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REINVENTING THE NATION
BY
DARREN KEW
Being excerpts
from a recent published book, Countries at the Crossroads 2006 (Africa at
the Crossroads (Sanja Tatic (ed.)
Introduction
culled from GUARDIAN, October
1, 2006
As
Nigeria enters the seventh year of its latest effort to build
democratic rule; the country remains stuck at the political
crossroads, vacillating between democratic consolidation and the
slow road to decay and dissolution. With an estimated population of
130 million growing at nearly three per cent annually and an oil
output of 2.5 million barrels per day increasing to 4 million by the
end of the decade, Nigeria should be taking its rightful place as
the giant of Africa. Instead, the giant was brought to its knees by
20 years of brutal and corrupt military rule, which left a legacy of
executive dominance and political corruption in the hands of
Nigeria's so-called godfathers - powerful political bosses sitting
atop vast patronage networks and who view the government primarily
through the lens of their own personal enrichment.
Since President
Olusegun Obasanjo was elected in 1999, he has undertaken a
number of marginal reforms seeking to reverse this situation. At
the same time, however, he has increased his personal hold over
the ruling Peoples Democratic Party and refused or been unable
to promote the most important reforms to secure democratic
consolidation, such as ensuring the independence and probity of
the electoral commission or respecting the independence of the
legislature through the budgetary process.
Freedom in
Nigeria remains protected more by the nation's immense size
and massive diversity than by the actions of its government.
The lifting of military rule in 1999 opened the public arena
to a host of non-state actors, producing a renaissance in
civil society and the media. Labour unions regained their
place as the leading public advocates amid an explosion in
the numbers of civic associations and non-governmental
organisations. Journalists, meanwhile, grew increasingly
bold in their political coverage, forcing the removal of two
speakers of the House (of Representatives) and a Senate
president after exposing their corrupt practices.
Moreover,
with some 250 ethnic groups speaking a myriad of
languages and split evenly across the Muslim-Christian
divide, Nigeria's sheer cultural complexity evokes an
environment of constantly shifting alliances and ready
balances that tend to check the authoritarian
inclinations of the country's political elite.
Yet, the
Nigerian government remains distant from serving the
interests of its people. Politics at the federal,
state, and local levels of the Nigerian federation
are dominated by the powerful mandarins
(incumbents), who built vast patronage networks
during the military days and who now use political
office to expand these networks and their personal
fortunes. Moreover, many of these so-called
godfathers have been cultivating personal militias
to secure their positions, prompting a local arms
race in some regions, particularly in the
oil-producing Niger Delta.
Even
though several governors are under indictment
for money laundering abroad and others are being
investigated at home, the bonanza continues at
public coffers for these power holders, while
basic public infrastructure in many parts of the
country remains as dilapidated as under military
rule. Electricity, for instance, is available to
less than half of the population and is on for
as little as two hours per day in some areas,
while many major roads are nearly impassable,
and health clinics face a severe shortage of
trained staff and supplies.
To his credit, President Obasanjo has kept
the military loyal under civilian control
and has undertaken a number of key
macroeconomic reforms - such as some
privatisation and paying down the nation's
exorbitant foreign debts - that have
fostered moderate GDP growth. He has also
set up anti-corruption machinery at the
federal level. Yet, the President has been
unable or unwilling to attack the heart of
the corruption empires of Nigeria's
godfathers through the government-controlled
oil industry, their monopolisation and
exploitation of government contracts, or
their subversion of the nation's electoral
system. Indeed, the President has shown a
growing willingness to play their game,
appearing inclined to build such a network
himself, to ensure his tenure in power past
his constitutional limit of two terms ending
in 2007.
While the politicians wrestle endlessly
for control, most Nigerians suffer
declining health, education, and
employment standards, such that the
British government has declared that
"Nigeria has some of the worst social
indicators in the world."
If freedom and democracy are to
continue to grow in Nigeria, the
government will have to make some
tough decisions that contradict the
interests of many of the powerful
men who dominate the nation's
political life. These reforms will
become even more difficult as the
potentially explosive 2007 elections
loom and virtually impossible if the
President's supporters are
successful in amending the
Constitution to extend his term in
office, at the price of heightened
godfather influence.
