship in the three divisions and brought the war to a

 

rapid close in the fashion expected when the war started.(13)

 

        But the "quick kill in slow motion"(14) was expensive.

 

Estimates on the total number of deaths from the war range

 

from 500,000 to 2,000,000.  There is no way of knowing with

 

certainty the exact number.  The vast majority of fatalities,

 

however, were starvation casualties among Biafran civilians.

 

        The Federals estimated in 1970 that the war cost them

 

$840 million.(15)  Their economy slowed down but never

 

reached zero growth and regained momentum after the war.

 

Loss of oil revenue caused the stagnant economic condition.

 

However, the Federals rapidly transferred their oil

 

production emphasis to the Midwest and soon equalled their

 

pre-war volume.

 

        The Biafrans were constantly in need of money for two

 

reasons.  First, they lost their oil revenue (two thirds of

 

the total Nigerian production) early in the war,; hence, they

 

were denied the revenue to finance the war.  The other reason

 

for their monetary shortage was that Nigeria converted her

 

currency during the war.  The Biafrans confiscated millions

 

in Nigerian currency, but were unable to get most of it

 

exchanged during the brief conversion period.  This rapid

 

reduction in capital in 1968 limited Biafra's ability to

 

purchase arms overseas.  Beyond occasional purchases and

 

French aid, she depended on what she captured and what she

 

could invent.  The industry and imaginations of her people

 

never matched the firepower of the Federals.

 

 

                                      CHAPTER 7

 

                                   THE AIR WAR

 

 

        The two most significant technological advances

 

introduced in the Nigerian Civil War were the extensive use

 

of modern artillery, particularly by the Federals, and the

 

impact of aviation on a disorganized, relatively unsophisti-

 

cated battlefield.  The numbers of aircraft were slight in

 

comparison to what the United States used in Vietnam, and the

 

tactics were generally limited to interdictory bombing and

 

strafing with some close air support.  Air-to-air combat

 

consisted essentially of attacks on bulky, outdated cargo

 

planes delivering relief supplies and armaments to Biafra.

 

Nonetheless, aircraft played a major role in making this

 

conflict a "modern" war.  Both sides experienced the

 

introduction of an advanced degree of sophistication and

 

killing power and the immense psychological effect that

 

aerial bombing and strafing produced.  We will look at the

 

Biafran side first.

 

        The Rebel Air Force.  The Biafrans had the first

 

aircraft used for offensive purposes.  A World War II

 

vintage, American made B-26 bomber was obtained in Europe,

 

manned by a European crew, and flown from Lisbon to Enugu and

 

then on operational missions.  The plane carried machine guns

 

and rockets which were outfitted on the plane in Enugu by

 

former Nigerian Air Force armorers.(1)  It was initially used

 

to bomb and strafe attacking Nigerian formations, but soon

 

the Rebels took the war to the Federal heartland to show

 

their strength and determination.

 

        With the B-26  and othe airplanes their agents in Lisbon

 

had procurred, the Biafrans turned to air raids on Lagos and

 

other towns.  These seemed to have no specific target other

 

than inducing panic in the civilians; these attacks resulted

 

in haphazard patterns which primarily produced the desired

 

panic in the Nigerians.  Several such raids caused a small

 

amount of property damage and a few civilian casualities; but

 

like the Midwest ground offensive, they served to awaken the

 

Nigerians from their lethargy and incensed the population.

 

Because the Federals did not immediately respond to the early

 

bombing raids, the Rebels misread their capabilities and

 

resolve.  The lack of reaction reinforced the Rebel belief

 

(based on their knowledge of Federal military strength) that

 

the war would quickly end.

 

        The small Biafran Air Force was overworked and soon wore

 

out.  When a Fokker F-27  passenger plane equipped to drop

 

bombs was shot down by anti-aircraft fire over Lagos in early

 

October 1967, Biafran offensive air operations were

 

essentially ended  until the last year of the war.  Another

 

noteworthy fact appeared; at least four of the crew of eight

 

who were killed in the crash of the Fokker were white

 

mercenaries.(2)  It was in the air conflict that mercenaries

 

had their greatest impact in the Nigerian Civil War.

 

        On the Biafran side, they helped prolong the war as they

 

delivered arms, ammunition and relief supplies to the

 

beseiged Biafrans.  The first Biafran mercenary was Hank

 

Wharton.  He operated the most famous of the companies which

 

ran charter airplanes into Biafra (the Biafrans also

 

purchased some older planes) and typified the "entrepreneurs"

 

who flew this dangerous route.  The German-American Wharton

 

owned a tired fleet of Superconstellations and DC-7's.  As

 

noted by mercenary Bruce Hilton, "Wharton's planes were

 

available to anyone who could afford to charter them, which

 

meant that a crew might take in rifle ammunitions for the

 

Biafran Army one night and medical supplies for the World

 

Council of Churches the next..."(3)  The flights were also

 

used by the Catholic relief organization, Caritas, and the

 

International Red Cross with round trips costing up to

 

$25,000.(4)

 

        Under these circumstances, the Federals accused the

 

relief agencies of concealing arms shipments with their

 

humanitarian flights.  This highlights the most controversial

 

aspect of the war, the effectiveness of the Federal blockade

 

as an offensive weapon and the resulting starvation of

 

hundreds of thousands of Biafrans.  At the same time, it

 

points out Ojukwu's obstinate unwillingness to sue for peace

 

despite the horrific suffering of his people.  Instead, he

 

advertised it to gain sympathy for Biafra.  He was successful

 

in his efforts becauses the relief organizations converted

 

sympathy into political support for Biafra, but with little

 

ultimate effect on the outcome of the war.  Saving Biafrans

 

bacame synonymous with saving Biafra.(5)  Concurrently, the

 

relief organizations wanted a ceasefire so they  could

 

concentrate on moving food into the country.  This was

 

desirable to Ojukwu since he knew that if the fighting

 

stopped, it would be difficult to restart.  In the stalemate,

 

Biafra would gain time and might survive.  The tragedy of the

 

war was that such political finagling, by both sides,

 

resulted in so many additional tragic deaths in the prolonged

 

war.

