Perspectives
On Succession
By
Akin Osuntokun
culled from GUARDIAN, July 4, 2005
Universally, political leadership succession is inherently problematic.
Primarily this is because of the power it reposes on the incumbent leader over
the allocation of scarce and limited resources. As such, political leadership
succession is a struggle for power-the capacity to change the probability of
actions. The contemporary and universally acceptable agency through which this
power is exercised is the state and the dominant framework through which the
contestation for power takes place is the electoral and political party system
in its varying degrees and manifestations.
Within the context of the liberal democratic order the greater the degree of
the institutionalisation of this framework the less problematic political
leadership succession tends to be. In this regard the difference between the
United States of America, and Nigeria is the gap in the acceptance and
institutionalisation of this norm in the two countries. Thus while the stalemate
and dispute that attended the American presidential elections in year 2000 is an
affirmation of the inherently problematic nature of political leadership
succession the successful and expeditious management of the attendant crisis
underscores the highly developed capacity of the political system to respond
effectively to the challenges of succession politics.
Conversely, the breakdowns of the first and second republics in Nigeria
indicates an underdeveloped capacity of Nigeria for the sustenance and
management of leadership recruitment and succession framework. A recognition of
this limitation and the manifest disposition for subversive military
intervention explain the Nigerian public ( and the international community)
anxiety at the approach of periodic succession contests.
In the political experience of Nigeria, the anticipated succession engagement
of Year 2007 is unique. It is the first time that three successive elections,
howsoever flawed, will take place and it is coming against the background of a
successful civilian to civilian transition. Equally, it's the first time that an
elected incumbent President ( chief executive) will not stand for election. How
then might the successor emerge? According to the theory of social reproduction,
an incumbent power elite tends to reproduce itself( mainly in general terms).
It was in such general terms that the British colonial elite ( believed to
have preference for the 'Northern' political establishment) was thought to have
maneuvered the dominant conservative wing of this establishment which had
coalesced in the Northern Peoples Congress, NPC, to inherit central political
authority in 1960. So to say, the decisive factor in this instance was the will
of a departing imperial power and it's vision for a country in which it has a
vested neo colonial interest. More or less, the circumstances of the military to
civil democratic rule transition of 1979 was, similarly, an instance of power
succession that was predicated on the will of an imperial autocracy with an
enlightened self interest in the normalization of political succession. The
military mentors were, of course, more favorably disposed towards the eventual
winner of the succession race than the other contestants. And perhaps, it was
also more politically correct and somewhat anticipatory of the contemporary
North/ South power rotational prescription that a candidate from the other side
of the divide should succeed a Southern incumbent.
In 1999 the succession to power of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was a product of
the crisis that followed the annulment of the 1993 Presidential elections. The
crisis was characterized by the following dimensions. One was the
deprofessionalization and intense politicization of the military which had
crystallized in a marked and widespread reluctance of the military to disengage
from power. Two was a denatured and confused political environment resulting
from protracted military rule and political over experimentation.
Three and undoubtedly the most consequential was the acute political
alienation and victimization of the South West which ensued from the annulment
and gathered apace through the virulent military regime of the late General Sani
Abacha. The questions that were posed by the three dimensions were twofold. One
was the question of how to secure a very problematic military disengagement and
the other was how to contrive an effective conciliatory response to the deep
sense of political alienation and victimization of the South West. Enters Chief
Olusegun Obasanjo. Between 1970 and 1999 Obasanjo had acquired an aura and
developed a personality of a military and Nigerian patriarch. Within the measure
of this three decades he had emerged at critical moments as the antithesis of
untoward political tendencies in Nigeria.
Be it as the Nigerian commander who took the surrender of Biafran
secessionists in 1970; the military head of state who against the African norm
voluntarily disengaged from power and restored civil democratic rule in 1979 and
as a martyr for democracy in the political crisis of 1993 to 1998. As a former
military ruler who had sufficiently demonstrated the attribute of political
correctness he seemed adequately prepared to provide a solution to the question
of securing a problematic military disengagement and as a Nigerian patriarch of
Yoruba extraction he was the ready and easy answer to the concessionary quest
for a President of South West origin. And in terms of the theory of social
reproduction in which every status quo power elite reproduces itself, there is a
valid sense in which Obasanjo was a status quo candidate ,at least more than his
other real contestant- Chief Olu Falae.
As we approach the year 2007, the inevitable question is what are the
predisposing eligibility factors for the successor President? What are the
factors that will shape the emergence of a successor? First there is the
implicit and explicit assumption of zoning and rotational formula in which, at
the minimum, the South West is disqualified and at most, only candidates from
the North are eligible. Second is the comprehensive dominance of the Peoples
Democratic Party,PDP, and the inherent meaning of monopoly claim to the
Presidency. The likelihood of course is that the Party cannot avoid the
occurrence of a degree of implosion which will stem from the politics of its
Presidential primaries. Because the incumbent President will, however, remain in
the Party, it is difficult to envisage a complete loss of dominance of the PDP
regardless of any attenuating crisis.
Third is the existence of an active and consecrating military faction of the
ruling political elite. Indeed President Obasanjo himself will have to make a
self-conscious effort of distancing not to be seen as a Godfather of this potent
faction. The reality of this faction is a unique product of post independence
political history of Nigeria in which the military had for the better part
usurped the political leadership of Nigeria. Fourth is a tradition( albeit not a
stable feature of unsettled and young democracies ) whereby likeminded running
mates succeed their principals. Fifth is the international community and
globalization especially in this age of intense international scrutiny;
Nigeria's aspirations for continental and regional leadership and a weak
dependent economy.
Last and of great consequence is the incumbency factor. It is necessary to
clarify that incumbency factor goes beyond personality preferences to include
the sustenance of regime attributes or what is commonly known as legacy. More
than any other Nigerian administration the subsisting Obasanjo Presidency is
characterised by the introduction and implementation of radical reform measures
and policies no less than the Nigerian situation requires if it was not to
bottom out. The measures are for the most part theoretically prescribed and its
application has sought no compromise with populism and the comfort of the status
quo. It lays a relentless siege on the status quo equilibrium and has been
unable to discriminate between victims and villains and has thus exposed itself,
inevitable, to the intermittent eruptions of popular disaffection and
alienation.
The truth is it has to be so, at least, in the short run until it all evens
out in recovery, stability and a new equilibrium. Having borne the heavy burden
and brunt of the sacrifice it is understandable if Nigeria forswears a relapse.
Echoing his refrain at the concerns of the visiting world bank chief executive,
President Obasanjo recently remarked in Holland " Let me quickly address an
issue that I have found necessary to touch upon at every forum of this nature...
It is on what happens after 2007 when I would have ....returned to my farm. Let
me assure you that the reforms will last well into the distant future. Nigerians
are beginning to own and defend the reform programmes".
If as I agree and as President Obasanjo wills 'Nigerians are beginning to own
and defend the programme' then the first significant act of faith towards
securing this future will be the predetermination of a reform programme made to
measure successor. Borrowing the parlance of a signal reform policy initiative
of this administration i.e. 'Due process' I conclude as follows: eligibility
factors First to Fourth as earlier mentioned will pre qualify succession
aspirants while the tender for successful successor candidature will be
predicated on the last two eligibility factors.