The next two years will be
dominated by the struggle for
ascendancy among the many
powerful individuals in Nigeria,
as the April 2007 elections
approach, as well as by the
efforts of the President's
supporters to alter the
Constitution. If they are
successful, then centrifugal
forces in the Nigerian polity
may grow increasingly difficult
to resist. The Nigerian
government can undertake a
number of reforms that will help
to strengthen democracy and
political freedoms, thus
preventing the nation from
taking the road to slow decline:
Accountability and
Public Voice
THE bitter fruits of
Nigeria's flawed
2003 elections came
to harvest
throughout 2004 and
2005. The drama of
the July 2003 coup
in Anambra State, in
which seemingly
rogue police
elements arrested
the governor on
behalf of his
estranged godfather,
continued to produce
stunning revelations
regarding the extent
of election fraud in
2003. While
mediating between
the governor and
this godfather (who
has close ties to
the President),
President Obasanjo
told the media that
both men had
admitted that they
had rigged elections
in their state. Both
were suspended from
the ruling party,
and the governor's
election was
overturned by an
election tribunal in
2005. By late 2005,
however, the
governor remained in
office awaiting an
appellate court
decision on his
case, and the former
godfather in
question was
readmitted to the
ruling party.
A similar drama
played out
between the
governor of
Plateau State
and his
political
opponents.
Community anger
over reportedly
rigged elections
followed by
inflammatory
actions and
corruption by
the governor
ignited
Muslim-Christian
tensions in the
state, leading
to religious
riots in several
cities across
Nigeria and
prompting the
President to
impose six
months of
emergency rule
in Plateau
starting in May
2004.
Worryingly,
the
President
himself
appeared to
grow less
interested
in
accountability
and free
elections
throughout
2005. Early
in the year,
he packed
the
leadership
of the
ruling
party, the
Peoples
Democratic
Party (PDP),
with his
supporters,
who then
ensured that
supporters
of the
President's
main rival,
the Vice
President,
were unable
to vote in
the PDP
party
congresses
from October
to December
2005. This
move has
ensured that
the
President's
supporters
will have a
lock on
determining
who can run
in the PDP
primaries in
late 2006.
The
Independent
National
Electoral
Commission
(INEC),
meanwhile,
shows
little
interest
in
addressing
its
vulnerability
to
rigging.
Despite
stating
that the
outcome
of the
2003
elections
was
primarily
the
result
of "how
much
money
exchanged
hands,"
the new
INEC
chairman
later
announced
that
international
monitors
would
not be
permitted
for the
2007
elections.
He also
said
that the
Commission
intended
to
introduce
electronic
voting,
but
opposition
parties
voiced
concern
that the
machinery
would be
even
less
transparent
and
prone to
more
centralised
rigging.
In
addition,
because
campaign
finance
laws are
minimal
and
largely
un-enforced,
the
President's
supporters
will
hold an
overwhelming
advantage
as the
2007
elections
approach,
having
both
access
to state
funds
and the
power of
the
presidency.
INEC
also
remains
chronically
under-funded,
receiving
only 13
per cent
of its
budget
appropriation
in 2005.
Opposition
parties
control
eight
of
the
36
States
of
the
federation,
but
as
they
are
divided,
they
have
posed
little
challenge
to
PDP
governance.
The
opposition
is
generally
free
to
campaign
on
the
pages
of
the
newspapers
and
to
some
extent
in
the
private
televised
media,
but
the
government
has
grown
increasingly
willing
to
prevent
them
from
holding
rallies
in
the
capital
and
major
cities
across
the
country.
In
some
states
and
in
the
rural
areas
more
generally,
opposition
parties
face
formal
and
informal
harassment
when
they
organise
and
campaign.
The
states
of
the
Niger
Delta
have
proven
particularly
inhospitable
to
opposition
events;
a
major
opposition
figure,
Marshall
Harry,
was
assassinated
there
in
2003.