 

        The mercenary pilots experienced a temporary halt in

 

their airlift when Federals captured Port Harcourt Airfield.

 

Fortunately for the Biafrans, they had foreseen the

 

possibility of losing their fixed air facilities and prepared

 

alternate sites.  The most famous was the Uli Air Strip.

 

Code-named Annabelle, the Uli Strip was in fact a stretch of

 

straight road between Onitsha and Owerri which was widened

 

for miles.  Vehicles mounted with communications equipment

 

served as a mobile control tower so that the actual landing

 

site could be shifted back and forth along the stretch of

 

road.  All operations occurred at night; relief planes made

 

their final approaches based on tower instructions; and

 

landing lights were turned on for 15-30 seconds to facilitate

 

touchdown.  Other similar strips were prepared, as well as

 

bush sites, but Uli survived to the last day of the war and

 

was an important symbol of resistance for the Biafrans.

 

        Initially Portugual, the last colonial power in Africa,

 

provided most of the staging bases for the relief and

 

resupply of Biafra.  Later the French gave major support to

 

the Rebel cause.  At first, night trips were made from Lisbon

 

with small arms and ammunition that was bought in Spain,

 

France or Switzerland through private dealers.  Aircraft were

 

refueled in Portuguese Guinea Bissau and the Portuguese

 

Island of Sao Tome.  Pilots landed at Harcourt Airfield or on

 

a stretch of highway between Orlu and Owerri.(6)

 

        Another route of entry reportedly began in South Africa,

 

with flights two or three times a week from Petersburg in the

 

Transvaal to a rendevous point in the Kalahari Desert in

 

Botswana.  South African DC-7's, charted to Biafra, then

 

carried the cargo to Uli by way of Angola and Sao Tome.(7)

 

Other staging points were Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Libreville

 

in Gabon and the Island of Fernando Po where much of the

 

relief supplies were marshalled.

 

        From the relief pilots Biafra got its most potent

 

offensive air capability.  Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen, the

 

Swede who commanded the Ethiopian Air Force in the 1930's,

 

was appalled at the indiscriminate bombing and strafing of

 

non-military targets by the Nigerian Air Force and pledged to

 

give the Biafrans an Air Force to interdict Nigerian efforts.

 

The arrival of his Minicon fleet, mentioned earlier, was

 

timely.  In late May 1969 Biafra was less than a tenth of its

 

original size.  The rainy season had slowed the Federal

 

offensive and their bombing, but also had reduced relief

 

efforts.

 

        Von Rosen brought three Swedish pilots and two ground

 

crewmen with the first five Minicons.  They were to both fly

 

the planes and train Biafran air and ground crews.  He also

 

used two Biafrans as pilots on the first aircraft.(8)  The

 

Rebels had several ex-Nigerian Air Force pilots trained by

 

the West Germans and a group of aviators partially qualified

 

in Portugual to fly various aging aircraft purchased in

 

Europe that never arrived in Biafra.

 

        The Minicons immediately boosted morale.  The single

 

engine trainers were too small to deliver iron bombs, so they

 

were outfitted with 76mm rocket pods. Flying below radar

 

coverage and surprising anti-aircraft gunners, the Minicons

 

swooped in on targets in lightning fast raids.  They targeted

 

on-the-ground aviation assets and oil facilities and were

 

extremely successful.  Attacks covered the air fields at

 

Benin, Enugu and Port Harcourt, reducing Federal interference

 

with relief flights.  In the first month of use, von Rosen

 

claimed destruction of four MIG's, and Ilyushin bomber, two

 

Canberras, a Heron and a control tower.(9)

 

        By September 1969, von Rosen had 19 minicons in Biafra

 

with a total of five Swedish pilots.  There also were two

 

Danish explosive experts who trained infiltrators.(10)  The

 

ports at Sapele and Port Harcourt were targets as were

 

the oil installations.  They cut oil exports from the

 

Midwestern Region to a trickle with attacks on the just

 

completed Shell-BP facility at Forcadoes.

 

        Von Rosen then had bigger plans.  He wanted to bomb

 

Nigeria's major port at Apapa, near Lagos, but the longer

 

ranged equipment he needed did not arrive before the war

 

ended in January 1970.  This may have occurred because von

 

Rosen's tactics caused the opposite of what he intended.

 

Instead of handcuffing the materially superior Federals, he

 

may have once again awakened them from their doldrums and

 

forced an increase in war activity that quickly ended the

 

war.(11)

 

        The Federal Air Force.  The Federals introduced a more

 

technogically advanced level of aviation to the war.  It is

 

paradoxical that the Rebels believed the failure of the

 

Federals to immediately retaliate for their early bombings

 

was a sign of weakness or a lack of resolve.  They should

 

have taken a more pragmatic view.  The Federals were planning

 

for a police action, but instead became involved in an

 

all-out war.  Responding as they would throughout the war,

 

they methodically obtained the right tools for the task.  The

 

Federals used the first jet aircraft in early August 1967 to

 

help clear the Midwest; and shortly thereafter their

 

mercenary pilots were indiscriminately bombing and strafing a

 

wide range of targets.

 

        The Biafrans quickly reassessed the resolve of their

 

opponent.  The verdict was that the unrestrained aerial

 

attacks on undefended hospitals and markets, especially with

 

napalm, and the tightening blockade were further evidence of

 

the Federal desire to commit genocide, i.e., the eradication

 

of the Ibo population.  The seeming validity of these

 

accusations often embarrassed the Nigerians throughout the

 

hostilities.  International observers would conclude that no

 

orderly, planned policy existed for extermination of the Ibo

 

people; however, there was irrefutable evidence of repeated

 

attacks on defenseless civilians which again and again  fed

 

the Biafran propaganda machine.

 

        The Federals used mercenary pilots in a different way

 

than the Biafrans.  A British mercenary, John Peters, was

 

hired in July 1967 to recruit pilots to fly converted DC-3's

 

and 4's with Nigerian crews since there were only a few

 

Nigerian pilots.  Paid between $2,000 and $3,000 per month

 

plus living expenses in Nigera, the Federals usually had 12

 

to 20 pilots available, primarily British, Rhodesians and

 

South Africans.  When Egyptian pilots proved ineffective, the

 

mercenaries were trained on the MIG-15's and then the

 

MIG-17's.(12)

 

        By the time the mercenary pilots were trained on the

 

MIG's, their efforts were concentrated on stopping the

 

gun-running into Biafra.  But along with the indiscriminate

 

bombing and strafing of civilan targets, the inability to

 

stop the night flights into Biafra demonstrated the gross

 

inefficiency of the Federal Air Force.  While the war still

 

progressed, historian Neville Brown pointed out several

 

reasons why the gun-running continued.

 

        a.  The short range and electronic deficiencies of the

 

MIG-17's.

 

        b.  Lack of skill and motivation of the Egyptian pilots

 

        c.  Reluctance of the Federals to let foreigners play a

 

large part in their success.(13)

 

        John De St. Jorre, another historian, went a step

 

farther.  He noted that the MIG's and Ilyushins were the

 

wrong aircraft to use against the make-shift airstrips like

 

Uli.  Their high speed and armaments made effective night

 

attacks on the narrow, unlit runways difficult.  He believed

 

a smaller, relatively slower plane with cannons, light bombs

 

and machine guns would have been more effective.  He also

 

argues that he mercenaries did not destroy Uli because it

 

would have been the end of a well paid job.(14)

 

        The Federals engaged in minimal close air support, but

 

used their jet aircraft with artillery to prepare their

 

ground objectives in major offensives.  In fact the increase

 

of air support by the Federals in early 1968 and early 1969

 

were clear indicators to the Biafrans that extensive major

 

moves were in the offing.(15)

 

        For both sides aircraft represented a new escalation of

 

power, capable of temporarily terrorizing the population or

 

sustaining it.  Neither side possessed the capability to use

 

aviation to its fullest advantage, but each saw the

 

battlefield reduced in size, the responsiveness of air

 

support, and the horror that the airplane could inflict on

 

both the civilian population and military formations.

 

Heretofore isolated enclaves became accessible to the

 

destructive dimensions of modern warfare through aviation.

 

 

                                      CHAPTER 8

 

                                   CONCLUSIONS

 

       

        The Nigerian Civil War was the first modern war

 

conducted in Independent Black Africa.  The lessons of the

 

war were not new or unique.  They merely reinforced what has

 

been learned over and over again.  However, their context was

 

unique, since the bush warfare of the Congo transitioned to

 

technologically sophisticated 20th Century warfare. The

 

military, though unsuited for the role, became the leading

 

institiution in Nigeria.  The causes of the war were complex,

 

based upon tribal, political and economic factors inherited

 

from the colonial period.  A military institiution,

 

subordinated through British traditions, took political form

 

in the post-colonial era and initiated a blood letting that

 

led to the Civil War.  Though segments of the military had

 

the capacity to disrupt and overthrow the civilian

 

govenment, the military was not sufficiently unified or

 

large enough to adequately govern the country.

 

        The coups of 1966 provided the immediate catalyst to the

 

economic, political and social unrest.  Once the horror was

 

unleashed, the military inherited responsibility for finding

 

a solution.  The war requried the formation of a large,

 

fighting force, which became the dominant institution in

 

Nigeria.  To this day, the political course of the country is

 

tied to the desires and decisions of the military leadership.

 

Once the precedent was set, getting the military out of power

 

became virtually impossible given the divisiveness of the

 

country.

 

        Neither side was prepared for war.  As the facade of

 

civilization crumbled under the weight of riots and pogroms,

 

Ibo tribesmen fled oppression and sought refuge in their

 

homeland.  Despite the evidence of the hatred that drove the

 

Ibo out of other areas and the fear of extermination which

 

permeated the consciousness of those in the Eastern Region,

 

military leaders were unable to fully mobilize their

 

countries for the coming war.

 

        The Federal Government announced its expectation that  a

 

"police action" would bring the secessionists back into the

 

fold in a brief time.  Available units were assembled on the

 

northern boundaries of the Eastern Region, ready for the

 

quick thrust and capture of the Rebel capital.  Civil defense

 

exercises were conducted in the North, but the capital,

 

Lagos, remained unmoved by the threat of war.  This

 

unconcerned attitude, as well as the incorrect reading of the

 

force requied, revealed the poor intelligence capability

 

that would hamper Federal efforts throughout the war.

 

        The Rebels likewise failed to comprehend the potential

 

for violence.  Probably due to ego, they did not believe the

 

Federals had the capability or resolve to defeat them.  The

 

Biafrans felt they would win because their struggle was just,

 

and moral courage and perseverence would win the day for

 

them.  As order broke down in Nigeria, the Rebels did start

 

building defensive positions and training militias and civil

 

defense personnel; but they were hesitant to invest their

 

limited monies to outfit and prepare an armed force.  Again,

 

they believed this was unnecessary because right was on their

 

side.  Consequently their soldiers received only superficial

 

training, and there were not enough weapons to arm units.