Televised
media,
especially
the
public
stations,
carry
generally
positive
news
about
the
government,
although
opposing
views
are
occasionally
aired.
Hostility
to
opposition
within
the
PDP
over
2004
and
2005,
however,
grew
far
worse
among
the
factions
jostling
for
control,
particularly
between
those
loyal
to
the
President
and
those
connected
to
the
Vice
President.
Rotation of political offices among Nigeria's ethnic groups and geographic regions has become a firmly entrenched principle of politics. The leading political parties are widely multiethnic, in part due to progressive election laws, and they typically rotate elected offices and party positions among members of their own party across the main regions of the country. Cabinet offices and leadership positions in the National Assembly are also distributed to mirror the 36 States of the federation, and state-level offices are similarly distributed across intra-state divides. Critics of President Obasanjo's purported third term bid, however, have argued that it would violate the rotation principle and jeopardise the fragile stability that principle has afforded.
The legislatures and judiciaries at the federal and state levels remain largely beholden to the executives, although important pockets of independence have grown. The National Assembly mounted an impeachment effort in 2004 that fizzled after several months, and both the National Assembly and state Assemblies contain a number of members truly dedicated to reform who have launched investigations into a number of alleged corrupt practices. The Supreme Court for its part has shown a dogged determination to protect its independence and to defend the rule of law in Nigeria.
The key source of institutional dominance of the executives remains their monopoly of public funds. The presidency collects the revenues first (particularly from oil), and even though the National Assembly passes a budget to allocate the funds, the President has refused to release the budgeted amounts every year and instead has released funds as he has seen fit. Governors in turn receive the states' portions of the oil revenues first, and they have used this control as leverage against their Assemblies and judicial branches. Within this context, the civil service remains troubled by political patronage and advancement by personal loyalties rather than by objective standards of merit, although some state and federal bureaucracies have improved their performances, as has the military in this regard.
Civil society has grown vibrant in recent years, managing to make its voice heard on a number of important issues, such as fuel price hikes, and some minor legislation. The National Assembly has proven increasingly open to civil society involvement. Perhaps, the most important civil society-led legislation is the Freedom of Information Act (see "Anticorruption and Transparency"). Politics overall, however, remains dominated by the Big Men, and civil society groups continue to have to clamour for respect and recognition from many government actors. Moreover, President Obasanjo's third term bid is prompting many civil society groups to return to organised opposition, a move that will close some of the doors in government that have opened to civil society in recent years.
Nigeria's fabled independent media remain largely vibrant, particularly on the Internet, which is awash in competing political visions and investigative journalism. The print media, however, have grown increasingly prey to bribery, especially as media houses often refuse to pay field reporters under the expectation that they will raise their own funds. Government harassment of journalists, which was largely absent in Obasanjo's first term, has reappeared in the last two years. The State Security Service's closing of the Insider Weekly magazine and arrest of its production manager in 2004 for releasing several articles critical of the President was particularly telling, in that the issue that prompted the arrival of the SSS and the seizure of 15,000 copies alleged that the President was planning to amend the Constitution to allow himself a third term in office. In addition, the Bayelsa Broadcasting Corporation and African Independent Television were both closed for periods of 2005 for televising stories on subjects that were deemed politically sensitive. Many journalists feel increasing pressure for self-censorship.
Recommendations
Proper checks and balances should be restored to Nigerian democracy by giving the legislatures control of revenue collection, appropriation, and allocation agencies and processes so that the Assemblies truly have the power of the purse.
The independence of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) must be assured, in part by giving INEC direct access to a guaranteed minimum percentage of the federal budget, extending the tenure of the chair to an eight to 10-year term (subject to impeachment); giving opposition parties significant oversight of the election process, and allowing domestic and international election monitors substantive watchdog roles. State electoral commissions, now often heavily manipulated by local politicians, should be absorbed into INEC.
The party primary process should be reformed so that party-candidates must win their nominations through competitive, open elections through INEC, which should monitor and regulate party finances and election expenditures.
Political opposition and opposition parties should be allowed to organise and hold peaceful public rallies and events without unreasonable government interference or prohibition. Opposition parties should be given formal oversight roles in the legislatures, including substantial voice in the anti-corruption oversight committees.