 

Officers were scarce and often went into battle before they

 

completed their training. This helped keep officer attrition

 

rates high, which consequently debased unit stability and

 

with other factors seriously damaged unit cohesion and

 

integrity.

 

        The Federals experienced similar problems with the rapid

 

expansion of their forces.  Junior leaders could not be

 

trained fast enough to fill the enlarged army.  Inexperi-

 

enced, poorly trained and ineptly led soldiers manifested

 

their lack of professionalism and indiscipline by massacres

 

of innocent civilians and a failure to effectivley execute

 

infantry tactics.

 

        The Federals were overly cautious and dependent on

 

artillery in their advances.  They would saturate objectives

 

with artillery fire, then move up on to the objective and

 

consolidate their force.  Further movement to shell the next

 

objective.  1 Division was especially noteworthy in the

 

cautiousness in its operations.  The division would prepare

 

for a mission for six months, gathering resources and

 

training.  The offensive would take place, but as soon as the

 

objective was seized, the division would consolidate its

 

gains and take another six months to prepare for the next

 

operation.

 

        Had they pursued their successes, there were several

 

times when more aggressive actions might have brought the

 

Federals immediate victory.  Examples are the first shelling

 

of Onitsha, the fall of Enugu and the capture of Port

 

Harcourt.  Instead, delays allowed the Rebels to recoup from

 

setbacks and establish new defensive positions.

 

        This tactical shortcoming stands in contrast to a

 

strategic strength given to the Federals by their leader,

 

Major General Jack Gowon.  Conservative and unflappable,

 

Gowon gave stability to the Federals.  When the police action

 

strategy proved inadequate, he orchestrated a methodical,

 

forceful strategy which resulted in a blockade of Biafra and

 

her subsequent inability to continue the war.

 

        The implications of seige warfare were heightened by the

 

introduction of modern media to the battlefield.  While

 

starvation was probably the factor which ultimately caused

 

Biafra to fall, it was also a factor in obtaining world-wide

 

support for the Rebels and gave false hope to its leaders and

 

initially prolonged the war.  Both the morality of the seige

 

and the exploitation of the media were key issues of he war.

 

        Far more than Gowon's character permeated Federal

 

thought and action, Major General Emeka Ojukwu's personality

 

dominated Rebel activity.  He was the single unifying figure

 

in the Biafra story.  Ojukwu was able to motivate and direct

 

the Rebels to incredible accomplishments in the face of never

 

ending shortages and constant defeats.  He adeptly achieved

 

tactical successes, but he failed to implement a strategic

 

plan that could bring victory.

 

        a.  He accurately saw the potential of the Midwest

 

Invasion and introduced bombers to the war, but he failed to

 

comprehend the long term effects of both actions.

 

        b.  He capitalized on airlift to sustain Biafra after

 

losing his sea lines of communcations.

 

        c.  He realized the tactical deficiencies of the Federal

 

Army but ignored those of his own army, and he failed to

 

resort to all out guerrilla warfare while his people still

 

had the means and will to resist.

 

        d.  Finally, he hoped that if he held Biafra long

 

enough, the Federals would become frustrated and give up.

 

Unfortunately, Ojukwu underestimated the Federal reslove in

 

relation to Biafra's ability to hold out.  The Federal

 

learning curve caught up with him when the Nigerian Army took

 

advantage of their successes without consolidating their

 

gains from November 1969 to January 1970.  Ojukwu failed to

 

understand that obstinancy on both sides meant the war would

 

be resolved on the battlefield and not by other means such as

 

negotiations.

 

        This last point highlights a shortfall for both sides,

 

unity of command or purpose.  On the Federal side, the three

 

divisions operated independently, competing among themselves

 

for men and materiels.  This allowed the Rebels to use their

 

interior position to advantage.  Ojukwu shifted resources

 

from front to front based on the most urgent threat.  This

 

worked well until the Federals launched their final

 

coordinated attack.

 

        On the Rebel side, unity of command was lost because of

 

the fear and suspicion that seized Biafra.  While fighting

 

the Federals, Ojukwu also had to maintain his position.  To

 

do this, he set the military and civilian leaders against

 

each other.  By making each weaker, he solidified his hold on

 

power, but the resulting political infighting greatly

 

detracted from the war effort.

 

        A major lesson of the Nigerian Civil War was that

 

technology must fit the situation.  The airplane had

 

significant importance in Nigeria.  Jet aircraft represented

 

tremendous psychological and destructive capacities not seen

 

before in Black Africa.  Yet the MIG's and Ilyushin's could

 

not stop the gunrunners or close Uli Air Strip.  On the other

 

hand, the use of reconnaissance helicopters forced a halt to

 

military activities, and Count von Rosen's Minicons virtually

 

cut off oil from the Midwestern Region in the later stages of

 

the war.

 

        In the same way, French support in 1968 showed how the

 

right materiels (in this case small arms, ammunition and

 

anti-tank weapons) could turn the war into a stalemate and

 

temporarily alter the balance of power, so that the Biafrans

 

went on the offensive.  The French support also demonstrated

 

how (by Western standards) relatively small amounts of  war

 

materiels could still critically affect the battlefield

 

equilibrium in the wars of developing nations.

 

        In closing, one point needs to be reviewed.  The

 

Biafrans fought for more than two and a half years against a

 

numerically and materielly superior force.  During that time,

 

shortages of critical items abounded, mass starvation

 

occurred, Federal incursions reduced Biafra to one tenth of

 

its original size, and paranoid fear of extermination was

 

rampant.  Corruption and political infighting grew.  The

 

gravity of the situation seems incomprehensible, yet the

 

Rebels fought on with what was generally regarded as higher

 

morale than their adversaries.  In the end the most

 

significant lesson of the Nigerian Civil War may be the

 

strength and flexibility of the indomitable human spirit.

 

 

                                       END NOTES

 

                                   INTRODUCTION

 

 

1.      Frederick Forsyth, The Biafra Story, (Baltimore: Penquin

        Books, 1969) p. 7.

 

                                       CHAPTER 1

 

1.      Colin Legum and John Drysdale, Africa Contemporary

        Record 1968-1969 (London: Africa Research Limited,

        1969), p. 2.

 

2.      Ibid., p. 3.

 

3.      John Hatch, Nigeria: Seeds of Disaster, (Chicago: Henry

        Regnery Company, 1970), pp. 141-3.

 

4.      John R. Sullivan, Breadless Biafra, (Dayton: Pflaum

        Press, 1969), p. 86.

 

5.      Legum, op. cit., p. 4

 

6.      Ibid., p. 5.

 

7.      Ibid., p. 5.

 

8.      Ibid., p. 5-6.

 

9.      General Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command, (London:

        Heinemann, 1980), p. xi.

 

10.     Billy J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order:

        Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, (Ibadan:  Ibadan

        University Press, 1973), p. 88.

 

11.     Zdenek Cervenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-1970,

        (Frankfurt: Bernard and Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen,

        1971), p. 131.

 

12.     Dudley, op. cit., p. 88.

 

13.     Harold D. Nelson, Ed., Nigeria:  A Country Study, 4th

        Ed., (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982)

        p. 243.

 

14.     Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World

        Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, (New Haven:

        Yale University Press, 1972), pp, 34-47.  In a

        compilation of various indicators, this work shows how

        little Nigeria stressed its military in 1965.  Examples:

 

Click here to view image

 

15.     Nelson, op. cit., p. 243.

 

16.     Cervenka, op. cit., p. 134.

 

17.     Ibid., p. 133.

 

18.     Ibid., p. 138.

 

19.  Quoted by Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military,

        (Cambridge:  University Press, 1971), pp. 32-33.

       

20.  Cervenka, op. cit., p. 134.

 

21.  Time, October 14, 1966. pp. 44-47.

 

                               CHAPTER 2

 

1.      Cervenka, op. cit., p. 138.

 

2.      Neville Brown, "The Nigerian Civil War," Military

        Review, vol. 48, October 1968, p. 27.

 

3.      Ibid., p. 28.

 

4.      A. A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran

        War, (Enugu:  Fourth Division Publishers, 1980), p. 9.

 

5.      Brown, op. cit., p. 27.

 

6.      Cervenka, op. cit., p. 139.

 

7.      Ibid., p. 139.

 

8.      Ibid., p. 139.

 

9.      Joseph Okpaku (Ed.), Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood,

        (New York:  The Third Press, 1972), pp. 293-294.

 

10.     Sir Robert Thompson (Ed.), War in Peace, (New York:

        Harmony Books, 1982), p. 159.

 

11.     Cervenka, op. cit., p. 139.

 

12.  John De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, (London:

        Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), pp. 150-151.

 

13.     Brown, op. cit., p. 25.

 

14.     Ibid., p. 26.

 

15.  Cervenka, op. cit., p. 140.

 

16.  Time, January 26, 1970, p. 18.

 

17.     Madiebo, op. cit., p. 118.

 

18.     Time, August 2, 1968, p. 25.

 

19.     Rolf Steiner, The Last Adventurer, (Boston: Little,

        Brown and Company, 1978), p. 87.

 

20.     Brown, op. cit., p. 26.

 

21.     Raph Uwechue, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War,

        (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971), p. 8.

 

22.     De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 151.

 

23.     Sir Rex Niven, The War of Nigerian Unity 1967-1970,

        (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971), p. 132.

 

                                      CHAPTER 3

 

1.      Colonel R. A. Adebayo quoted by Fola Oyewole, Reluctant

        Rebel, (London: Rex Collings, 1975), Introduction.

 

2.      Obasanjo, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

 

3.      Ojukwu quoted by A. A. Madiebo, op cit., p. 19.

 

4.      Story related by Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 12.

 

5.      Madiebo, op. cit., pp. 149-151.

 

6.      Oyewole, op. cit., p. 30.

 

7.      Obasanjo, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

 

8.      New York Times, August 1, 1967, p. 7, col. 1.

 

9.      Cervenka, op. cit., p. 51.

 

10.     New York Times, June 29, 1967, p. 1, col. 3.

 

11.     Quoted by Jimoh Lawal, "Nigeria--Class Struggle and the

        National Question," Nigeria:  Dilemma of Nationhood, (New

        York: The Third Press, 1972), p. 281.

 

12.     De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 127.  At the start of the

        war, two thirds of the oil production and virtually all

        the oil processing facilities were in the secessionist

        Eastern Region.

 

13.     John De St. Jorre and Fola Oyewole, among others, report

        the routine travel of senior Nigerian military officers

        (Ibo) from Benin to the East immediately before the

        attack.  The presumption is clandestine preparations for

        the assault.

 

14.     De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 169.

 

15.     Madiebo, op. cit., p. 157.

 

16.     Niven, op. cit., p. 116.

 

17.     De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 169.

 

18.     Madiebo, op. cit., p. 158.

 

19.     Oyewole, op. cit., pp.42-44.

 

20.     Time, September 1, 1967, p. 20.

 

21.     New York Times, September 20, 1967, p. 6, col. 3.

 

22.     Elechi Amadi, Sunset in Biafra, (London: Heinemann,

        1973), p. 48.

 

23.     Oyewole, op. cit., p. 77.

 

24.     De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 172.

 

       

                                      CHAPTER 4

 

1.      Gowon reportedly maintained a copy of Carl Sandburg's

        Lincoln biography, The War Years, on his desk later in

        the war.  Time, August 23, 1968, p. 27.