Government harassment and detention of journalists should stop, and the media houses should be encouraged to institute standards and oversight practices to expunge bribery from Nigerian journalism. Civil society groups should be given the government access and oversight privileges they deserve in a free society.
Civil Liberties
USE of torture remains rampant on the part of the Nigerian police and security services, despite condemnation of these practices from the upper echelons of the government and spirited efforts by civil society groups to alter entrenched patterns. Police and military brutality also remain standard practice, particularly in the militarised Niger Delta region, where peaceful, women-led protests against multinational oil corporations' lack of investment in their communities were fired upon on several occasions in 2004 and 2005.
Security forces frequently fire indiscriminately when in hot pursuit of suspects. The government occasionally prosecutes police offenders, such as four police officers who fired at Abuja market traders over non-payment of bribes in 2005. But the media prominence of this case underscores the infrequency of such prosecutions, much less redress for the victims of these crimes or of police torture.
Ethnic and religious militias, some supported by state actors, also engage in an array of torture and violent practices. State-sponsored enforcers of the Sharia criminal code, who are known as the Hisbah, are notorious for practicing summary justice that typically involves corporal punishment. Ethnic militias associated with oil smuggling networks are particularly violent and known to murder opponents both within and outside their ranks. The President spearheaded a successful disarmament and amnesty programme in the Niger Delta in late 2004, but the programme was allowed to lapse and the participating militias had largely rearmed with more modern equipment by late 2005.
Prison conditions across Nigeria remain abysmal. Most inmates do not come to trial for 10 years on average, and police evidence is often poor or fabricated. Policemen are frequently open to hire for a range of noble and ignoble activities, including political skullduggery and criminal gang dealings. Consequently, arrests are often arbitrary and financially motivated, and judicial redress, much less appeals, can often take years unless the individual has powerful political connections.
In response to these concerns and to overcrowding in the prisons, the Obasanjo administration announced in January 2006 that it would release 25,000 prisoners, roughly half the entire prison population, who had already served longer terms than sentencing would have given them if they had come to trial, or who were too old or sick to be public security concerns. Amnesty International hailed the move as an important step forward, but the structural problems in the justice system, remain largely un-addressed.
With regard to women's rights, Nigeria remains a firmly male-dominated society. Only 24 of the total 469 members of the National Assembly are women, and women face significant discrimination in the workplace. President Obasanjo has made some effort to reduce this trend by naming an increasing number of women to high-level positions in his government, including four women ministers, most notably the powerful position of Finance Minister.
Women's organisations across the country have also increased their political advocacy, winning important legal battles that expand women's protections under the Sharia code, such as the internationally covered case of Amina Lawal, who would have been stoned to death for adultery had she been convicted. At home, however, women face regular brutality, such that the New York Times reported that one-third of Nigerian women surveyed had responded that their husbands had beaten them. In addition, women's legal rights to property, particularly land, are denied on occasion.
International news coverage over the last two years of Nigerian prostitute-smuggling rings to Europe has brought increasing attention to the scope of this problem. Most of the women are fooled into thinking that they are joining guest-worker or exchange programmes and then forced into prostitution once they arrive in Europe. The federal government has declared its intention to eradicate the smuggling rings. State and local authorities, however, have been far less willing to become involved, and the police remain on both sides of the issue.
Ethnic-based discrimination is a perpetual problem in a society as diverse as Nigeria's. Political elite have enshrined ethnic balancing as a political principle, but Nigerians outside the political arena face a more difficult picture. Officially, the Constitution condemns ethnic discrimination, but individuals typically derive their citizenship based on the state of origin of their parents or grandparents. Nigerians living outside their home states, therefore, are typically deprived of a range of citizenship privileges, such as running for political office, even if they have lived most of their lives outside their states of origin.
The Nigerian Constitution also calls for a principle known as federal character, which is generally applied as ethnic quotas in government hiring. Private companies that do business with the government also must feature ethnically balanced employee profiles in line with federal character standards, and government contracts account for a significant portion of all Nigerian economic activity.