 

2.      Raph Uwechue, op. cit., p. 197.

 

3.      Time, January 26, 1970, p. 22.

 

4.      De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 273.

 

5.      Even when they went to the Russians for capital

        equipment, the Nigerians paid cash.

 

6.      Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 19.

 

7.      Ibid., p. 19.

 

8.      New York Times, September 28, 1967, p. 12, col. 3;

        September 30, 1967, p. 21, col. 7; October 1, 1967, p.

        8, col. 1.

 

9.      Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 20.

 

10.     Madiebo, op. cit., p. 175.

 

11.     Bruce Hilton, Highly Irregular, (London, The Macmillan

        Company, 1969), p. 127.  Oyewole (op. cit. p. 128) notes

        that when Umuahia was later captured by the Federals,

        the Biafrans spoke of the govenment as "decentralized."

 

12.     Michael A. Samueli (Ed.), The Nigeria-Biafra Conflict,

        (Washington: The Center for Strategy and International

        Studies, Georgetown University, 1969), p. 19.

 

13.     New York Times, September 23, 1967, p. 10, col. 4.

 

14.     Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 20.

       

15.     Forsyth, op. cit., p. 123.

 

16.     Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 43.

 

17.     Brown, op. cit., p. 30.

 

18.     Cervenka, op. cit., p. 61.

 

19.     Brown, op. cit., p. 31.

 

20.     De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 188.

 

21.     Ibid., pp. 188-189.

 

22.     Time, October 4, 1968, p. 36.

 

23.     Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 47.

 

24.     New York Times, October 9,  1967, p. 11, col. 1. Lester

        A. Sobel (Ed.), Facts on File Yearbook, (New York: Facts

        on File, Inc., 1968), p. 507.

 

25.  Madiebo, op. cit., pp. 191-192.

 

26.     New York Times, November 3, 1967, p. 11, col. 1.

 

27.  Madiebo, op. cit., p. 196.

 

28.     Oyewole, op. cit., p. 85.

 

29.     Niven, op. cit., p. 123.

 

30.     Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 50.

 

31.  Time, May 31, 1968, p. 31. Sir Rex Niven, op. cit., p.

        127, points out that Adekunle may have wanted to add to

        the supply and health problems the Rebels were already

        experiencing.

 

32.     The London Times among other sources declared that the

        war was militarily won.

 

33.     De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 257.

 

              

                               CHAPTER 5

 

1.      Uwechue, op. cit., p. 133.

 

2.      Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Succession

        1966-1970.  (London: Frank Cass, 2nd Edition, 1976), p.

        25-26.

 

3.      Ibid., p. 92.

 

4.      Ibid., p. 92-93.

 

5.      Oyewole, op. cit., p. 126.

 

6.      Madiebo, op. cit., p. 174.

 

7.      Ibid., p. 171.

 

8.      Oyewole, op. cit., p. 127.

 

9.      Madiebo, op. cit., p. 210.

 

10.     Amadi, op. cit., p. 143.  A. A. Madiebo argued that this

        conceptually is the reason the Biafrans were so

        unprepared for war.  They did not want to take on the

        expensive process of outfitting their army because they

        felt that "determination" and "will power" were all that

        were needed to secure their just cause.  Madiebo, op.

        cit., p. 108.

 

11.     Quoted by Akpan, op. cit., p. 95.

 

12.  Ibid., p. 95-95.

 

13.     Madiebo, op. cit., p. 173.

 

14.  Akpan, op. cit., pp. 98-100.

 

 

                                      CHAPTER 6

 

1.      De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 271.

 

2.      Time, October 4, 1968, p. 36.

 

3.      Cervenka, op. cit., p. 64.

 

4.      Oyewole, op. cit., p. 64.

 

5.      This morale was based in large measure on the belief

        that extermination was the alternative to the fight for

        survival for the Rebels.  Biafran units were often

        formed on short notice, decimated and deactivated or

        incorporated into other units constituted for a new

        emergency.  That the Biafrans were successful in the

        incredible disorganization can only be attributed to

        their intense motivation and front line leadership.

        Note:

 

        a)  The Biafrans commissioned 10,000 officers during the

        war of which about 3,000 were killed (Oyewole, op. cit.,

        Introduction, page unnumbered).  Even with this high

        incidence of officer casualties, the Rebels displayed

        the suspicious distrust of their officer corps noted

        earlier.

 

        b)  Morale was high in front line units in spite of large

        number of casualties.  In its first six months of

        existence, 4 Commando Brigade (led during that time by

        the mercenary Rolf Steiner) sustained 8,400 killed,

        wounded and missing in action in a unit with an average

        strength of 5,000 soldiers (Steiner, op. cit., p. 119).

 

6.      Michael Mok, Biafra Journal, (New York: Time-Life Books,

        1969), p. 64.

 

7.      Cervenka, op. cit., p. 54.

       

8.      Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 24.

 

9.      Ibid., pp. 56-57.

 

10.     Hilton, op. cit.,  p. 125.

 

11.     Oyewole, op. cit., p. 87.

 

12.     Cervenka, op. cit., p. 79.

 

13.  Akpan, op. cit., p. 191. Ojukwu noted these issues in a

        memorandum to the president of the Ivory Coast, but he

        claimed the improved leadership was due to an infusion

        of foreign officers to direct the Nigerian forces.

 

14.     A. H. M. Kirk-Green, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria,

        vol. II, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.

        112.

 

15.     Peter Schwab (Ed.), Biafra, (New York: Facts on File,

Inc., 1971), p. 118.

 

 

                                       CHAPTER 7

 

1.      New York Times, July 10, 1967, p. 1, col. 4.

 

2.      New York Times, October 8, 1967, p. 5, col. 1.

 

3.      Hilton, op. cit., p. 74.

 

4.      Time, August 23, 1968, p. 28.

 

5.      Cervenka, op. cit., p. 154.

 

6.      Brown, op. cit., p. 26.

 

7.      Schwab, op. cit., p. 113.

 

8.      De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 336-337.

 

9.      Time, June 6, 1969, p. 38.

 

10.     Schwab, op. cit., p. 79.

 

11.     De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 338.  De St. Jorre notes that

        von Rosen's air force accomplished the opposite of his

        intension.  The Federals increased their bombing and the

        pace of the war.

 

12.     Ibid., pp. 315-316.

 

13.  Brown, op. cit., p. 26.

 

14.     De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 318.

 

15.  Madiebo, op. cit., p. 284.

 

 

                               SELECTED BIBILIGRAPHY

 

A.      Books and Special Reports

 

Ademoyega, Adewale.  Why We Struck.  Ibadan:  Evans Brothers

        (Nigergia Publishers) Limited, 1981.  Expanation and

        history of the coup attempt in January 1966 by one of

        the key participants.  This book gives a feel for the

        dynamics that led to the coup, the personalities and

        motivations of the plotters, and the naivete which

        doomed the plot from its beginning.  Used for background

        information, this work is heavily biased, almost a

        complete defense of the plotters.

 

Akpan, Ntieyoug U.  The Struggle For Succession 1966-1970.

        2nd Ed.  London: Frank Cass, 1976.  Author was chief

        secretary of the government and head of the Civil

        Service of Eastern Nigeria (later "Biafra") from

        1966-1970.  This book provided an insider's view of the

        operations of the Biafran government.  Used as a

        principal source.

 

Alade, R. B. The Broken Bridge.  Ibadan:  The Caxton Press,

        1975. Background reading only.

 

Amadi, Elechi. Sunset in Biafra.  London:  Heinemann

        Educational Books, Limited, 1973.  An autobiography by a

        noted Nigerian novelist.  The easy, direct style made

        this book enjoyable to read.  The work was used to

        verify certain concepts or conclusions through the

        review of specific events detailed in the book.

        Excellent source of information on  reestablishing

        control of former Rebel areas.

 

Balogun, Ola. The Tragic Years:  Nigeria in Crisis

        1966-1970.  Benin City:  Ethiope Publishing Corporation.

        1973.  Review of Civil War years; used as back-up source

        for this paper.

 

Cervenka, Zdenek.  The Nigerian War 1967-1970.  Frankfurt:

        Bernard and Graefe Verlag fur Wherwesen, 1971.

        Comprehensive research document on the Civil War,

        published shortly after the conclusion.  This work is

        objective and an appropriate starting point for

        researchers.  It contains an excellent bibliography and

        was published in English.

 

Collis, Robert.  Nigeria in Conflict.  London:  Secker and

        Warburg, 1970.  A pro-Federal account of the war, this

        book is sketchy and greatly biased.  Used for

        comparison.

 

Critchley, Julian.  Crisis Paper No. 7:  the Nigerian Civil

        War:  The Defeat of Biafra.  London:  Atlantic

        Information Centre for Teachers, 1970.  This pamphlet

        outlines the events of the Civil War providing a

        chronology with brief accompanying analyses.  Included

        are a wide selection of editorial quotes on the fall of

        Biafra from newspapers around the world.

 

De St. Jorre, John.  The Nigerian Civil War.  London:  Hodder

        and Stoughton, 1972.  Thorough, readable book by

        jounalist who spent extensive time in Nigeria before,

        during and after the war.  He was objectives in his

        pronouncements and his detailed research was reflected

        in his well substantiated conclusions.  Heavily used

        this reference.

       

Dudley, Billy J. Instability and Political Order:  Politics

        and Crisis in Nigeria.  Ibadan: Ibadan University

        Press, 1973.

 

Forsyth, Frederick.  The Biafra Story.  Baltimore: Penguin

        books, 1969.  Interesting, but biased.  Written while

        the war was in progress to tell the Biafra side.

 

Gold, Herbert.  Biafra Goodbye.  San Francisco:  TwoWindows

        Press, 1970.  Short book recounting the author's

        personal involvement with Biafra.  Polished work which

        often slips to stream of consciousness.

 

Hatch, John.  Nigeria: Seeds of Disaster.  Chicago: Henry

        Regnery Company, 1970.  Review of factors leading to the

        Civil War.  Excellent recapitualtion of causes for

        serious researcher.

       

Higham, Robin. ed.  Civil Wars in th 20th Century.

        Lexington:  University of Kentucky Press, 1972.

        Established context for the war in Nigeria in light of

        various aspects of civil warfare in this centruy.

 

Hilton, Bruce.  Highly Irregular.  London:  The Macmillan

        Company, 1968.  Biography of the mercy missions,

        including proposed airlift by author.  Concise

        background to the causes of conflict. Documents the

        suspicious nature of Biafran officials.

 

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., ed.  Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria. 2

        vols. London:  Oxford University Press, 1971.

        Comprehensive collection of source documents on the

        Nigerian Civil War.  Important reference due to

        selection of texts and profound analysis in both

        volumes.

 

Legum, Colin, and Drysdale, John, ed.  Africa Contemporary

        Record 1968-1969.  London:  Africa Research Limited,

        1969.  Best synopsis of factors leading to the Civil

        War.

 

               . Africa Contemporary Record 1969-1970.  London:

        Africa Research Limited, 1970.

 

Luckham, Robin.  The Nigerian Military.  Cambridge:

        University Press, 1971.  Detailed analysis of the

        development of the Nigerian military during the period

        1960 to 1967.  Luckham outlined the factors which put

        the military in a position to seize power, examined both

        coups and studied the military as a social system and

        political entity.  Exceptional research work.

 

Madiebo, A.A. The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War.