Federal character practices have generally led to a more ethnically diverse profile in government hiring and, to some extent, among corporate leadership. Southern Nigerians, however, historically have enjoyed higher income and education levels, and some have complained that federal character has primarily been used to give northerners preference in key positions in business and government while northerners point to southern dominance of the civil service.
Religious freedoms are also a controversial subject in Nigeria. From one perspective, Nigeria allows a level of religious self-determination that is rivaled by few nations of the world, in the sense that each state of the federation is allowed to implement its own religious and traditional legal codes and public policies. Muslim majority states in northern Nigeria have implemented their own interpretations of the Islamic Sharia code and promulgated religious-inspired policies such as banning alcohol, while Christian majority states in the South have passed Christian-inspired policies as well, such as providing public funds for Christian festivals or events. The federal Constitution prohibits a state religion, but the federal government provides funds for a range of religious activities such as pilgrimages to Mecca for the Hajj and to Jerusalem for Easter.
The limits of this self-determination of the states, however, are deeply disputed across the federation. The most notable problem has been the case of Christian minorities residing in Muslim-majority states, which have argued that they face religious discrimination and persecution. The 12 state governments that have implemented the Sharia criminal code (in addition to the civil code that has been in force since 1979 in most Muslim-majority states) officially claim that most provisions of the code are not applied to Christians, who have recourse to the secular courts, but policies such as alcohol bans have universal effect.
Moreover, the Hisbah militias have enforced their interpretations of the Sharia on Christians as well as Muslims, and instances of Hisbah-led violence against Christians in the Sharia states have been reported. Overall, however, rights abuses by the Hisbah appear to have declined since 2003. Muslims living in Christian-majority states have also been targeted for reprisal killings after minor disputes have ignited inter-communal clashes elsewhere in the federation.
Civic associations are generally allowed to form and function freely, and by and large most Nigerians belong to several such groups, including community associations, religious organisations, and a range of trade and professional associations. The government heavily regulates trade unions, but union leaders have been at the forefront of opposition to a number of Obasanjo administration policies, most notably fuel price hikes. In response to union activism, the Obasanjo administration pushed the National Assembly to introduce legislation in 2005, to break up the umbrella union of all Nigerian trade unions - the Nigeria Labour Congress - but the Assembly has yet to pass it.
Union and other public demonstrations are generally allowed, but the government has prohibited or blocked them on occasion. Several unionists and opposition figures had been arrested at these protests, including Nobel laureate and opposition leader Wole Soyinka briefly in May 2004. Security forces fired on peaceful protesters on several occasions over the period of this report, as noted in the case of women's movements in the Niger Delta, or in the case of ethnic-interest rallies in the Igbo, Yoruba, or other regions.
Most worrisome, however, was the government's de facto admission in 2005 that the machinery for the notorious death squads active under General Sani Abacha in the 1990s had apparently not been dismantled, and that hitmen from these squads - some awaiting trial - had been returned to duty at the Directorate of Military Intelligence and other state security services.
Recommendations
The federal government should undertake a sweeping reform of the police, the security services, and the prison system; torture in particular should not be tolerated, while perpetrators of torture should be investigated and punished.
The federal government should investigate the persistence of Abacha-era death squad machinery in the security services, dismantle any that are discovered, and dismiss officers who are known to have taken part in these units.
Federal and state governments should undertake comprehensive efforts to disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate militias across the country, focusing on those in the Niger Delta in particular, while dismantling the oil-bunkering networks and prosecuting the political kingpins who benefit from them.
The government should respect the rights of Nigerian unionists to organise, peacefully protest, and strike, and should refrain from dismantling the Nigeria Labour Congress.
Implementation of constitutional and legal provisions must be improved, especially regarding women's rights.
Rule of Law
NIGERIA'S judiciary continues to be vulnerable to compromise through bribery and political influence. Starved of funds and intimidated by the executive for decades, many judges have lost their independence. The national body charged with administering to the judiciary - the National Judicial Council (NJC) - has made some efforts to crack down on these practices, and the Nigerian Bar Association continues to be an important critic of and advocate for judicial development.
The appointment and promotion processes in particular have seen some improvement through NJC action, and several judges had been dismissed for impropriety. Notably, the NJC suspended the two judges who gave initial legal backing to the Anambra coup, in which a political godfather paid an assistant inspector general of the police to arrest the Anambra governor in an effort to force him to resign.
Yet, the Anambra fiasco underscores the fact that only the most high-profile and brazen breaches of the rule of law typically get remedial attention, while the bulk of the system remains deeply susceptible to compromise. Moreover, both the federal and state executives have shown an increasing selectivity in enforcing court judgments over the past two years, as well as a willingness to overstep their constitutional authority.
The President set the tone in this regard when in May 2004 he declared a state of emergency in Plateau State and suspended the governor, deputy governor, and state Assembly for six months, placing the state under a military-style sole administrator in the interim. The National Assembly quickly moved to authorise the President's declaration after the fact, but the Nigerian Bar Association argued that these dismissals far exceeded the President's constitutional emergency powers and that the Attorney General admitted that they had been made under a defunct 1961 law.
The Supreme Court remains the most trusted judicial body in the federation, after several landmark rulings in the early part of the decade. Because of this trust, however, it has been overburdened with a crush of appeals cases. Thus, the court ruled on the suit brought by the losing candidate for the 2003 presidential election only in July 2005, although part of this delay was attributed to the election tribunals themselves. Supreme Court analysts have also been waiting to see if the four new justices appointed to the court in mid-2005 by President Obasanjo will continue in the path-breaking role of their predecessors.
Under Nigerian law, citizens are presumed innocent until proven guilty, although some Nigerian interpretations of the Sharia criminal code place differential burdens of proof on men and women in certain circumstances. Once an accused person has entered the system, he or she is rarely afforded legal representation. A number of human rights organisations across the country try to offer legal assistance, but they are capable of reaching only a small percentage of the total number of cases in the country. Moreover, persons can remain in detention for more than a decade before coming to trial (see "Civil Liberties").
Presidential control of the military and internal security forces has remained fairly constant over the past several years, but legislative oversight and civilian defence capacity have grown slowly. In the field, the security services remain unpredictable, using deadly force unnecessarily on occasion and harassing the public by demanding bribes at security checkpoints. In a particularly egregious incident of indiscipline, army and police officers have even leveled their guns at each other over an interpersonal dispute, turning a Lagos neighborhood into war zone for two days in October 2005.
The Nigerian Constitution clearly states that all Nigerians have the right to own property. An important exception is property that sits upon mineral, oil, or gas deposits, which is owned by the federal government. Moreover, the 1978 Land Use Act effectively placed all land under state control, creating a difficult network of government licensing astride traditional communal approaches to land tenure, which together remain in practice across the federation. This arrangement allows the federal and state governments to revoke property rights with relative ease and without engaging in a deliberative legal process. This has been most evident in disputes over control of oil-producing lands, but housing contracts awarded under military regimes or other instances had also been arbitrarily revoked without judicial decisions.
Recommendations
The President and the National Assembly should work with the National Judicial Council and the Supreme Court to undertake a sweeping reform of the Nigerian judicial system. Particular attention should be paid to giving the judiciary direct access to its portion of the budget, with a minimum guaranteed percentage, and control over all logistics necessary for its proper functioning.
All Nigerians should have access to free legal counsel in the secular, Sharia and customary courts when they have been accused of criminal offences. The government should sponsor an extensive public education programme, particularly in the rural areas, that alerts Nigerians to their fundamental rights.
The federal government should undertake a comprehensive review of land ownership in Nigeria and reform the system in a manner that better protects individual property rights and that protects poorer, traditional, and communal landowners.
Anti-corruption and Transparency
PRESIDENT Obasanjo has made anti-corruption a central priority for his administration. In 2000, he established the Independent and Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), which has sweeping powers to investigate and prosecute public corruption. The ICPC, however, has made only a handful of arrests of prominent individuals, primarily in connection with a bribery case involving several state high court justices.
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