        Enugu:  Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980.  Major

        General Madiebo was commander of the Biafran Army from

        September 1967 to January 1970.  He offered a unique,

        knowledgeable perspective characterized by candor and

        reason. His insider's view made this a major source.

       

Mok, Michael.  Biafra Journal.  New York:  Time-Life Books,

        1969.  Popular literature by a photo journalist who

        covered the Biafran side of the war.  Admittedly biased,

        yet moving account of life in the horror of the war in

        Biafra.

 

Nelson, Harold D., et. al. Nigeria:  A Country Study.

        Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

        Outstanding reference work.

 

Niven, Sir Rex.  The War of Nigerian Unity 1967-1970.

        Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971.

        Relatively objective overview despite pro-Federal

        orientation of book.

 

Nwankwo, Arthur Agwunch and Ifejika, Samuel Udolhukwu.

        Biafra:  The Making of A Nation.  New York:  Praeger

        Publishers, 1970.  Text provides a development of events

        leading up to the Civil War and a justification for the

        existence of Biafra.

 

Obasanjo, Olusegun.  My Command.  London: Heinemann, 1980.

        Key figure in the post-independence history of Nigeria

        (Division Commander in war and later military ruler who

        turned government over to civilian leadership.)

        Outlines causes of Civil War and its early stages.

        Obasanjo details events that occurred after he assumed

        division command until the end of the war.  One of the

        major works about the conflict.

              

Obe, Peter.  Nigeria:  A Decade of Crises in Pictures.

        Apapa:  Times Press Limited, 1971.  Basic picture book

        with pro-Nigeria (Federal) cant by long time

        photographer for Lagos Daily Times.

 

Ojukwu, C.O.  Biafra. 2 vols.  New York:  Harper and Row,

        1969.  Selected speeches by the Biafra head of state.

 

Okpaku, Joseph, ed.  Negeria:  Dilemma of Nationhood.  New

        York:  The Third Press, 1972.

 

Oyediran, Oyeleye, ed. Nigerian Government and Politics

     Under Military Rule 1966-1979. New York: St. Martin's

     Press, 1979.

 

Oyewole, Fola.  Reluctant Rebel.  London:  Rex Collings,

        1975.  Autobiography of Civil War experience by a

        Biafran staff officer.  This work has significance

        because of its first hand insights into the conduct of

        the war in Biafra.  Major source for this paper.

        Oyewole was released from prison to fight in the war.

        He returned to prison at the end.  A thoughtfully

        objective account of the Biafran regime and its military

        operations.

 

Samuels, Michael A., ed. The Nigeria-Biafra Conflict.

        Washington:  The Center for Strategic and International

        Studies, Georgetown University, 1969.  Minutes from a

        one-day conference.  Highlights the critical concerns of

        the day.

 

Schabouvka, Henry Ka and Himmelstrand, Ulf. Africa Reports

        on the Nigerian Crisis.  Uppsala, Sweden:  The

        Scandianavian Institute of African Studies, 1978.

        Primarily tangential information.  Study of press

        responses and attitudes to Nigerian Civil War.

 

Schwab, Peter, ed. Biafra.  New York:  Facts on File, Inc.,

        1971.  Factual reference work recapping media accounts

        of war.

 

Sobel, Lester A., ed. Facts on File Yearbook 1967.  Vol.

        XXVII.  New York:  Facts on File, Inc., 1969.

 

Steiner, Rolf.  The Last Adventurer.  Boston:  Little, Brown

        and Company, 1978.  Authobiographical account of noted

        mercenary's experiences in Biafra, as well as Algeria

        and the Sudan.

 

Stremlau, John J. The International Politics of the Nigerian

        Civil War 1967-1970.  Princeton:  Princeton University

        Press, 1973.  Salient work on the topic.

 

Sullivan, John R. Breadless Biafra.  Dayton:  Pflaum Press,

        1969,  Pro-Biafran publication by jounalist who visited

        Rebels in 1969.  Concise, easy-to-read account of chain

        of events leading up to war.

 

Taylor, Charles Lewis and Hudson, Michael C. World Handbook

        of Political and Social Indicators.  New Haven: Yale

        University Press, 1972.

 

Thompson, Sir Robert.  War in Peace.  New York:  Harmony

        Books, 1982.  Establishes context of conflicts since the

        Second World War.

 

Uwechue, Raph.  Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War.  New

        York:  Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.  Primarily

        politico-social analysis of Civil War.  Objective

        conclusions about the war considering pro-Biafra

        reference of author.

 

B. Periodicals

 

Brown, Neville.  "The Nigerian Civil War."  Military Review,

        October 1968, pp. 20-31.

 

Grinaldi, J.S. Major,  "The Effect of Political Geography on

        Nigeria's Solidarity."  Marine Corps Gazette, July 1969,

        pp. 50-51.

 

New York Times, 15 January 1966-15 February 1970.

       

Sterling, Claire.  "The Self-Defeating Civil War in Nigeria."

        The Reporter, 10 August 1967, pp. 23-30.

 

Time, 14 October 1966; 1 September 1967; 31 May 1968; 23

        August 1968; 4 October 1968; 6 June 1969; 26 January

        1970.

 

C. Interviews

 

Becka, Mary, Major, USA.  Research Analyst for Western

        Africa, Defense Intelligence Agency.  Arlington.

        Virginia, March 8, 1984.

 

Hubard, William, Lieutenant Colonel, USA.  Current Analyst,

        Africa Branch, Defense Intelligence Agency. Washington,

        D.C., October 21, 1983.

 

Isom, William G., Lieutenant Colonel.  Director, African

        Studies, National War College.  Washington, D.C., March

        9, 1984.

 

Stoakley, William, Dr. (Ph.D., History).  Research Analyst

        for Western Africa, Defense Intelligence Agency.

        Arlington, Virginia, March 8, 1984.

 

 

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